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The purpose of this thesis is to articulate a theological metaethic which accepts the nature of 
ethics as understood under the rubric of evolutionary theory. It will be argued that such a 
theological methaethic can be interpreted as hopeful and optimistic given the apparent 
evolution of the moral from the amoral. The biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky suggested 
that ―nothing in biology makes sense except in light of evolution.‖
1
 But how wide a net is 
cast with this remark? Biology is the science of bios, meaning ‗life‘. Our social, 
psychological, religious, and moral experiences are unquestionably elements of our life; are 
they hence within the remit of biology? Of course human experience requires higher levels 
of study though sociology, psychology, etc., but that does not discount the potential insights 
biology may bring to our self-understanding. Evolutionary theory is not only an analysis of 
the differential selection of genes, recombinant DNA, mutations, adaptations, and so on, but 
also has legitimate anthropological import, which, as Joseph Ratzinger notes, challenges 
faith to ―understand itself more profoundly and thus help man to understand himself....‖
2
  
 The principles of evolutionary theory can be employed beyond the confines of 
biology to develop a Weltanschauung which carries significant weight for our understanding 
of ourselves, and pertinently, our moral imperatives. Evolutionary theory has shown that we 
are just one strand in a complex web of millions of other evolutionary lineages; as the 
philosopher Mary Midgley‘s asserts in her oft-quoted remark, ―We are not just rather like 
                                                          
1 Theodosius Dobzhansky, ‗Nothing in Biology Makes Sense Except in Light of Evolution‘, American Biology 
Teacher, 35.3 (1973) p. 125 
2 Joseph Ratzinger, quoted by Christoph Schonborn, Creation and Evolution: A Conference with Pope Benedict 
XVI, Stephan Otto Horn and Siegfried Wiedenhofer eds., trans. Michael J. Miller, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
2008) p. 16. Here I refer to ‗Joseph Ratzinger‘ as this quotation was taken from a period before he became Pope 
Bededict XVI. I use his papal title when quoting his work subsequent to him becoming pope.  
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animals; we are animals.‖
3
 If theology were to ignore these insights, it would be, as Benedict 
XVI suggests, ―confined to a ghetto and thus lose its significance for the whole of reality 
and of human existence.‖
4
 What is thus required from a theological perspective is perennial 
revision and hermeneutical appropriation of whatever is well-founded in other disciplines or 
contexts; a theology that can be characterised by the decree of the reformation semper 
reformanda (always to be reformed).
5
 
 The relationship between theology and evolutionary theory is presented here not as 
dichotomic but as dialectic – this is not to suggest that the two fields are mutually 
communicative, but rather that both can contribute to a cohesive, overarching worldview. In 
this respect, this thesis threads together the theological presupposition of a God of values 
with the naturalistic and material presuppositions of the modern scientific worldview (being 
cognizant of the fact that science may not necessarily be presented with these 
presuppositions). This dialectic occurs between two different but intertwined levels. One is 
the level of ethical systems; in this work, a particular understanding of Western Christian 
ethics. This level is framed by another, broader level of metaethics; in this thesis, an 
overarching understanding of the character of ethics will emerge from reflections on 
evolutionary theory and its naturalistic context. This will be a naturalistic view, though one 
which is understood to fit within a theological framework. 
 Amidst the abundance of literature on the interplay between theology and 
evolutionary theory, one encounters many issues such as theodicy, teleology, and our 
understanding of the significance of human life in light of our relationship with animals. 
Whilst aspects of these themes will require some attention, what is of specific interest within 
                                                          
3 Mary Midgley, Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature, (London: Routledge, 2002) p. xxvii [Originally 
published 1979] 
4 Benedict XVI, in Creation and Evolution: A Conference with Pope Benedict XVI, p. 161 
5 I have argued elsewhere that theology not only needs to dialogue with evolutionary science but more specifically, 
engage with representations of evolution that are presented as inherently inimical to theological worldviews, Gary 
Keogh, Reading Richard Dawkins: A Theological Dialogue with New Atheism, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014) 
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the broad context of ‗theology and evolution‘ is a reshaping of theological metaethics which 
is fully appreciative of the insights made available through evolutionary ethics and the wider 
picture of science in general. This is not to interpret evolution theistically, nor to seek 
credence for theological propositions, but rather to take evolutionary ethics in toto and 
incorporate it into a worldview which will re-evaluate the viability of particular theological 
themes and reconstruct an overarching theological metaethic. It will be argued that this 
theological metaethic can scaffold a particular understanding of Christian ethics as an ethical 
system, providing a more holistic and enriched vision which ultimately illustrates, to use 
Charles Darwin‘s phrase, the grandeur of this (evolutionary) view of life.
6
 
 In the task of reshaping a theological metaethic, it is important that the 
‗conventional‘ theological framework for understanding good and evil be acknowledged, as 
this work does not come ex nihilo. Indeed much of the history of at least Western Christian 
theology can be characterised by a predominant metaethical understanding which has an 
identifiable asymmetrical quality; a presupposed good and a conspicuous evil (in that evil 
demanded explanation in a world created good). This context will be the subject of Chapter 
One. The asymmetrical approach of a presupposed good and conspicuous evil is perhaps 
most evident in the Augustinian exegesis of Genesis which led to the influential doctrines of 
the fall and original sin; ideas which subsequently pervaded much of theology and 
philosophy. An expiatory (atoning) theodicy prevailed, where divinely instituted goodness 
was spoilt by human transgression, illustrating the corrupt nature of humanity (being 
mindful that interpretations on whether humanity is ‗corrupt‘ have varied among Christian 
demoninations). In this view, evil existed as result of humanity‘s sin; this will be understood 
as the ‗classical‘ or ‗traditional‘ theological metaethic. It will also be demonstrated in this 
chapter how the principles of evolutionary theory intersect with certain key features of this 
                                                          
6
 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, (London: Wordsworth Classics, 1998) p. 369 [Originally published 1859] 
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influential metaethic challenging significantly its asymmetrical character and consequently, 
the whole framework for understanding good and evil. This intersection between 
evolutionary theory and the traditional theological vision of good and evil provides the 
conceptual landscape within which this thesis rests; it highlights the need for a revised 
metaethic in light of evolutionary theory. 
 The second chapter will then turn to how the nature of ethics is envisaged from the 
perspective of evolutionary theory; how the principles of competition and struggle in natural 
selection can be reconciled with the apparent altruism and morality existent in humans and 
other species. It will also be considered how this understanding of ethics can be compatible 
with a particular understanding of Christian ethics. In this chapter, what is understood by 
‗Christian ethics‘ will be explicated; Christian ethics in this context is characterised by three 
key features; moral freedom, agape and neighbourly love, and natural law. Potential 
conflicts between Christian ethics and evolutionary ethics will then be addressed apropos 
these three themes. Although the classical expiatory framework for understanding good and 
evil will be shown to be inconsistent with evolutionary theory in Chapter One, it will be 
argued in Chapter two that perceived conflicts between Christian ethics and evolutionary 
ethics can be overcome upon a deeper analysis of evolutionary ethics. Consequently, this 
chapter will assert that Christian ethics is compatible with evolutionary ethics, and therefore, 
the task set in this thesis – to construct a theological/evolutionary metaethic which frames a 
Christian view of ethics – is possible. 
 In Chapter Three the task of redrafting a theological appreciation of good and evil 
will be attended to. After establishing that the traditional theological framework of a 
primordial good and conspicuous evil fails in light of evolutionary theory in Chapter One, 
and having further acknowledged evolutionary explanations of ethics in Chapter Two, this 
chapter will discuss a renewed approach with respect to a theological metaethic; a 
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paradisiacal past marred by human transgression is no longer tenable. Although such a 
renewed approach is evident within certain branches of theology, particular issues will be 
identified which require further reflection and refinement. Consequently, building upon and 
adding to others‘ work, a theological worldview will be proposed in this chapter which is 
appreciative of evolutionary ethics. 
 In outlining a shift in worldview, from the expiatory theodicy of Augustine to a 
more dynamic approach in line with evolutionary theory, the question of theodicy needs to 
be addressed; it was in a sense, the asymmetrical need to account for evil which framed the 
Augustinian explication of the fall. In moving away from the Augustinian framework, the 
question of evil is left unresolved. In Chapter Three, aspects of a response to the problem of 
evil will be suggested with respect to moral evil. Chapter Four will then give attention to the 
question of natural evil. In addition, given that evolutionary ethics, and the wider picture of 
modern science in general offers a seemingly self-sufficient, naturalistic ontological picture 
of the world, this naturalistic context must be considered. Chapter Four will thus argue that 
the world can be understood from the perspective of a naturalistic/material ontology. It will 
be outlined how a naturalistic ontology is consistent both with advances in modern science 
and theological considerations, significantly, the problem of natural evil. Furthermore, it will 
be explained how theological presuppositions can be consistent with a naturalistic ontology. 
Notwithstanding the weight attributed to a naturalistic ontology and its coherence with a 
theological view, it is acknowledged that a distinct caveat emerges when naturalism is 
interpreted theologically; namely, the connotations of inevitability which may be interpreted 
as nihilistic. 
 The fifth and final chapter of this thesis seeks to circumvent this caveat by 
illustrating how a naturalistic theological metaethic can provide a hopeful outlook. In order 
to do so, the issue of free will must be addressed; it will be argued throughout this thesis that 
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free will is a prerequisite of moral decisions, and thus without some form of free will 
morality becomes vacuous. Yet if mental events are material, as in the perspective of a 
naturalistic/material ontology, then the mental realm is governed by the same physical laws 
that govern the rest of non-conscious matter. In order to reconcile the concept of free will 
with a naturalistic/material ontology, this chapter will turn to a compatabilist conception of 
free will which recognises the reality of freedom but also the deterministic character of 
physicalism. It will then be proposed that the fact ethics evolved from what can be 
understood as a non-teleological, evitable and material world offers a glimmer of hope; the 
world need not be viewed nihilistically as meaningless collocations of atoms. The existence 
of goodness is seen here as indicative of profundity; a profundity interpreted theologically to 
be reflective of divine values. Moreover, it will be argued in this chapter that human 
morality is in a process of progression which can be understood from a Christian perspective 
as a progression towards an immanent telos; the concept of agape. This moral progression is 
considered as a further development in the natural evolution of altruistic behaviour as 
understood within the framework of evolutionary ethics. Consequently, a hopeful 
theological metaethic or axiology can be reconstructed to embrace the invaluable insights 





THE CONTEXT OF THEOLOGICAL METAETHICS:  
A PRESUPPOSED GOOD AND A CONSPICIOUS EVIL  
 
1.0 Introduction 
The question of how accommodative Christian theology can be of modern science is one 
which has spawned many responses, extensively diverse and wide-ranging. What will be 
dealt with here is a specific reading of a specific element of this much broader dialectic, 
namely, how a particular reading of evolutionary ethics can contribute to a theological 
understanding of ethics. Whilst these two disciplines may not wholly and transparently 
align, evolutionary ethics can have a dynamic impact on Christian theological ethics. This is 
not necessarily a thesis about particular ethical challenges which evolutionary theory begets, 
though these are important and fascinating issues and will play a supporting if peripheral 
role. What is of more immediate concern is a schema for understanding good and evil, one 
which is appreciative of our current scientific understandings of the world though developed 
through theological and philosophical thought. In conjunction with the theories and 
doctrines of modern science, it will be shown how evolutionary ethics can offer a glimmer 
of hope in what may be interpreted as a nihilistic world.  
 In order for us to make visible what lies ahead, both in this text and in general, we 
must recall what has gone on before. This chapter will thus engage with the context out of 
which the core statements of the thesis will emerge. It will explore the rich traditions of 
theology and its understanding of good and evil, which has traditionally (though not 
universally) been presented under the umbrella themes of original sin and the fall. Distinct 
aspects of this understanding will be highlighted which evolutionary ethics can have 
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implications for. This will allow situating evolutionary ethics within the broader scheme of 
theological appreciations of good and evil. Specific, identifiable, and recurrent themes 
within theological frameworks for understanding ethics will provide focus in this chapter. 
The predominant theme that will be identified throughout this discussion will be the 
asymmetry in theological and philosophical frameworks for understanding good and evil; 
there was a discernible preoccupation with the question of evil, whereas goodness was 
always presumed. It will be argued that this asymmetrical presupposition is something that 
is in particular need of revision in light of evolutionary theory. 
 Preparatory to engaging with the subject matter, some brief notes clarifying 
semantics will be provided to assert what is meant when various terms are used; good, hope, 
sin, evil, etc. This will help to avoid grammatical confusion over the use of related terms. 
Section 1.2 will demonstrate how the questions of the origins of kindness did not feature in 
theological or philosophical discourse because theology had generally provided a satisfying 
answer; goodness has its origins in God. Therefore, it can be asserted that historical 
understandings of ethics are marked by a theo-centric character. Section 1.3 will then 
explore the preoccupation with the origins of evil that pervades theological discourse and 
represents one of the most debated issues in intellectual history. The theo-centric character 
of ‗traditional‘ frameworks for understanding good and evil, and the debate on the origins of 
evil exemplify the asymmetrical understanding of a primordial goodness followed by 
sin/evil which begs explanation. The cyclical concepts of crime and punishment will be the 
focus of section 1.4 in relation to the prevalent expiatory understandings of sin, human 
nature and suffering. This will show how the notions of original sin and the fall became a 
predominant framework for what will be taken as the ‗traditional Western Christian‘ 
framework for understanding good and evil. This framework stems largely from Augustine, 
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and thus may also be referred to as ‗Augustinian‘ – though being mindful that as we shall 
see, Augustine was not its sole protagonist.  
 Section 1.5 will discuss the major influence these conceptions of good and evil 
have had in theology and philosophy. It will pinpoint where original sin has gained a marked 
foothold in philosophical thinking. The somewhat pessimistic vision of humanity as inclined 
towards evil can also be held to contrast with a more optimistic and hopeful reading of 
evolutionary ethics to be presented in later chapters. Similarly, the reigning imprint of the 
theme of punishment will be shown, but also critiqued in a somewhat Kantian manner, 
questioning whether the fear of punishment acts as a motive and thus negates the goodness 
of good actions. In preparation for a turn toward evolutionary theory then, section 1.6 will 
indicate where evolution presents problems for the more traditional understandings of good 
and evil. 
 
1.1 Preliminary Semantic Clarifications 
Although technically and grammatically different, certain terms will be used somewhat 
interchangeably throughout this dissertation. One cardinal assumption of this thesis is that 
the meaning of ‗hope‘ is closely related to particular terms which are in turn close synonyms 
of each other; good, altruistic, ethical, moral, and neighbourly love, for example. Whilst 
these terms are not interchangeable in every grammatical context, they will be understood 
here as related. Neighbourly love for instance, is a state, whilst ‗good‘ is an adjective which 
may be employed to describe actions consistent with neighbourly love. Hope is usually an 
expectant term; one can be hopeful about the consequences of their actions, in contrast to 
acting out of neighbourly love, which need not be as concerned with any particular outcome. 
However, in the context of the present study, hope is predominantly presented as a view in 
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opposition to nihilism. These terms (hope, good, moral, etc.) are neither inherently separate 
nor inherently synonymous, but understood as closely related in this context.  
 A central assumption of this dissertation is that ethics or goodness provides hope. 
Hope is related to these other terms in this way. Hope can be understood here, as an 
ephemeral philosophical subject that stands firmly in opposition to nihilism or futility. This 
will become more apparent as we progress. Conversely, antonymous terms are also 
considered to be related; nihilism, sin, selfishness, evil, immorality, and unethical, for 
example. These terms are again, not inherently interchangeable in every grammatical 
context. Sin usually pertains to actions, whilst immoral is a descriptive term (though original 
sin, as we will see, also pertains to a description of the human condition). Yet, for present 
purposes, these terms can be understood as related. Similarly, evil, pain, and suffering are 
somewhat interchangeable terms with the potential to lead to hopelessness or nihilism 
(though this could be disputed with reference to the resilience of humanity portrayed 
eloquently in the book of Job, or in other ways). Understanding the terminology in this 
manner will aid the forthcoming project by avoiding confusion in this regard. 
 
1.2 Theo-centric Context of Ethics 
The primary goal of evolutionary ethics is to provide a framework in which the existant 
degree of altruism, goodness, ethics, etc. can be understood as consistent with the principles 
of natural selection. In other words, it seeks to explain how goodness came to be. Despite 
the profoundness of this question, it is relatively recent in philosophical and moral discourse. 
This is because traditionally, an answer was already assumed; goodness came from God. 
The Australian philosopher Peter Singer explains this point, ―For centuries, religion 
provided a way out of this difficulty. It is natural for those who believe in God to look to his 
17 
 
wishes or commands for the origin of morality.‖
7
 God created the world and it was good 
(Gen. 1:10). This theme runs throughout the history of philosophy and ethics even beyond 
Judeo-Christian civilisations. Plato‘s Demiurge is a prominent example; although Platonism 
was indeed appropriated by Christian thinkers, for example Augustine
8
, Plato‘s supposition 
of a good God was explicated in a culture that in his own time was quite distinct from early 
Judeo-Christian civilisations, ―Let us therefore state the reason why the framer of this 
universe of change framed it at all. He was good... God therefore, wishing that all things 
should be good and so far as possible nothing be imperfect....‖
9
 Given its divine origin, 
goodness was expected and assumed. It was not a feature of the world that demanded 
explanation; the explanation was already supposed.  
 Correspondingly, the rules and laws which determine whether certain actions are 
classified as moral or immoral were also traditionally associated with a divine will, as 
philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre illustrates, ―God is our father. God commands us to obey 
him. We ought to obey God because he knows what is best for us.‖
10
 God established a 
divine mandate, a code for how we ought to live, rules we must abide by. MacIntyre goes 
on, however, to suggest that this vision of God-as-lawgiver immediately raises the question 
of why should we be obedient? He provides an answer which relates to the first point made 
in this section; that God is assumed good (and holy and powerful) and God‘s laws reflect 
this.
11
 The concept of a pre-existing normative, divine, natural or ecclesiastical set of laws 
permeated moral discourse for centuries, and has been defined as ‗classicism‘ by theologian 
Richard McBrien in his work Catholicism.
12
 The classicist view of ethics, which is arguably 
still prevalent, can be evidenced throughout history from the ten commandments of the 
                                                          
7 Peter Singer, The Expanding Circle: Ethics, Evolution and Moral Progress, (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1981) p. xv  
8 Scott MacDonald, ‗The Divine Nature‘, Eleonare Stump and Norman Kretzmann eds., The Cambridge 
Companion to Augustine,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) p. 72 
9 Plato, Timaeus and Critias, trans. Denis Lee, (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1979) p. 42 
10 Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, (London: Routledge, 2002) p. 107 [Originally published, 1967] 
11 Ibid., p. 108 
12 Richard McBrien, Catholicism: II, (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1980) p. 941 
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Decalogue through to the deontological categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant, 
characterised by the idea of universal laws; ―I am never to act otherwise than so that I could 
also will that my maxim should become a universal law.‖
13
 
 This classicist vision of ethics remained dominant throughout the centuries – 
though the rigidness or legalism varied among scholars. The ethical vision of Aquinas, for 
instance, was more amenable, appreciative not only of scriptural decrees but also of the 
powers of human reason, evident in his strong admiration of Aristotle.
14
 Aquinas also 
understood the variance in human nature with regard to moral beliefs; ―... 
these moral institutions are various for various people.‖
15
 Religious thinking dominated the 
ethical and intellectual landscape until the Enlightenment when many felt that faith was 
beginning its demise; Matthew Arnold wrote in ‗Dover Beach‘ [1867] how he heard the sea 
of faith‘s ―long withdrawing roar‖. 
 Secular ethics and even atheism are arguably evident even amongst the pre-
Socratics. Nevertheless, it was not really until the Enlightenment that such ideals became 
more prominent, though perhaps still peripheral. Oxford theologian Alister McGrath, for 
example, pinpoints the French Revolution in 1789 as the ―dawn of the golden age of atheism 
in the West.‖
16
 Secular ethical systems emerged from this tumultuous period, manifest for 
example, in the influential utilitarian philosophies of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 
Rather than obedience to divine law, Bentham and Mill sought to base morality and law on 
                                                          
13 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) p. 15 [Originally published 1785] 
14 Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy, (London: Routledge, 2010) pp. 418-424 [Originally published, 
1946] 
15 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: I-II, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2nd and rev. ed., 
(London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1920) 100.1 
16 Alister McGrath, The Twilight of Atheism: The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World, (London: 
Random House, 2004) p. 21 
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the principle of whether certain actions ―augment or diminish the happiness of the party 
whose interest is in question.‖
17
  
 Amongst the secular ethicists, the question of the origins of goodness was still 
hardly asked – and those that did probe this question, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, still 
proposed that a set of laws were devised by archaic societies.
18
 Friedrich Nietzsche 
recognised this in 1886 as he wrote, ―As strange as it may sound, the problem of morality 
itself has been missing from every ‗science of morals‘ so far: there was no suspicion that 
anything was really a problem.‖
19
 The classicist framework for ethics, thus, maintained its 
influence. In religious systems particularly, the concept of divine laws was paramount. What 
can be discerned, therefore, is the theo-centric character of the history of ethical philosophy. 
Intuition and theology usually provided an answer to the origins of good; goodness came 
from God. This is a foundational premise which framed philosophical and theological 
understandings of good and evil; ethics is contextualised by a good God, and a good 
creation. This is a marked characteristic of the traditional understanding of good and evil. 
The primary question of evolutionary ethics, therefore, did not exist in public consciousness 
in any meaningful way until relatively recently. The assumption of the innate goodness of 
God and creation led to the reverse question gaining a far more pronounced role in 





                                                          
17 Jeremy Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation, (New York: Prometheus Books, 1988) p. 2 
[Originally published 1780]; also, John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, (London: Dover, 2007) [Originally published 
1861]. There are, however, subtle differences between Bentham and Mill. For example, Mill distinguishes between 
higher and lower forms of happiness. For discussion, see Harvard political philosopher, Michael J. Sandel, Justice: 
What’s the Right Thing to Do?, (London: Penguin, 2009) p. 52  
18 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. H.J. Tozer, (Heretfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1998) p. 
15 [Originally published 1762]   
19 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Judith Norman, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002) p. 76 [Originally published 1886]  
20 David Hume, Dialogues and Natural History of Religion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 100 
[Originally published 1779] 
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1.3 The Theodicy Question 
Hume, of course, was not the first to address the infamous ‗problem of evil‘ which stems 
logically from postulating a good, omniscient and omnipotent creator whilst also 
acknowledging the degree of suffering existent in the world. The ancient Greeks, such as 
Chrysippus and Epicurus grappled with the issue centuries before Christ. Circa the second 
century A.D., Sextus Empiricus, classified as a Greek sceptic, elucidated the problem as 
follows:  
 
Those who affirm positively that God exists cannot avoid falling into an 
impiety. For if they say that God controls everything, they make Him the 
author of evil things; if on the other hand, they say that He controls some 
things only, or that He controls nothing, they are compelled to make God 




This paradox has been perennially recycled and used to underpin attempts at logically 
challenging the existence of God. The influential Swiss theologian Hans Küng identifies the 
problem of evil as ―the rock of atheism‖ and suggests that it has scarcely changed since the 
ancient Greeks.
22
  It continued to provide ammunition against theism for twentieth century 
atheist philosophers such as Bertrand Russell
23
 and J.L. Mackie
24
, and perhaps in part led 
Nietzsche to contemptuously discard the whole idea of Christianity as farcical.
25
 It is a 
theme which also perennially appears throughout literary history. The literary critic Terry 
Eagleton analyses the manifestations of problem of evil in literature from Milton‘s Paradise 
Lost to William Golding‘s Lord of the Flies.
26
  
 Gottfried Leibniz, who coined the term ‗theodicy‘, meaning a theological 
explanation for evil, sought along with others to resolve the problem rationally. Leibniz‘s 
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answer to the problem was the concept that this is ‗the best of all possible worlds‘, ―Now as 
there is an infinity of possible universes in the Ideas of God, but one of them can exist, there 
must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God which determines him to select one rather 
than another. And this reason is to be found… in the degree of perfection….‖
27
 Contrary to 
Leibniz‘s reasoned approach, Kant felt that the theodicy question can only be tackled in the 
context of faith and by ―taking notice of the impotence of our reason.‖
28
 Voltaire re-
articulated the problem in his ‗Poem on the Lisbon Disaster‘ [1755] and in his work 
Candide,
29
 whilst others such as Hegel attempted to justify God in light of the problem.
30
 A 
more contemporary approach is that of philosopher Alvin Plantinga who sought to outline 
how beliefs about God can be reconciled with suffering; evil can exist in a world created by 
a good God. At the risk of oversimplifying, he suggests that moral evil is the result of human 
persons‘ free actions, whilst natural evil is the result of the free actions of nonhuman 
persons, e.g. Satan (moral evil and natural evil will be further discussed in Chapters Three 
and Four respectively).
31
 Plantinga thus, is not so much offering a justification of evil in 
light of God‘s goodness, but rather demonstrating the logical coherence of God‘s goodness 
in a world where suffering exists. Pertinent in the context of this thesis, the problem of evil 
also perplexed Charles Darwin, as he wrote in a letter to the American botanist Asa Gray in 
1860: 
 
I cannot see, as plainly as others do, and as I should wish to do, evidence of 
design and beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much misery 
in the world. I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God 
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would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention 





 When considering the problem of evil, an immediate caveat surfaces; the innate 
subjectivity in our classifying certain events/subjects as ‗evil‘. Is it not a remarkable 
illustration of human hubris that we have taken it upon ourselves to classify what is and 
what is not evil? This was the objection put forth by Spinoza; notions such as disgust, 
repugnance, rottenness, ugliness, delight, etc., are only considered as such when certain 
events affect human senses.
33
 Whether or not something, an event or entity, is classified as 
‗evil‘ depends solely on its relation to the human mind. The theologian John Hick, in his 
work Evil and the God of Love, illustrates the point, ―... in terms of the usefulness of things 
to ourselves, there lies a deeply rooted delusion of the human mind that everything in nature 
obeys a purpose and works towards some end.‖
34
 It can be argued that ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ are 
not a priori concepts; they are not Platonic ideas but merely human inventions. As such, 
even the positing of the problem of evil may be misguided.  
 This objection to the theodicy question can be substantiated by referral to 
MacIntyre and the idea of ‗functional concepts‘. MacIntyre enters this discussion by 
questioning the relationship between the ‗is‘ and the ‗ought‘. Taking his cue from the 
philosopher Arthur Prior [1914-1969], MacIntyre explains how an ‗is‘ can determine an 
‗ought‘, ―From the premise ‗He is a sea-captain‘, the conclusion may be validly inferred that 
‗He ought to do   whatever a sea-captain ought to do‘.‖
35
 The validity of a statement 
attributing ‗goodness‘ to a subject can only be ascertained if that subject has been given 
what MacIntyre calls a ‗functional concept‘. A watch can be validly described as a good 
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watch if the watch is defined in terms of a purpose or function. A watch may be a good 
watch because it tells the time accurately; but it cannot be considered good independent of 
the function we have attributed to it. One could equally say, if they sought to use the watch 
as a paperweight for instance, that it was a good watch because it performs that function 
well, irrespective of whether it tells time accurately. Ostensibly, the notion of ‗good‘ only 
exists insofar as we define what good is. Similarly, if we take the idea of a super-virus that 
has the potential to eradicate human civilisation, we would generally consider that to be an 
example of evil in the world. However, it is only evil because we attribute evil to it. The 
virus may be exceptionally good in terms of its functionality; it replicates and infects host 
bodies efficiently and has developed immunity to antibiotics. Consequently, we are left with 
the perplexity of whether good even exists abstractly or is wholly and intrinsically bound up 
in our own definitions and prescribed functions. This perplexity was also attended to by 




 Just as questions can be raised over the existence of an objective good, so too 
questions can be raised over the existence of an objective evil. Augustine for example, 
discussed evil as an absence of good; a ‗privation of good‘ or privatio boni. Augustine 
―breathed in‖ and adapted Plotinus‘ notion that evil is not a positive force, but the ―going 
wrong of God‘s creation‖ which is fundamentally good.
37
 Augustine makes a metaphysical 
claim that evil is ―accurately describable as a loss or lack of goodness‖ rather than 
something primary; evil has not been created by God.
38
 Viewing evil as an absence of 
goodness further exemplifies the asymmetrical characteristic of the ‗traditional‘ theological 
framework for good and evil; goodness here is again, presupposed. What is required is an 
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understanding or explanation of evil – in this case, evil is not understood to have substance 
itself but is only a manifestation of the absence of something else – good.   
 Notwithstanding this caveat, it is still possible to contend that evil exists in the 
world, and therefore, still demands explanation in itself. Hick presents an argument along 
these lines in his shift away from Augustine and the neo-Platonist conception of evil as 
privatio boni. Hick believes that evil is a positive force; ‗positive‘ meaning in this context, 
being a substantive ‗something in itself‘ and not merely consequential. He asserts, ―As an 
element in human experience, evil is positive and powerful. Empirically, it is not merely the 
absence of something else but a reality with its own distinctive and terrifying quality and 
power.‖
39
 For Hick, the quality of natural evil (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, etc.) can be 
attributed when it ―impinges deleteriously upon the realm of the personal, or at least upon 
the sphere of animal life.‖
40
 The degree of suffering and pain caused by natural evils cannot 
be understated and dismissed merely as a lack of good, even if the causes were not evil in 
any a priori way; an earthquake or volcanic eruption are not evil things themselves. To 
discount the suffering and pain caused by these events would be deeply fallacious. 
 With regard to moral or intentional evil, the inadequacies of privatio boni become 
even more prevalent. When we consider the malevolence and intentional evil which is 
prevalent in human history and even today, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to attribute 
this evil to merely a lack of goodness. Taking the holocaust as the archetypal example, Hick 
states, ―The evil will as an experienced and experiencing reality is not negative. It can be a 
terrifyingly positive force in the world. Cruelty is not merely an extreme absence of 
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kindness, but is something with a demonic power of its own.‖
41
 In experiential terms (as 
opposed to metaphysical) the intentional actions of individuals which cause 
incomprehensible suffering can hardly be understood as a lack of good virtues. 
Nevertheless, we should be mindful here that it may not be an ‗either/or‘ situation, the 
privatio boni reading on one hand and Hick‘s acceptance of evil as a positive force on the 
other. We should, along with the theologian David Tracy, have an awareness of the 
necessity of ―responsible pluralism‖; there is a plurality in texts which demands 
hermeneutical interpretation.
42
 The debate on evil is a case in point, evident in the writing of 
psychologist Carl Jung. Hick cites Jung as a critic of the privatio boni conception of evil.
43
 
Yet Jung also discusses evil or sin as a result of failing to achieve our ambitious moral 
expectations.
44
 This aspect of Jung could be interpreted as consistent with the privatio boni 
approach, contrary to Hick‘s claim. Therefore, it can be asserted that in exploring this debate 
on evil, we may not arrive at a firm destination; we may need to leave this question open.  
 Although the nature of evil may not be clearly defined, the point remains that there 
is clear evidence of an asymmetrical preoccupation with explanations for evil throughout 
philosophical and theological history. Certainly before Darwin, and indeed afterward, 
goodness was assumed and ethicists largely concerned themselves with the so called 
problem of evil. As Nietzsche states, ―Morality itself... was thought to be a ‗given‘.‖
45
 In 
contributing to the aims of this chapter, then, we can affirm that the context of theological 
understandings of good and evil are characterised in a significant way by the prevalence of 
the theodicy question throughout intellectual history, from the ancient Greeks to 
contemporary philosophers. Highlighting this point will help contextualise evolutionary 
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ethics by demonstrating the contrast between traditional ethics and evolutionary ethics. The 
traditional framework for understanding good and evil will now be further explored, placing 
emphasis on the dominant themes of sin and punishment in the history of Western thought. 
 
1.4 Original Sin: Evil as Sin and Punishment 
The influential concepts of sin and punishment are also intrinsic to the traditional theological 
metaethic. The theology of sin and punishment provides an understanding of our vision of 
humanity and its relationship with evil. The predominant framework for understanding these 
issues has a scriptural source in Genesis, but is more specifically, derived from the 
Augustinian exegesis of Genesis. Any one model for understanding, as philosophers such as 
Paul Ricoeur would constantly remind us, is indeed just that; one model among others with 
multiple interpretations.
46
 However, the influence of Augustine‘s framework for 
understanding sin and punishment should not be underestimated. It was already stated in 
section 1.2 that a cardinal premise which pervades ethical thought is that creation was made 
‗good‘. Another dominant theme which contextualises theological ethics is that this 
paradisiacal creation was spoiled by what palaeontologist and philosopher Pierre Teilhard de 
Chardin calls an ―initial transgression‖ or primordial sin; humanity turned away from God at 
some ancient point thus introducing sin into the world – the fall.
47
  This idea of an original 
sin, dramatised through the Adamic myth, has become deeply entrenched in Western 
Christian thinking and foregrounds the dominant model for understanding good and evil. 
 Interestingly, however, the Adamic narrative does hold not much significance 
throughout either of the testaments. Adam is referred to throughout the Old Testament as a 
somewhat peripheral or incidental character, and the actual story of the fall holds little 
significance. Ricoeur makes this point by suggesting that the story of Adam should not be 
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isolated from the other stories in Genesis; Cain and Abel, the tower of Babel, Noah and the 
Great flood, etc.
48
 Similarly, according to the Gospels, Jesus never explicitly refers to 
Adam.
49
 Moreover, the doctrine of original sin is not evident in the writings of the Greek 
Church Fathers. Although Tertullian, Origen, Athanasius, Chrysostom, Cyril of Jerusalem, 
Gregory of Nazianzus and Gregory of Nyssa all wrote about the fall, they did not do so in 
such terms as an original sin or guilt which is inherited by humanity.
50
 Paul did, however, as 
Ricoeur states, raise the Adamic theme from its lethargy.
51
 Even so, Paul only used Adam as 
a figure with which to contrast Christ, ―For as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in 
Christ‖ (I Cor. 15:22). Therefore, it is only retroactively through Christ that Adam gained 
individuality in the scripture; it was retroactively then, that Adam became demythologised 
and understood as the person from which humanity descended physically.
52
 Ricoeur thus 
challenges the view that the story of Adam is a cornerstone of the Judeo-Christian tradition, 




 For Ricoeur, the story of Adam has the ―greatness of myth‖, indicating that it has a 
more multifaceted and richer meaning than a purely historical account of an event.
54
 Indeed, 
Augustine himself recognised this and was perturbed by the possibility of Genesis being 
interpreted and promulgated literally, ―Now it is quite disgraceful and disastrous... that they 
should ever hear Christians spouting... and talking such nonsense that they can scarcely 
contain their laughter....‖
55
 Ricoeur shares Augustine‘s angst, though has the benefit of being 
able to actually look at how the Adamic myth was interpreted from the time of Augustine 
until relatively recently, ―It will never be said enough just what evil has been done to 
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Christianity by the literal interpretation, the ―historicist‖ interpretation, of the Adamic myth. 
This interpretation has plunged Christianity into the profession of an absurd history....‖
56
 
Ricoeur opts for a hermeneutical vision which lies between the ―naive historicism of 
fundamentalism and the bloodless moralism of rationalism....‖
57
  
 The prevailing understanding of good and evil manifest in Augustine‘s reading of 
Genesis and his doctrine of original sin, is essentially a response to the conundrum of the 
problem of evil. Hick suggests that the concept of the fall is scaffolded by two pillars; one 
maintains the goodness of God and creation (as discussed in section 1.2) and one the guilty 
nature of creatures:  
 
The theodicy that follows from belief in the fall of angels, and its repetition on 
mankind, is built upon two central pillars of doctrine: first, that God created 
all things good; and second, that free creatures, by an inexplicably perverse 
misuse of their God-given freedom, fell from grace, and that from this fall 
have proceeded all other evils that we know.
58
   
 
The belief in a fall provides a solution to the question of evil‘s origin; it comes as a result of 
an intentional turning away from God‘s goodness. In answering the Gnostics‘ articulation of 
the question ‗Whence comes evil?‘, Augustine developed the apologetic concept that 
humanity‘s moral negligence was responsible; evil or suffering came as a result of our sin.
59
  
 The Adamic myth provides an explicit demarcation between the origin of evil, and 
the origin of creation itself. It thus provides a stark contrast between the inherent goodness 
of God‘s creation and the existence of evil. In the words of Ricoeur, it distinguishes between 
the ‗radical‘ origins of evil, and ‗primordial‘ origins of good.
60
 This understanding of 
creation can be sharply distinguished from the writings of the Gnostics, such as Theophilus 
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of Antioch, who drew upon the Platonic idea that the universe was made out of pre-existing 
matter – matter which in their view was deficient, thus accounting for evil in the world.
61
 
They emphasise the distinction between creator and created, and therein lies the difference 
between good (God) and evil (matter). In the Gnostic tradition, writers such as Origen 
therefore, view creation and the fall as almost synonymous.
62
 
 In contrast, the theologian John Macquarrie in his work, Principles of Christian 
Theology, considers the Gnostic view inadequate; the fact that creation itself is not God 
―does not seem in itself to constitute sinfulness.‖
63
 The Gnostics‘ stress on the otherness of 
God does not seem sufficient to account for the existence of evil. Moreover, the Gnostic 
vision of a deficient creation may well mitigate the goodness of God‘s creation. It is for this 
reason that it is ultimately rejected by Augustine, as Hick explains: 
 
Here, then, is a central theme of Augustine‘s thought; the whole creation is 
good; the sun, moon, stars are good... all are good expressing as they do the 
creative fecundity of perfect goodness and beauty. So Augustine rejects the 
ancient Platonic, Neo-Platonic, Gnostic, and Manichaean prejudice against 
matter....
64
   
 
The interpretation of the Adamic myth offered by Ricoeur, then, is far closer to the more 
conventional Augustinian understanding (and is arguably, more coherent); the universe was 
created good, and evil arrived later, as a result of a radical human offence; an original sin. 
This is another cardinal feature of a traditional conception of good and evil; there is a 
chronological and conceptual separation between a good creation and the origin of evil. This 
is again illustrative of the asymmetry in the traditional conceptual framework for 
understanding good and evil.  
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 Ultimately, the traditional reading of good and evil stemming largely from 
Augustine interprets the biblical narrative as a literary comedy as opposed to a tragedy. It 
has a positive beginning and end, with a negative middle. The literary critic Northrop Frye 
describes the standard structure of a comedy as approximately U-shaped, ―where a series of 
misfortunes and misunderstandings brings the action to a threateningly low point, after 
which some fortunate twist in the plot sends the conclusion up to a happy ending.‖
65
 The 
biblical narrative as interpreted by Augustine, Ricoeur and others, begins on a high plateaux; 
a good created paradise. Yet a series of misfortunes occur – humanity turning their back on 
God at several points, but most pertinent to the current discussion, Adam‘s succumbing to 
temptation. This leads to a long period of suffering as punishment. The structure of the 
narrative of course eventually takes an upward turn and reaches its culmination with our 
salvation by Christ, as Frye explains, ―The entire Bible, viewed as a ‗divine comedy,‘ is 
contained within a U-shaped story of this sort, one in which man, as explained, loses the tree 
and water of life at the beginning of Genesis and gets them back at the end of Revelation.‖
66
 
Of course, this is an approximate and overarching description of the biblical narrative, 
within which there are numerous stories of the triumphs and tragedies of Israel, and indeed 
further U-shaped narratives such as the Book of Job and Jesus‘ parable of the Prodigal 
Son.
67
 Understanding the biblical narrative with this U-shaped, comedic structure again 
illustrates that at the first apex of the narrative, goodness was presumed; the low period of 
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1.4.1 Sin and Human Nature 
Another feature of the Adamic myth which characterises traditional thinking on good and 
evil pertains to the nature of humanity itself. In any given tradition, the structure of ethics is 
bound to reflect important features of human nature, whatever those features are perceived 
to be in that given tradition. This premise holds true in the traditional Christian view of good 
and evil. It was already evidenced (section 1.3) that pre-Darwinian ethical frameworks 
maintained somewhat of a preoccupation with the question ‗whence comes evil?‘ The 
traditional Augustinian view provides a response to this question which relates to how we 
view human nature; evil came from humanity.
68
 At the risk of oversimplifying, Augustine 
postulates that evil arrived into the good creation as a result of human sin. This is 
allegorically portrayed through the Adamic myth; Adam, the story‘s central protagonist, 
represents humanity by way of his being a primordial ancestor of the human race. Ricoeur 
makes an interesting clarification on this point. He suggests that Adam is portrayed as 
sharing our condition.
69
 In other words, he denounces what he believes to be a popular 
interpretation of Adam; that he was in some senses, a special or supernatural human. 
Ricoeur is highly cautious about even using the term ‗fall‘ because for him, this implies that 
Adam was somehow elevated above the present human condition.
70
 Furthermore, he 
perceptively notes that the word ‗fall‘ is alien to the scriptural text. A vision of a primordial 
superhuman – which Ricoeur explains is evident in Plato, Plotinus and gnosis – may 
diminish or distort the weight of the anthropological message; the Adamic myth is strictly 
anthropological in Ricoeur‘s reading.
71
 
 The associations, both between Adam and humanity, and between humanity and 
evil/sin, are not however, to be understood as a proclamation of the fundamental evilness of 
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humanity. This interpretation has been, according to Richard McBrien, one of the most 
common misunderstandings of original sin.
72
 The prevailing Augustinian understanding of 
humanity is more nuanced than this, particularly as he incorporates an understanding of free 
will. Within the myth itself, freedom as a concept is only implicit, apparent in the original 
defection.
73
 Augustine incorporated the idea from Tertullian, who in turn was influenced in 
this regard by the Stoics.
74
 Humans, Augustine argued, have the freedom to make 
autonomous choices. Freedom is an important prerequisite for moral choices; it is necessary 
that for actions to have moral worth, actions must be freely chosen (being mindful that the 
concept of ‗freedom‘ is open to multiple interpretations – the theme of free will will be also 
be important for my central argument presented in later chapters).  
 For Augustine, there are limits to freedom, unlike Pelagius who proposed that 
humanity is completely free.
75
 Alister McGrath explains a useful analogy which Augustine 
used to illustrate his thinking on this matter: a set of scales with two balance pins, one 
representing good, one representing evil. The scales represent human judgement, and are 
loaded in favour of evil. The scales, or human free will, still works, but a strong bias exists 
towards evil. Original sin affects all humanity and is inherited from Adam; it has 
compromised the human mind.
76
 This weighting towards evil is understood by Augustine to 
be pride; Adam and Eve voluntarily succumbed to pride thus begetting sin.
77
  
 Discontent with their human nature, they needed more; they sought to be like God. 
The myth of Adam is then in part a myth of temptation, illustrating humanity‘s inclination 
towards evil.
78
 At this point, the peripheral characters such as the serpent and Eve play some 
role. Yet as Ricoeur again explains, they are counterpoles, not be taken as ―multiplication of 
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the centres of the proliferation of evil‖; they do not detract from Adam‘s centrality.
79
 There 
is no doubt that Adam is the key figure, the tragic hero. This idea lies at the centre of 
Augustine‘s dominant theodicy, ―that free will is the cause of our doing evil and that thy just 
judgement is the cause of our having to suffer from its consequences.‖
80
 As Augustine 
himself articulates, ―This covers the whole range of evil, i.e. sin and its penalty.‖
81
 This is a 
focus of the traditional understanding of good and evil, and human nature; humanity is 
inclined towards sin and responsible for evil. Every instance of pain and suffering can be 
accounted for by reference to humanity‘s dubious moral character. 
 
1.4.2 Suffering as Punishment 
Another related characteristic of the predominant Christian framework for understanding 
good and evil is the notion of punishment. Punishment is a prevalent theme throughout 
classical literature, an exemplar being Prometheus‘ rebellion and subsequent enslavement. It 
appears regularly throughout the Hebrew scripture, for example in the Egyptian plagues 
(Exod. 7:4), the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Deut. 29:23) and elsewhere. The 
Adamic myth however, portrays an elaborate and dramatic exposition of the law of 
retribution, which is conspicuous in how Augustine and Christianity came to understand 
good and evil. It is through retribution that suffering, the symptom of evil, becomes 
apparent. Indeed, it may be convincingly argued that evil is deprived of any meaning 
without its symptom; suffering. As discussed in section 1.3, evil, like good, may not have 
any intrinsic properties at all; a debated topic in moral philosophy.
82
 
 Drawing from the punishments of Adam and Eve, Augustine‘s theology develops a 
legalistic character; sin must be forbidden by divine directive – a characteristic of ethical 
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history explored in section 1.2. Interestingly, it has been suggested by theologian Nancey 
Murphy and scientist George Ellis that Augustine‘s context of living within an authoritarian 
ecclesiastical society may have influenced his thought in this regard.
83
 In any case, a 
cardinal feature of Augustine‘s understanding of good and evil is, as Ricoeur writes, that 
―suffering is the price for the violation of order.‖
84
 Having established that sin enters the 
world through Adam, it is logical that a punishment should follow. Ricoeur posits that 
nothing could be more rational; crime merits chastisement.
85
 Hick‘s views are concurrent in 
his reading of Augustine and the prospect of ‗moral balance‘. Sin is balanced out by 
punishment; sin is not allowed to ―mar the perfection of God‘s universe, because the balance 
of the moral order is preserved by the infliction of appropriate punishment.‖
86
 This issue is 
the bedrock of Augustine‘s theodicy, and hence the preeminent understanding of good and 
evil; suffering is the result of human sin, it is our punishment, ―The theodicy-tradition, 
which has descended from Augustine through Aquinas to the more tradition-governed 
Catholic theologians of today... teaches that all evil that indwells or afflicts mankind is, in 
Augustine‘s phrase, ‗either sin or punishment for sin‘.‖
87
 From this, Augustine ―constructed 
the idea of natural guilt inherited from the first man‖ to explain suffering within the scheme 
of crime and punishment.
88
 
 At this point it must be acknowledged that there are legitimate difficulties in the 
Augustinian understanding of good and evil. Both Hick and Ricoeur make reference to this. 
Hick asserts that Augustine‘s preoccupation with sin and punishment is in direct conflict 
with the Christian impulses underlying the theodicy question (presumably, those of the 
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 Hick sees some promise in Augustine‘s theodicy, in that it seeks to 
bring good out of evil by overruling the malicious deeds of the wicked through 
punishment.
90
 However, the overwhelming emphasis on the sinful nature of all mankind 
forces Hick to eventually search elsewhere for a solution to the theodicy problem.
91
 Anselm 
of Canterbury also expressed concerns regarding the sin-punishment framework for 
understanding evil. Anselm understood the need for punishment, yet he was cautious in how 
this should be expressed; he was clear to distinguish between punishment as a love of justice 
rather than as an unjust torment.
92
 
 Similarly, Ricoeur pre-empts a substantial challenge to this potent vision; why is 
the suffering-as-punishment inflicted upon humanity as a whole?
93
 Paul proclaimed that sin 
entered the world through one man (Rom. 5:12), though why must the sin and punishment 
necessarily damn all of humanity to a life of suffering? Original sin may also lie opposed to 
the theme of Job; the suffering of the just man, which for Hans Küng portrays human 
perseverance and suffering as a way to be with God, as opposed to a punishment for sin.
94
 
Moreover, there are further issues with Augustine‘s theodicy in light of evolutionary theory, 
which will be explored in section 1.6. Notwithstanding these considerable deficiencies, the 
expiatory vision most prominently asserted by Augustine has been, in Ricoeur‘s words, ―the 
most orthodox tradition of Christianity.‖
95
 As such, it goes some way in providing a 
backdrop against which an evolutionary understanding of ‗good‘ can be contextualised and 
contrasted. This powerful philosophy even transcended specifically Christian thinking, 
which gives further weight to this assertion.  
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1.5 The Legacy of Original Sin 
A primary theme of the doctrine of original sin as explored above is the imperfect nature of 
the human species. Augustine‘s view could be interpreted as insisting that humanity is 
fundamentally flawed, or at least that we are inclined to do wrong. Although stemming from 
a specifically religious origin, this concept has resurfaced in various forms throughout 
philosophies that do not intentionally have religious motives, or in cases, have decisively 
anti-religious motives. Rousseau is an interesting example, though not quite as definitive as 
Arthur Schopenhauer or Hegel, three thinkers to be considered here briefly for their thoughts 
regarding on original sin. 
 The original sin, Augustine argued, emerged through pride; Adam and Eve had a 
prideful want for more.
96
 There is a striking similarity between this concept of pride causing 
original sin, and Rousseau‘s idea of amour propre or exorbitant self-love. Berkeley 
philosopher Niko Kolondy explains amour propre as a concern to be equal or superior to 
others in basic worth or standing.
97
 A common reading of Rousseau interprets this self-love 
as the catalyst for humanity to be wicked.
98
 In this regard, however, Rousseau‘s philosophy 
is more nuanced. Amore propre in itself is not necessarily the cause of humanity‘s evil; it is 
only when humanity is placed within the context of civilisation that amore propre becomes 
inflamed and thus, results in wicked actions. It is the circumstances of society which ―makes 
amore propre inevitable.‖
99
 Later, Jean-Paul Sartre offered a comparable reflection on 
original sin; it arose only in relation to an ‗other‘, (though Sartre was more focused on 
‗guilt‘ as opposed to Rousseau‘s focus on pride or amore propre) ―Original sin is my 
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upsurge in a world where there are others.‖
100
 Humanity, for Rousseau (and Sartre), is 
naturally good – it is our relationships with each other that brings out our evil. 
 Here a disparity between Rousseau and original sin could be perceived. Indeed, 
Rousseau himself felt that he was diverging from original sin; he even uses the term in 
denouncing it, ―Let us lay it down as an incontrovertible rule that the first impulses of nature 
are always right; there is no original sin in the human heart, the how and why of the entrance 
of every vice can be traced.‖
101
 However, if one makes a genuine comparison between 
Rousseau‘s concept of inordinate self-love and the Adamic myth, parallels can still be 
drawn. Ricoeur recognises this, as he recalls how the Adamic tradition views humanity as 
created good, as a part of a good creation (explored in section 1.2). It was later that the 
prideful desire corrupted Adam, ―This is what Rousseau generally understood: man is 
‗naturally good‘, but we know him under the regime of civilisation – that is to say, of 
history, only as ‗depraved‘.‖
102
 In both Rousseau and in Genesis, we can see humanity 
created good, and then being inclined towards evil. There are, as noted, subtle differences 
between the two views such as Rousseau‘s emphasis on natural goodness over the 
Augustinian emphasis on natural sinfulness. Yet Bertrand Russell is perhaps audacious as he 
presents Rousseau‘s philosophy as the ―antithesis of the doctrine of original sin....‖
103
 
Hermeneutically, Russell‘s reading of Rousseau may be well-founded, particularly given 
Rousseau‘s own views cited above. It may also stem from inherent inconsistencies in 
Rousseau‘s own work, which have been noted by commentators.
104
 Russell‘s statement does 
seem overconfident however, in light of the fact both Rousseau‘s amour propre and original 
sin concur that humanity, at least in its present condition, is inclined toward wicked actions 
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as a result of our hubris. Thus, Rousseau‘s philosophy and view of sin still fits within the 
asymmetrical framework of primordial goodness, with evil as the phenomenon in need of 
explanation. 
 A less controversial instance of original sin‘s legacy can be found in the philosophy 
of Schopenhauer, who has been described as a pessimistic philosopher.
105
 Unlike Rousseau, 
he is explicit in acknowledging his Augustinian influence, and writes admiringly on original 
sin. For present purposes, it is worth noting that Schopenhauer agrees with the general 
sentiment of this chapter thus far; that original sin holds a privileged place within 
Christianity, and hence, within a Christian understanding of good and evil, ―Certainly, the 
doctrine of original sin (assertion of the will) and of salvation (denial of the will) is the great 
truth which constitutes the essence of Christianity....‖
106
 Drawing heavily from Augustine 
and the reformer Martin Luther, Schopenhauer argues that the human will has a natural and 
inescapable inclination towards evil.
107
 He even goes as far as to decry Pelagius‘ vision of 
humanity as freely morally balanced as ―vulgar‖.
108
 Likewise, Nietzsche, though highly 
critical of the dogma of original sin, maintains that morality itself is a tyranny against our 
nature and reason.
109
 This could be interpreted as viewing humanity as having a decisively 
anti-moral predisposition, congruent with Augustine‘s vision of a natural inclination toward 
evil. The theme of a natural inclination toward evil is thus substantially evident even beyond 
Christian theology. 
 Another Augustinian theme explored above which has influenced philosophy is the 
notion of punishment, explored in section 1.4.2. Hegel, for example, engages in a complex 
and nuanced analysis of the notion of punishment, and whether or not punishment should be 
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used as a deterrent. Hegel expresses scepticism towards punishment strictly for retribution 
sake, though he does believe in punishment.
110
 Hegel expresses concern about the motives 
for punishment, and particularly Feuerbach‘s view that punishment must follow crime if the 
criminal knew about the punishment.
111
 He expresses anxiety for if such a stringent causal 
approach to crime and punishment is adopted, then this may lead to indignation. He worries 
that this negates human freedom and dehumanises individuals.
112
 However, his philosophy 
of morality could be understood as being characterised in some respects by a ‗crime and 
punishment‘ model from this qualifying remark, ―The immediacy which is superseded in 
crime thus leads, through punishment... to affirmation, i.e. to morality.‖
113
 Despite his 
cautious approach, therefore, punishment is still a striking theme in Hegel‘s philosophy. 
 Richard McBrien asserts that whilst original sin has indeed been an influential 
doctrine, it has often been presented with pessimistic connotations. He feels that such 
pessimism is a profound misreading of the doctrine and cites Sartre‘s pessimistic 
existentialism as an example of such misunderstanding; that we are radically and thoroughly 
flawed and are helpless in this sinful condition.
114
 Schopenhauer can also be cited as an 
archetypal example of deriving pessimism from original sin, because as noted above he is 
explicit in his admiration of the idea. Schopenhauer views humanity as condemned to 
sinfulness; our works can never save us.
115
 Like Sisyphus, condemned for all eternity by 
Zeus to push a boulder up a hill in what Albert Camus described as a ―futile and hopeless 
labour‖, we are destined to be imperfect no matter how hard we try.
116
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 McBrien reiterates the point that original sin has little biblical basis, particularly in 
the Old Testament, and has been unfortunately misunderstood throughout history. 
Consequently, he downplays the idea of original sin and suggests that it no longer plays a 
major role in modern Catholic theology, and has even less of a role in Protestant theology.
117
 
However, notwithstanding McBrien‘s remarks on the curtailing of original sin in theology, 
several modern theologians have persisted in one form or another with the doctrine of 
original sin, albeit with the Augustinian emphasis on sinfulness understated. Within modern 
theology, salient examples of the legacy of the doctrine of original sin can still be evidenced. 
Although certain theologians have moved away from the idea (this will be made evident in 
Chapter Three, particularly in light of evolutionary theory), we can still see examples of 
some of its themes.  
 A recent discussion on modern attempts at persisting with original sin is provided 
by anthropologist Jonathan Chappell. In reviewing recent literature, such as theologian 
Raymund Schwager‘s Banished from Eden: Original Sin and Evolution, Chappel notes how 
certain scholars are keen to uphold the historicity of the fall because of its perceived 
importance in Catholicism.
118
 However, such attempts seem to be merely searching for 
scientific consistencies in embryology and other sciences to corroborate the notion of 
hereditary transmission of sin.
119
 Unfortunately, these approaches do not take into account 
the fact that Augustine‘s model of original sin preceded our understanding of genetic 
inheritance by over a millennium, before Gregor Mendel began to study nature‘s methods of 
genetic transmission in the nineteenth century. Nor do they enter into the ‗nature vs. nurture‘ 
debate; how much of our behavioural characteristics are biologically inherited and how 
powerful of a role does culture have? 
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 As such, any consistencies between scientific understandings of trait transmission 
and Augustine‘s work are incidental. As Karl Barth wrote, ―we miss the unprecedented and 
incomparable thing which the Genesis passages tell us of the coming into being and 
existence of Adam if we try to read and understand it as history, relating it either favourably 
or unfavourably to scientific palaeontology....‖
120
 Somewhat more viable positions on 
original sin are also defended by contemporary thinkers such as John Polkinghorne, who 
suggests that the primordial ‗turning away‘ from God is symbolic of the dawning of human 
consciousness.
121
 Similarly, R.J. Berry suggests that Adam could be taken not as a historical 
individual, but as the first ‗spiritual‘ human.
122
 Therefore, we can assert that the doctrine still 
has advocates today, albeit shaped differently to accommodate modern understandings of 
science. 
 Further instances of the lingering influence of Augustine‘s account of original sin 
are according to British scholar Oliver Bennett, evident in the writings of John Paul II. 
Quoting from John Paul II‘s Crossing the Threshold of Hope, Bennett suggests that the late 
Pope is ―unwilling to let go of the concept of divine justice that reserves the hope of 
eschatological reward... whilst meting out punishment to those seen to deserve it.‖
123
 Whilst 
John Paul II did indeed make statements to justify Bennett‘s assessment, it could be argued 
that it is an unfair classification. John Paul II does give due importance to the theological 
theme of justice, though he also gives forgiveness primacy and repeats that the two cannot 
be untwined – this may be seen to echo Anselm‘s distinction between punishment as a love 
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of justice and punishment as torment discussed in section 1.4.2.
124
 Nevertheless, the theme 
of justice is still evident in John Paul II, even if Bennett might be too strong in his realisation 
of this.  Understanding the context of good and evil through this expiatory or crime-
punishment model, however, presents significant theological problems, despite its 
prevalence throughout history. Understanding the context of morality in terms of 
punishment could negate moral actions, if those actions are only being carried out because 
of the fear of punishment. This is the perspective of morality offered by Kant, who views the 
motives of actions as the criteria of demarcation between moral and immoral, ―What counts 
is not actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of actions which one does not 
see.‖
125
 This is the great flaw in Pascal‘s wager, which states that one should believe in God 
if only because the consequences of disbelief are so great in comparison with the relatively 
little effort one must exert by believing.
126
 Do these disingenuous motives not diminish the 
perceived ‗goodness‘ of the actions? Kant would argue yes, that actions do not have moral 
worth if they are precipitated by disingenuous motives, though others of course may not 
agree. Hick makes similar remarks, as he suggests that good actions that arise out of free and 
responsible decisions are more valuable than good deeds done merely out of necessity.
127
  
 There arises then an interesting contrast between moral actions out of self-interest 
and moral actions out of a genuine desire to be good. Such a distinction is explored at length 
in Swedish theologian Anders Nygren‘s significant work Agape and Eros published in the 
1930s. Nygren uses the Greek distinctions between two kinds of love (Agape and Eros) to 
demonstrate how one (eros) describes loving actions emerging from ultimately self-
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gratifying motives, whilst the other (agape) is a genuine, selfless love.
128
 Nygren identifies 
agape as the only true source of Christian love, and thus, in a somewhat Kantian manner, the 
source of true morality. Pertaining to the topic under discussion at present, acting out of fear 
of punishment could be equated to Nygren‘s understanding of eros.
129
 The Kantian outlook 
of sharply distinguishing motives from actions is an intriguing and oft debated issue, which 
is a significant aspect of the context of understanding good and evil. Furthermore, this point 
becomes even more conspicuous in the field of evolutionary ethics, which will be engaged 
with in more detail in the next chapter. Therefore, it is an interesting aspect of the traditional 
theological understandings of good and evil. 
 Although the influence of original sin still lingers in some areas, what is common 
in more modern theology is to shift the emphasis away from the ‗sinful‘ nature of 
humankind, and toward the salvific event of Christ. The emphasis on Christ‘s saving actions 
rather than the sinfulness of Adam characterises and differentiates the major theologians of 
the twentieth century, such as Karl Barth, Karl Rahner and Jürgen Moltman. Rahner 
explains the premise as follows, ―It may be assumed that sin was only permitted by God 
within the domain of his unconditional and stronger salvific will, from which beginning was 
directed towards God‘s self-communication in Christ.‖
130
 Ricoeur also emerges as a 
proponent of this school of thought with his statement, ―We never have the right to speculate 
on either the evil that we inaugurate, or on the evil that we find, without reference to the 
history of salvation.‖
131
 Such a shift in emphasis will be explored in more detail in Chapter 
Three, though ultimately, I will argue for a more immanent and present conception of hope 
                                                          
128 Philip Watson, ‗Translator‘s Preface‘, Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip Watson, (Philidelphia: 
Westminster, 1953) p. vii [Originally published 1932] 
129 Benedict XVI in his encyclical Deus Caritas Est, suggests that such debate has drawn too sharp a distinction 
between the two forms of love and much confusion has been caused as a result of translations. He argues that these 
kinds of love cannot be separated and are all elements of Christian love. Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, (Rome: 
2005) http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/encyclicals/documents/hf_ben-xvi_enc_20051225_deus-
caritas-est_en.html 19th Sept. 2013 
130 Quoted by Richard McBrien, Catholicism: I, p. 165 
131 Paul Ricoeur, ‗―Original Sin‖: A Study in Meaning‘, p. 286  
44 
 
than theological views which emphasise an ultimate salvation. Also, it is noticeable that a 
refocused emphasis on salvation still adheres to the U-profiled comedic structure of the 
Augustinian reading of the biblical narrative mentioned in section 1.4; a presupposed 
goodness tainted by humanity‘s turning away, even if to be eventually restored. 
 
1.6 Problems with Original Sin as a Theodicy in Light of Darwin  
Heretofore, this chapter has explored the context of the predominant model for 
understanding good and evil, as expressed largely through the Augustinian theodicy 
tradition. Particular features of this influential outlook were presented in order to provide a 
backdrop for this thesis with its focus on evolutionary ethics. Whilst carefully 
acknowledging that the framework for understanding good and evil presented in the writings 
of Augustine and more modern commentators (Hick, Ricoeur, etc.) is just one model among 
many, it was evidenced just how pervasive this understanding is by mentioning many 
important philosophers and theologians who have adopted various aspects of it. In light of 
Darwin‘s theory of evolution by natural selection, however, this model for understanding 
good and evil becomes highly problematic. Reasons for this will now be briefly discussed, 
which indicate the need for a deeper engagement with relevant aspects of current 
evolutionary theory. The issues outlined below essentially demonstrate why a new 
perspective on understanding good and evil is required in light of evolution. Attempts at 
which will be elaborated on in more detail in later chapters. 
 
1.6.1 Issues with the Asymmetry of A Primordial Good and Conspicuous Evil 
Perhaps the most salient issue that evolutionary theory presents to the traditional 
understanding of good and evil is the abolition of the notion of a primordial good, thus 
posing a strong challenge to the dominant asymmetrical view of a presupposed good and a 
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requirement to explain evil. Evolutionary theory forced us to fundamentally alter our view 
of time-scales and the proportion of biological history that humans have inhabited; we were 
not specially created amongst other creatures but only arrived on the evolutionary scene in 
comparatively immediate history. The American philosopher Daniel C. Dennett often 
quotes, in writing and lectures, Robert Beverly MacKenzie, an early critic of Darwin: 
 
In the theory with which we have to deal, Absolute Ignorance is the artificer; 
so that we may enunciate as the fundamental principle of the whole system, 
that, in order to make a perfect and beautiful machine, it is not requisite to 
know how to make it. This proposition will be found, on careful examination, 
to express, in condensed form, the essential purport of the Theory, and express 
in a few words all Mr. Darwin‘s meaning; who by a strange inversion of 
reasoning, seems to think Absolute Ignorance fully qualified to take the place 




Dennett draws attention to Darwin‘s ―strange inversion of reasoning‖; the fact that apparent 
design need not in an evolutionary view, be designed. Darwin‘s theory of evolution, then, 
could be argued to represent a decisive shift in how we view the world, as opposed to being 
a purely scientific theory. Viewing biological life, and indeed the world, as an evolving 
process is a significant shift in attitude from either the traditional image of a static creation, 
or the resignation to ignorance. A prolonged and transformational process is a substantially 
different worldview, one which is deeply enigmatic but also simultaneously logical – the 
strong survive and propagate. Evolution changes our simplistic appreciation of causality by 
allowing randomness to precede order; it becomes more dynamic than the assumption that 
design necessarily implies a designer. As such, evolution possesses substantial philosophical 
and theological import – such themes will be explored in greater depth in later chapters. 
                                                          




Dennett, among many others, has therefore enthusiastically defended the philosophical 
significance of evolutionary theory.
133
 
 There are however, those who insist that scientific theories such as evolution 
should be confined to science and not be incorporated into other areas such as theology and 
religion. Perhaps the most renowned proponent of such as view was Stephen Jay Gould, 
who developed the methodological approach known as ‗NOMA‘ or non-overlapping 
magisteria. Gould was particularly concerned with the fields of science and religion, and 
suggested the delineation of certain topics into each of these fields.
134
 However, as I will 
demonstrate throughout this thesis, evolutionary theory does in fact have profound 
implications for the fields of theology, religion, philosophy, and particularly ethics, a subset 
of these fields. Moreover, Gould‘s advocacy of his NOMA approach is in itself wrought 
with inconsistencies. For example, he acknowledges that evolution presents an authoritative 
challenge to the prospect of a soul infused in humans indicating our superiority over other 
animals. Yet he maintains in vain that evolution does not infringe on this religious belief.
135
 
Gould‘s thesis may hold true in certain instances; for example, the atomic weight of nitrogen 
may bear no impact on theological ideas, but presenting it as a universal approach is deeply 
inadequate. A far more robust position is defended by MacIntyre, who realises that 
traditional academic disciplinary boundaries which compartmentalise thought, distorts and 
obscures key principles of those disciplines.
136
 
 With regard to envisioning original sin in light of evolutionary theory, Nancey 
Murphy and George Ellis, in their study On the Moral Nature of the Universe, demonstrate 
difficulties that evolutionary theory presents for the traditional Augustinian theodicy with its 
presuppositions of primordial goodness. They correctly note that because humans are 
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essentially an infantile species within the grand scheme of evolution, tens of millions of 
years of animal suffering preceded our existence; there is no sign of a primordial goodness. 
However, theologians such as Christopher Southgate are cautious in this regard. He worries 
about over-sentimentalising animal experience in what he terms ―bambi theology.‖
137
 
Although he does not wish to minimise the extent of animal suffering, he acknowledges the 
essential role of animal suffering in evolution; for example, the suffering of a deer at the 
hands of predators or disease may ultimately benefit the group of deer given that they will 
not grow too numerous for their resources and perhaps all starve.
138
 The evolved pseudo-
immunity to certain diseases also emerges from the suffering of many from the disease. 
However, what is at issue here pertains more to the fact that human suffering is essentially 
animal suffering; we are animals. Although as Southgate rightly points out, positives often 
emerge from suffering, such suffering still precedes us, and thus the image of a primordial 
good seems inappropriate.   
 Consequently, Augustine‘s postulation that human sin is the direct cause of 
suffering and evil in the world is incoherent with our current knowledge of life‘s origins.
139
 
The theologian Holmes Rolston III offers a concurrent perspective, ―Suffering in a harsh 
world did not enter chronologically after sin and on account of it. There was a struggle for 
long epochs before the human arrival....‖
140
 Indeed, as it will be argued in later chapters, 
goodness is extremely recent in evolutionary history and thus, the traditional notion of 
primordial goodness seems untenable. For this reason and others, Murphy and Ellis become 
highly critical of the Augustinian model of original sin. They acknowledge how the 
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Augustinian sequential view of a paradise lost by human transgression becomes deeply 




 Although Murphy and Ellis are correct in highlighting the disparity between 
Augustine‘s original sin and the knowledge of our origins acquired from the study of 
evolution, it could be argued that they are too strident in their denunciation of his work. It is 
no intellectual victory to outthink a scholar who is separated from the knowledge one has by 
a millennium and a half. Augustine should not be too harshly criticised for his mistakes with 
regard to his ignorance of the pre-human world because he simply did not have the same 
information available to him that we do (though there are of course other reasons for 
rejecting his view, as Hick explores).
142
 Augustine himself should be commended for at least 
recognising the allegorical nature of the creation narrative as expressed in Genesis, as he 
equates the figurative days to ages of creation.
143
 Even though Augustine was eventually 
subject to empirical refutation, he went some way in contributing to our understanding of 
human nature through his hermeneutical appreciation of Genesis. Yet, it still must be firmly 
asserted that evolutionary theory significantly erodes Augustine‘s theodicy because of his 
presuppositions of a primordial goodness gone awry, and his explanation of evil in terms of 
human sin.  
 
1.6.2 The Measure of Suffering 
A similar difficulty which evolution poses to the traditional understanding of good and evil 
pertains to the measure of suffering apparent in the natural world and its centrality in the 
creative process of natural selection. The creative process of evolution is incomprehensibly 
violent and competitive, exemplified in Darwin‘s Ichneumonidae and understood as ―red in 
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tooth and claw‖ – such principles are presuppositions of evolutionary ethics to be explored 
in the next chapter.
144
 Traditional theodicies, such as the pervasive Augustinian model, were 
not formulated with the understanding of just how vast the timescales of evolution are, and 
thus, how extensive the apparent suffering and wastage of the process is. This realisation, as 
Alister McGrath asserts, goes far beyond the concerns of traditional theodicy.
145
 He 
articulates that our understanding of Darwinian evolution greatly exacerbates the original 
problem of evil.
146
 The measure of suffering that has become apparent through our 
knowledge of evolution may thus be taken as another significant challenge to the traditional 
theo-centric framework for understanding good and evil; the asymmetry of a presupposed 
goodness seems to be at odds with the essential role of death, struggle and competition in 
evolutionary history. 
 At this point, one could raise an objection that echoes Spinoza‘s mentioned in 
section 1.3. Whilst we can appreciate that there is a great deal of suffering, one could ask, 
suffering for whom? It could be that the interpretation of natural selection as a process 
teeming with suffering is only understood as such through a particular hermeneutical lens. 
The emotive language we use in discussions on the matter – pain, suffering, red in tooth and 
claw, etc. – may be skewing perceptions. Gould makes this point as he suggests that 
understanding the natural world as exceptionally vicious and in need of metaphysical and 
theological defence may be just one hermeneutical understanding; a hermeneutic which has 
emerged from a context steeped in violence itself, ―measured in terms of battles won and 
enemies destroyed.‖
147
 A similar critique can be found with Rolston, as he offers an 
alternative to the more common ‗red in tooth and claw‘ perspective on evolution. He 
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suggests that the evolutionary struggle is best characterised as a sacrificial tragedy, 
exemplified in Christ‘s passion, though a tragedy from which beauty emerges: 
 
The secret of life is seen now to lie not so much in heredity molecules, or in 
natural selection and the survival of the fittest, or in life‘s informational, 
cybernetic learning. The secret of life is that it is a passion play. This is the 
labor of divinity, and it is misperceived if seen only as selfish genes or red in 
tooth and claw. The view here is not panglossian; it is a tragic view of life, but 
one in which tragedy is the shadow of prolific creativity. That is the case, and 
the biological sciences with their evolutionary history can be brought to 





In order for life to flourish, death must occur; this is a central principle of natural selection. 
Yet even if this alternative interpretation is adopted, it still presents a challenge to the 
Augustinian theodicy as it negates the need for suffering to be explained. If suffering is 
merely a hermeneutical understanding indicative of a cultural context, then this negates the 
need for a theodicy; Augustine‘s doctrine of original sin becomes redundant. In either case 
then, whether evolution is a raging battle royal or a creative tragedy, it erodes the dominant 
understanding of good and evil with its asymmetrical focus on an established good repealed 
because of human sin.   
 
1.6.3 Anthropocentrism  
The predominant conception of good and evil can also be characterised by its focus on 
humanity. In Augustine‘s view, through our initial sin, humanity is essentially the culprit 
behind suffering in the world; the paradisiacal creation went awry because of our actions. 
Other appreciations of good and evil also share this idiosyncrasy; the free will defence 
advocated by Alvin Plantinga, for instance, cites creatures‘ freedom to act good or evil as an 
explanation for evil. Plantinga even stresses that this free will defence can be extended to 
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incorporate natural evil, given the free will of Satan or demons – as discussed in section 
1.3.
149
 The ‗best of all possible worlds‘ theodicy of Leibniz is less explicitly vulnerable to 
this criticism, as is the more nuanced version of it promoted by Aquinas.
150
 However, when 
dealing with the question of whether this is or is not the best of all possible worlds, one 
could contentiously raise the question, ‗best for whom?‘ The grand narrative of evolution 
continually indicates that human beings are seemingly insignificant late-comers in the 
unfolding drama; we are an ephemeral thread sown into a boundless tapestry. Therefore, it 
becomes dubious to propose that this is the best of all possible worlds, if we are 
understanding it in terms of what is best for us; ‗best‘ is again characterised in purely human 
terms.  
 In this view, the entire problem of evil could be rendered unintelligible; pain and 
suffering and their requirement to be explained are only understood in humanity‘s seemingly 
insignificant sphere. Christopher Southgate writes on this matter, though he disagrees with 
the premise.
151
 He argues that there is a genuine need for a theodicy, and moreover, that 
previous understandings of good and evil, such as those explored in this chapter, have been 
too anthropocentric to be reconciled with evolutionary theory.
152
 He acknowledges that 
traditional theodicies are too anthropocentric, but he does not suggest that this important 
point makes the problem of evil obsolete. It could conversely be maintained, that some 
degree of anthropocentrism is warranted based on the fact that humans do exhibit certain 
characteristics which distinguish us from the rest of the animal kingdom. Such sentiment is 
apparent in theologians such as Rahner, who writes that it is ―through men above all that we 
must look at in order to learn what the Creator-creature relationship is.‖
153
 Our social and 
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cultural behaviour is far more intricate and advanced than any other living organism, a fact 
that even stalwart evolutionists like Richard Dawkins will acknowledge.
154
 Thus there 
emerges a necessary dialectic on this issue which could not be resolved here, but will be a 
perennial question posed by theology and science alike; are humans special? What can be 




To conclude, five distinct points pertaining to the traditional theological understanding of 
good and evil can be discerned. Firstly, as articulated in section 1.2, our conceptions of 
ethics have generally had a theo-centric character; goodness was always attributed to God. 
Divine laws stipulated what was considered right and wrong. Even pre-evolutionary secular 
ethics can be seen to be consistent with some form of overarching laws. Moreover, the theo-
centric appreciation of the origin of goodness was hardly challenged at all; the question of 
evolutionary ethics, where does goodness come from, was not asked. Secondly, it was 
explained in section 1.3 how the converse question became one of the most dominant 
perplexities in theological history; whence comes evil? Rather than searching to ascertain 
where goodness comes from, theology and philosophy had a general preoccupation with the 
origins of evil. Consequently, we see an overarching theological conception which 
maintained an asymmetry; a primordial goodness and a conspicuous evil. This vision led to 
a myriad of arguments pertaining to evil, from attempts to justify God (in the case of 
Leibniz, Hegel and others), to attempts to refute God‘s existence (in the case of Bertrand 
Russell and J.L Mackie). More significantly in this context, it gave rise to the most dominant 
                                                          
154 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 30th Anniversary ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) p. 189 
[Originally published 1976] 
53 
 
model that has been used to understand good and evil; the Augustinian framework of 
original sin and the fall.  
 The third and fourth discernable points were two elements of theological 
understandings of good and evil, explicated in section 1.4; the notions of a fallen human 
state or natural inclination towards evil and sin, and the focus on punishment. The belief that 
humanity is fundamentally flawed or destined to sin could be considered a pessimistic 
outlook. It may, as was asserted above, have arisen in part from the cultural context of 
Augustine which promoted obsequiousness to authoritarian ruling regimes, and was 
certainly influenced by his exegesis of Genesis. However, it was also discussed how 
attempts have been made in twentieth century theology particularly, to bring the theme of 
Christian salvation to the forefront and mitigate the more pessimistic motifs of original sin – 
yet, this still adheres to the U-profile of the biblical narrative and the asymmetry of a pre-
existent  goodness to be restored. The vision of suffering as a punishment for humanity‘s 
sinful nature could also be understood as pessimistic, as it leads one to understand moral 
actions as a result of fear rather than genuine motives. This point was discussed with relation 
to Kant‘s ideas on motives and Nygren‘s classifications of agape and eros. Loving actions 
done out of fear of punishment may be equated to eros; they are actions stemming from self-
interest, as opposed to genuine Christian love or agape. This distinction will become a 
significant theme in the next chapter which will engage with both Christian ethics and 
evolutionary ethics itself. The influence of these themes in philosophy and theology was 
then explored in section 1.5, to demonstrate how instrumental the traditional or Augustinian 
vision as understood here has been. 
 The fifth discernable point which concluded this chapter and established the 
background for this thesis was the inconsistencies between the traditional understandings of 
good and evil and evolutionary theory. Whilst there have been significant efforts made to 
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persist with some or all of the themes of original sin, it has been widely acknowledged (by 
theologians such as Alister McGrath, Christopher Southgate, Holmes Rolston and others) 
that evolutionary theory does indeed bring new dimensions to bear with regard to how we 
are to understand suffering in the natural world. Particularly important in this context is how 
evolutionary theory presents perhaps insurmountable difficulties for the vision of a paradise 
lost, which scaffolds the traditional understanding of good and evil. As such, it is necessary 
that theology engages more fully with a framework for understanding good and evil in terms 
of evolution. Consequently, this thesis will engage with such a framework and present a 
particular reading of evolutionary ethics which does not necessarily supersede previous 
thinking on Christian ethics, but provides a new dimension which is accommodative of 
current theory in science and theology. In achieving this task, the next chapter will examine 
the compatibility of Christian ethics and evolutionary ethics as I understand them, in 
contributing to a synthesis between theological and evolutionary approaches to provide an 









It was demonstrated in the previous chapter that the ‗traditional‘ theological framework for 
understanding good and evil, and hence, ethics, is challenged in a number of ways by 
evolutionary theory. This chapter will now make a turn towards a more specific comparison 
between Christian ethics and an evolutionary framework for understanding ethics. 
Ultimately, it will be argued here that Christian ethics and evolutionary ethics can co-exist. 
However, immediately a caveat surfaces, as a clear understanding of what both ‗Christian 
ethics‘ and ‗evolutionary ethics‘ entail in this context needs to be chosen and argued for. 
Wide-ranging and often conflicting ethical stances have been adopted by different churches 
which identify themselves as ‗Christian‘, for example just-war theories and pacifism, which 
seem to conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to articulate what I take to be ‗Christian ethics‘ in 
this context. In this regard, it is outlined in section 2.1 that in this thesis, Christian ethics has 
three distinct characteristics; moral freedom, agape and neighbourly love, and natural law. 
Of course it is not contested that these three characteristics are all-encompassing, 
exhaustively definitional attributes of Christian ethics in any context, nor are they exclusive 
to Christianity. Indeed a Christian ethicist may very well challenge either the importance or 
particular meaning I attribute to these tenets of Christian ethics. 
 Yet these characteristics, and a particular understanding of them, have been chosen 
to provide a functional definition of Christian ethics in order to address a comparison with 
evolutionary understandings of ethics. That being said, this threefold representation of 
Christian ethics is not arbitrary but drawn from important theological traditions: moral 
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freedom I take in part from theologians of the early Church such as Augustine and Pelagius, 
and in part from philosophy; agape and neighbourly love I take in part from reflections on 
the Gospels, and in part from liberation theologies; and natural law I take in part from 
Aquinas, and in part from subsequent reflections upon Aquinas. 
 Having established what is implied by ‗Christian ethics‘ then, in order to compare 
this with evolutionary ethics, a particular reading of what is understood by ‗evolutionary 
ethics‘ must also be outlined. This will be addressed in section 2.2. Evolutionary ethics will 
be understood as the attempt to explain from an evolutionary perspective the origin and 
nature of ethics/moral behaviour. This task has been an important element of the field 
known as sociobiology – though sociobiology is not solely concerned with morality but with 
all social behaviour, and not just with humans but with insects and other animals also. Of 
specific concern in this context is human morality, how it evolved, and whether or not such 
an evolutionary understanding of human morality conflicts with a Christian understanding of 
morality.  
 It must be acknowledged at this point that the field of sociobiology can be 
problematic. Sociobiology or evolutionary ethics as I understand it, assumes in the first 
instance that our genetics play an important role in our behaviour. Yet the question remains 
over exactly how influential our genetics can be. This is pointed out by philosopher Philip 
Kitcher, who acknowledges the uncontroversial claim that our behaviour is influenced 
somewhat by our genetics, though questions how proximate such causes are.
155
 He also 
questions the appropriateness of attempting to understand human behaviour directly in terms 
of evolutionary benefit, whether such explanations overlook the importance of social 
practice, and indeed what contribution such studies can make to a grand analysis of human 
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 Notwithstanding, as philosopher of biology Michael Ruse explains, 
although intensive investigation is still ongoing, ―the evidence is strong that the genes, as 
promoted by natural selection, do have a significant causal input into human social 
behaviour, and consequently, into culture.‖
157
  
 Further critiques of sociobiology have been posed by philosophers such as Bart 
Voorzanger who suggests that sociobiology can be highly speculative and prejudiced; 
sociobiology is influenced by socio-political motivations and merely presented in a scientific 
way.
158
 Sociobiology can be seen as emerging from a context or paradigm with socio-
political motivations thus limiting the neutrality of its conclusions – a critique reminiscent of 
Thomas Kuhn‘s depiction of science en masse.
159
 Whilst these cautionary critiques are 
acknowledged, I follow Ruse in asserting that sociobiology or indeed its parent Darwinian 
theory, is not always value-laden to the point where its core themes are not substantive; the 
fact that scientific or philosophical theories may be value-laden does not discount their 
legitimacy.
160
 Despite potential socio-political motivations, sociobiology can be considered 
to bring important insights into human nature and human morality. Evolutionary ethics as I 
understand it – that is, an understanding of ethics from an evolutionary perspective rather 
than ethical discourse informed by evolution – will therefore be outlined in section 2.2. 
 Attention will then be given to a comparison of the two systems – though such a 
comparison is not necessarily balanced. It is acknowledged that the overarching 
asymmetrical metaethic of a primordial good and conspicuous evil explored in the previous 
chapter must be reconsidered in light of evolutionary theory. Such a reconceived metaethic 
will be sketched in the following chapters, though presently, it will be considered how 
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evolutionary ethics may be perceived to conflict with the three tenets of my understanding 
of Christian ethics. Particular aspects of evolutionary ethics may be seen to impinge on 
human freedom, agape and neighbourly love, and natural law, and these perceived conflicts 
will be articulated in sections 2.3-2.5 respectively. However, I will argue that these conflicts 
only arise as a result of certain misunderstandings of evolutionary ethics; once issues such as 
the role of human consciousness and emergence are taken into account, then apparent 
contradictions between Christian ethics and evolutionary ethics can be understood to be 
erroneous. Once these conflicts have been overcome, it can then be stressed that the two 
systems can co-exist. Establishing the potential co-existence of these two systems is the goal 
of this chapter, which will make headway towards the central argument of this thesis; that 
evolutionary ethics can contribute to a theological or Christian worldview and provide hope 
in a seemingly nihilistic world. 
 
2.1 An Understanding of Christian Ethics 
In this chapter, it will be argued that evolutionary understandings of ethics are not inimical 
to Christian ethics. ‗Christian ethics‘, however, is an extremely broad term; it could even be 
argued that there is no single ‗Christian ethics‘. For example, various religious 
denominations which identify themselves as Christian not only approach particular moral 
issues differently, e.g. homosexuality, but also derive their ‗Christian ethics‘ from different 
sources, e.g. scripture, magisterium or various amalgamations of different sources. 
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, even within particular Christian traditions such as 
Catholicism, there often exists diverse approaches to moral issues such as homosexuality, 
celibacy, divorce, etc.
161
 Therefore, in order to demonstrate how evolutionary 
understandings of ethics are compatible with, or at least not intrinsically disagreeable to 
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Christian ethics, it needs to be clearly stated what is meant by ‗Christian ethics‘ in this 
current context. In approaching the question then, of the potential compatibility of 
evolutionary ethics and Christian ethics, three distinct aspects of Christian ethics will be 
considered; i) moral freedom, ii) agape and neighbourly love, and iii) natural law. Perceived 
conflicts between the two systems can be discerned with respect to these three aspects of 
Christian ethics – though ultimately, it is contested that these conflicts have weak 
foundations upon a closer analysis of evolutionary understandings of ethics. Furthermore, 
ambiguity also pervades each of these three themes and they could each be interpreted in a 
variety of ways. Therefore, each of the three themes must be further explained in terms of 
what they are taken to mean in this context.  
 
2.1.1 Moral Freedom  
The concept of free will can be understood as equivocal, evident in its multifarious 
interpretations in philosophical thinking; Descartes for example, considered that liberum 
arbitrium or the ability to choose was so free that it could never be constrained, whilst 
Thomas Hobbes was less enthused about free will, noting that while actions are voluntary, 
unimpeded liberty would contradict the liberty and omnipotence of God.
162
 Moreover, 
difficulties emerge in positing free will as a consideration for moral actions given that there 
is no a priori reason to assume that freedom can be clearly demarcated from non-freedom; a 
view of moral freedom will be defended in Chapter Five, which considers freedom as a 
matter of degree rather than an extrinsic quality in itself; actions may be considered more 
free or less free, not necessarily free or not free. Free will is thus difficult to consider 
categorically. 
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 Within Christian theology itself, varying positions with regard to free will also 
exist, for example the debate between Augustine and Pelagius on the issue of whether 
humans were completely free (Pelagius) or without grace unable to will the good 
(Augustine).
163
 In addition, as the American theologian Eleonore Stump explains, 
―Historians of philosophy read Augustine on free will so variously that it is sometimes 
difficult to believe they are reading the same texts.‖
164
 Stump explores various scholarly 
attempts to formulate definitions of Augustine‘s position on free will, none of which can be 
considered either exclusive or exhaustive. 
 Notwithstanding, as stated in section 1.4.1, moral freedom is an important element 
of theological appreciations of ethics. Whatever ambiguities exist pertaining to the issue of 
freedom, it is essential that actions be free in some sense in order for them to have moral 
worth. This is not to suggest that determinism mitigates freedom, or question whether a 
mitigated freedom subsequently mitigates the moral worth of actions – one could for 
example, acknowledge determinism yet still morally judge actions based on particular 
determining factors. Philosopher Harry Frankfurt considers such a view – that actions can be 
judged based on determining factors (he distinguishes between actions based on first or 
second order desires).
165
 Yet even on this view, he acknowledges a mode of freedom 
attributed to humans premised on our ability to form second order desires and have a choice 
between first and second order desires.
166
 Therefore, it can be stated that in order for moral 
actions which are morally consequential – that they result in either good or evil – to be 
distinguished from amoral but morally consequential actions, e.g. the moving of tectonic 
plates causing evil, a form of freedom must be present, however one understands such 
freedom – again, a particular understanding of freedom will be defended in Chapter Five.   
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 Consequently, despite the difficulties in considering free will, we can proceed 
under the assumption that some form free will does exist and that humans are responsible 
moral beings. This freedom is enough to allow for intelligible moral discourse. Moral 
freedom is a prerequisite for there to be any distinction between good and evil; at the risk of 
oversimplifying, if freedom did not exist, then actions could not be considered morally good 
or morally evil; they would be amoral, as no alternative would be possible. Alvin Plantinga 
explicates this premise in the following passage: 
 
A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform 
more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a 
world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, 
but He can't cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if He does 
so, then they aren't significantly free after all; they do not do what is right 
freely. To create creatures capable of moral good, therefore, He must create 




Moral freedom, then, is taken here as an example of a cardinal characteristic of Christian 
ethics. It is an example of an aspect of an ethical view (though one not specifically Christian 
or theological) which could be perceived as a source of conflict between evolutionary ethics 
and Christian ethics. 
 
2.1.2 Agape and Neighbourly Love 
The second characteristic of Christian ethics as it is understood in this chapter is the notions 
of agape and neighbourly love. Like the issue of free will, Christian neighbourly love is a 
concept which has been filtered through diverse hermeneutical funnels, often diluted and 
applied selectively in various situations. Jesus‘ great commandment ―love your neighbour as 
yourself‖ (Matt.22:39) is not unique or original; it echoes Leviticus (19.18), ―You shall not 
take vengeance or bear a grudge against any of your people, but you shall love your 
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neighbour as yourself‖ as well various other philosophies and religions. Anders Nygren 
rightfully illustrates that considering love as a central tenet of Christianity is an obvious fact, 
but of course, the term has been variously understood.
168
 Therefore, he posits agape as an 
appropriate understanding of Christian love, ―What is the good? The good is ἀγάπη, and the 
ethical demand finds summary expression in the Commandment of Love, the commandment 
to love God and my neighbour.‖
169
 
 Nygren considers agape as the distinguishing feature of Christian ethics, ―It sets a 
mark on everything in Christianity. Without it nothing that is Christian would be Christian. 
Agape is Christianity‘s own original basic conception.‖
170
 As mentioned in Chapter One, 
agape can be understood as an altruistic, unconditional love, as opposed to eros, variously 
defined as physical love or ultimately self-gratifying love stemming from yearning desire.
171
 
As the religious scholar Colin Grant explains, in the Hellenistic world, eros was used to 
designate the Greeks‘ aspiration or desire, ―It could cover sexual desire and thirst for the 
divine.‖
172
 Of course, such definitions are not absolute; they are functional in aiding 
Nygren‘s task of distinguishing Christian love. According to Grant, a strong case can be 
made against Nygren in this regard.
173
 Benedict XVI was already cited in the previous 
chapter, as suggesting that too sharp a distinction had been drawn between agape and eros. 
Similar perspectives are found with Paul Tillich, who felt that agape and eros were 
inseparable.
174
 Grant suggests then that the altruism of agape (if the two terms are roughly 
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 Notwithstanding, in the context of comparing Christian ethics with evolutionary 
ethics, Nygren‘s classification of Christian love as altruistic agape provides a good starting 
point for a normative position understood in this context as a fundamental tenet of Christian 
ethics. As Nygren states, ―We have... every right to say that ἀγάπη is the centre of 
Christianity, the Christian fundamental motif par excellence, the answer to both the religious 
and ethical question.‖
176
 Consequently, altruism can be identified as a key feature of 
Christian ethics. This sentiment is also found in the work of theologians such as Philip 
Clayton, who signifies altruism as the ―crucial question for religious ethics.‖
177
 Jeffery 
Schloss expresses a similarly robust position, as he states that sacrificial love or altruism is, 
in the Christian tradition, the ultimate telos of human existence, ―the summation and 
fulfilment of all moral obligation.‖
178
 Although agape will be considered as the telos of 
human morality in Chapter Five, Schloss‘ statement here could be perceived as overly 
grandiose as it pertains to the broader issue of human existence, as British theologian Neil 
Messer points out, ―Strictly speaking, in the Christian tradition, the telos of human existence 
is more commonly reckoned to be eternal life with God....‖
179
 There is nothing expressly 
theological in viewing altruism as the summum bonum of Christian life; indeed Auguste 
Comte‘s atheistic positivism held altruism (a term Comte himself coined) as the definitive 
formula of human morality.
180
 However, in the context of this chapter, altruism or agape can 
be signified as at least a key feature of Christian ethics – though this is not to say that the 
notion of agape implies Christianity.  
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 A related question arises with this understanding of altruism as a key feature of 
Christian ethics; if selfless love is the fulfilment of moral obligation, it could be asked, 
selfless love towards who? This was the question posed to Christ by an expert in law in 
Luke (10.29). Within various Christian denominations, for example Roman Catholicism, 
dissatisfaction has been expressed due to perceived conditional representations of ‗love for 
thy neighbour‘; conditions, for example, based on the gender or sexual orientation of ‗thy 
neighbour‘.
181
 There have been various understandings or representations of who ‗thy 
neighbour‘ is. Messer instructively points to aspects of Karl Barth‘s approach, which he 
feels are relevant on this question.
182
 Barth suggests that the Christian challenge is to expand 
the circle of loyalties and concerns; that there is no distinction between near and distant 
neighbours – a sentiment developed in the Good Samaritan parable (‗near‘ and ‗distant‘ 
taken not just spatially but also with respect to identity).
183
 The interpretation of Christian 
ethics followed here, then, is an unconstraint agape towards others, irrespective of who the 
‗others‘ are; a love even towards one‘s enemies (Matt. 5:44) – though for the sake of focus, 
whether or not animals be considered morally relevant others will be an ethical question left 
for future research. What is of concern here is developing an overarching framework and not 
a discussion on the intricacies of ethical dilemmas present within such a framework.  
 Whilst this facet of Christian thought can be held as the ‗fundamental motif‘ of 
Christian morality as Nygren suggested, this is not to say that it is immune to critique. 
Nietzsche, for example, expresses clear distain for such ethics, ―Christianity has been the 
most disastrous form of arrogance... with their ―equality before God‖....‖ T.H. Huxley, a 
contemporary and colleague of Darwin, also provides an interestingly critical view on the 
Christian ‗golden rule‘ of neighbourly love. Huxley considers the logical conclusions of the 
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empathetic notion of ‗do as you would be done by‘ and suggests that they would be 
―incompatible with the existence of a civil state, under any circumstances of this world 
which have obtained, or, so far as one can see, are likely to come to pass.‖
184
 Huxley points 
out that a strict understanding of Jesus‘ altruistic neighbourly love can ultimately defeat 
itself in the following example: 
 
For I imagine there can be no doubt that the great desire of every wrongdoer is 
to escape from the painful consequences of his actions. If I put myself in the 
place of the man who has robbed me, I find that I am possessed by an 
exceeding desire not to be fined or imprisoned; if in that of the man who has 
smitten me on one cheek, I contemplate with satisfaction the absence of any 
worse result than the turning of the other cheek for like treatment. Strictly 
observed, the ―golden rule‖ involves the negation of law by the refusal to put 
it in motion against law-breakers; and, as regards the external relations of a 




Although Christian altruistic neighbourly love is understood in the context of this thesis as a 
fundamental characteristic of Christian ethics which will be compared with evolutionary 
ethics, it should be acknowledged that it may be vulnerable to certain criticisms. 
 A further point on the Christian idea of neighbourly love pertains again to the 
questioning of who is the ‗neighbour‘. Although the ‗neighbour‘ in ‗neighbourly love‘ is 
taken to be unconditional in the understanding of Christian ethics presented above, there is 
also a focus on certain ‗neighbours‘ evident in particular representations of Christian ethics; 
the oppressed. For example, liberation theologians such as Gustavo Gutiérrez argued that 
theology should be focused on solidarity with the oppressed classes.
186
 Despite certain 
criticisms of liberation theology,
187
 the idea of a preferential option for the poor was adopted 
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by influential figures such as John Paul II.
188
 Therefore, in this chapter, it will be considered 
that a preferential option for the poor is a further characteristic of Christian ethics. Christian 
ethics focuses on, as the theologian Albert Nolan explains, ―the poor, the blind, the lame, the 
crippled, the lepers, the hungry, the miserable (those who weep), sinners, prostitutes, tax 
collectors, demoniacs (those possessed by unclean spirits), the persecuted, the downtrodden, 
the captives... the least, the last... the lost sheep of Israel.‖
189
 Christian ethics, as understood 
here in terms of agape and neighbourly love, is concerned specifically – though not only – 
with the poor and the oppressed (being mindful that these are equivocal terms and are not 
necessarily concerned with material poverty or political oppression). This theme is also 
discussed in wider-than-Christian contexts, such as in the work of John Rawls, who felt that 





2.1.3 Natural Law  
A further characteristic of Christian ethics as it is understood in this chapter, is natural law 
theory. The British theologian Gerard J. Hughes offers a definition of natural law in its 
broadest sense, as the view that ―morality derives from the nature of human beings.‖
191
 
However, as Hughes points out, such a broad understanding may dilute the true nuance and 
controversy within theories of natural law.
192
 Aquinas is understood to have built his 
representation of natural law on various aspects of Aristotelian philosophy such as teleology 
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– though this is not to say that the two thinkers have identical positions on morality.
193
 
Aristotle did discuss the question of the good in markedly teleological terms; there are 
particular ends in different actions and arts, ―Therefore, if there is an end for all that we do, 
this will be the good achievable by action....‖
194
 Aquinas understood moral ends in a 
comparably teleological way, though went a step further in identifying the ends as God‘s 
eternal law, ―all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, insofar as, namely, from its 
being imprinted upon them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and 
ends.‖
195
 Aquinas and Aristotle then, are comparable in terms of speaking of ends, though 
for Aquinas, the inclination is/should be to pursue the eternal law, whereas Aristotle 
believed in a diversity of ends.  
 Aquinas‘ thought on natural law and ends is complex, governed by various precepts 
which have been interpreted in a variety of ways, making it difficult to take as a singularly 
definable aspect of Christian ethics. His often quoted general principle of natural law, that 
―good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided‖
196
 for example, demands further 
explanation; what is the good? How do we know the good? What about the perceived 
subjectivity of the good in various situations?  These questions highlight the difficulty in 
considering natural law as a stand-alone doctrine. Notwithstanding, Aquinas does 
acknowledge the role of human reason in aiding our exploration and hopeful discovery of 
the eternal right and wrong; it can be a guide through this moral ambiguity. Therefore, a 
functional understanding of natural law is employed in this chapter; I take natural law as a 
distinguishing characteristic of Christian ethics for the purposes of comparing Christian 
ethics with evolutionary ethics, natural law being understood as the idea that morality stems 
from an interplay between human reason and an innate morality in nature. Human reason 
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uncovers a moral code evident in nature.
197
 Contrary to Bertrand Russell‘s idea of 
omnipotent matter, blind to good and evil, Aquinas postulated that nature has inherent in it, 
the ingredients of a moral code.
198
 In Aquinas‘ view, this natural law reflects the values of 
God. 
 Indeed, like altruism and neighbourly love, the theological component of natural 
law, whilst present in Aquinas, is perhaps omissible in a broader discussion on morality. As 
Hughes explains, basing morality on human nature has been a feature of all classical 
Western philosophers, from Aristotle to Bentham.
199
 However, the possibility of omitting 
the theological aspect of natural law only serves to strengthen my argument that Christian 
ethics and evolutionary ethics are not inherently inimical to one another, irrespective of 
whether Christian ethics requires a theological addendum conceiving a divine, eternal law. It 
is not contended that evolutionary ethics and Christian ethics will comfortably coalesce 
without remainder, nor would such a synthesis be expected. A theological component will 
be central to many Christian understandings of ethics, though in the field of evolutionary 
theory, such a component will not be of concern. As such, it will not be argued that 
evolutionary ethics specifically implies a theological element. However, this does not in any 
way provide an argument that the two understandings of ethics are opposed. Rather, it 
signifies a difference, but difference is not opposition. 
 To summarize the understanding of Christian ethics in this context then, I have 
highlighted three important characteristics; i) moral freedom, ii) agape and neighbourly 
love, and iii) natural law. This is not by any means an exhaustive understanding of what 
Christian ethics may be taken to mean. For example, it does not indicate a particular stance 
on any given moral issue or set of moral issues. Moreover, even within each of these motifs, 
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variety exists. Therefore, it has been stated above what is understood by each of these 
characteristics. These particular characteristics have been used here because they are firstly, 
cardinal features of Christian ethics, and secondly, because it is with regard to these three 
issues that perceived conflicts between Christian ethics and evolutionary ethics lie. It is the 
task of this chapter to demonstrate that on these three central tenets of Christian ethics, there 
is little or no conflict between the two systems under investigation. In fact, several 
interesting parallels may even be drawn. 
 
2.2 An Understanding of Evolutionary Ethics 
Evolutionary ethics, like Christian ethics, is a term which is open to a variety of 
interpretations. Therefore, it should be made clear what it is taken to mean or imply in the 
current context. In this thesis, I take evolutionary ethics to mean an approach to ethics 
primarily concerned with how ethics evolved through natural selection. It is taken from 
various attempts to reconcile the principle of competition which drives natural selection 
(though this principle and its influence can itself be disputed) with the salient manifestations 
of altruism in the natural world.
200
 In this sense, I equate evolutionary ethics to the 
sociobiological perspective on ethics. The central problem of sociobiology is stated by 
Edward O. Wilson, arguably the founder of the field, as; ―How can altruism, which by 
definition reduces personal fitness, possibly evolve by natural selection?‖
201
 In other words, 
the understanding of evolutionary ethics is predominantly concerned with the 
scientific/philosophical question of ethics‘ origin. More specifically, I am concerned with 
human ethics, whereas the field of sociobiology is broader, though in dealing with human 
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ethics we are forced to consider our evolutionary lineage which is of course wider than 
humanity. 
 Others such as legal philosopher Jeffrie Murphy have suggested that evolutionary 
ethics or sociobiology could offer a parallel or alternative to ethical systems such as 
utilitarian ethics, deontological ethics, consequentialism, and so on.
202
 Evolutionary theory 
can offer certain insights into developing ethical codes; Peter Singer, for example, contends 
that our understandings of evolutionary theory challenges us to review our moral approach 
to apes and other animals.
203
 However, in this current context, I am concerned with the 
system for understanding the origin and nature of ethics from the perspective of evolutionary 
theory and its emphasis on struggle and competition (it has already been duly noted that this 
emphasis has been challenged, though I follow Gould in suggesting that such criticisms do 
not discount the intrinsic role of struggle in evolution).
204
 
 As discussed in Chapter One, ‗traditional‘ frameworks for understanding ethics 
were marked by the presupposition of a world created good, evident for example in Plato 
and the Judeo-Christian narrative. Goodness was understood as established instantaneously 
(or thereabouts) and instilled in an archaic covenant or social contract. However, Darwin‘s 
depiction of humanity as an aspect of gradual evolution seems to conflict with the idea of an 
early or first society which established a moral code, as in the social contract myths of 
Rousseau and others. Peter Singer makes this point by acknowledging that archaeological 
evidence indicates that our pre-Homo sapien ancestors and their relatives, such as 
Australopithecus africanus and Homo Habilis were social beings. Therefore, the concept of 
a set of rules emerging from a distant Foundation Day where the first rational humans 
became social beings seems implausible.
205
 Consequently, modern social contract theorists 
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such as Rawls have since stressed that the original state of nature is a hypothetical situation 
used only to conceive principles of justice; it is not a historical point.
206
 From an 
evolutionary perspective, there was no original, primordial state where humanity began; 
there was a long period of incremental progression. The traditional, theo-centric moral 
systems based on archaic covenants cease to be sufficient when evolution is taken into 
account, leaving a void in our understanding of where ethics came from. Evolutionary 
ethics, in the context of this thesis, is taken as a framework which has been posed as a 
solution to the question of the origins of ethics. It should be noted however, that when 
speaking of evolutionary ethics as a framework, I am envisioning an overarching scheme, 
similar to that presented in Chapter One, though of course, ‗evolutionary ethics‘ may 
encompass not just one approach but several – as we shall see below, there are significant 
differences in the weight attributed to particulr aspects of evolutionary ethics within the field 
(for example Dawkins and Wilson‘s dispute on the role of group selection).    
  
2.2.1 The Question of Altruism in an Evolutionary Context 
Examining altruism in an evolutionary context requires a shift in thinking when compared 
with the theological understanding of ethics that is more concerned with explaining evil than 
good. A central tenet of evolution stresses competition, as Darwin wrote ―... natural 
selection acts solely by and for the good of each.‖
207
 Permitting an anthropomorphic 
analogy, one could state along with Darwin that natural selection occurs as if it has the 
benefit of each as its primary focus – though this is not to portray natural selection as purely 
individualistic, indeed as we shall see, the ‗each‘ is often extended to kin. Therefore, Darwin 
postulated that it will ―never produce in a being anything injurious to itself....‖
208
 Darwin 
cites the influential nineteenth century theologian William Paley in this regard. Paley 
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recognised this particular principle, though postulated divine beneficence as the explanation, 
―We never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomist ever 
discovered a system of organisation, calculated to produce pain and disease....‖
209
  
 The appearance of design in living organisms is substantiated by the fact that no 
bodies contain elements that are inherently hostile to themselves.
210
 Darwin was later able to 
explain why this is the case, ―After the lapse in time, under changing conditions of life, if 
any part comes to be injurious, it will be modified; or if it be not so, the being will become 
extinct, as myriads have become extinct.‖
211
 T.H. Huxley expressed that because of these 
principles, he could not reconcile moral behaviour with the selfishness and moral 
indifference of nature.
212
 In some respects, this emphasis on competition in Darwinian 
evolution echoes previous philosophies such as Thomas Hobbes‘ ―war of every one against 
every one‖ where only the strong survive – though again, Darwin‘s discussions on kin may 
indicate his own view as less individualistic.
213
 It could even be stated that the Darwinian 
survival of the fittest – a term coined by Herbert Spencer
214
 – lends scientific credence to 
Augustine‘s understanding of original sin; we are naturally inclined to do evil as we are 
naturally self-interested in order to ensure our survival. 
 Altruism becomes conspicuous in an evolutionary context then, as it can be 
disadvantageous to one‘s own self. It seems to contradict the basic principles of natural 
selection. We would not expect evolution to produce altruism. For a similar reason, 
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Nietzsche was disapproving of morality, what he termed the ―danger of dangers‖; he felt it 
deeply hindered humanity‘s attempts to achieve its ―highest potential power and 
splendour.‖
215
 Darwin himself recognised this and noted that it hardly seemed probable that 
natural selection could produce virtuous tendencies such as altruistic behaviour.
216
 Yet 
altruism clearly exists. As Adam Smith wrote, ―How selfish soever man may be supposed, 
there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, 
and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the 
pleasure of seeing it.‖
217
 Smith speaks of a ―man within the breast‖ who acts as a conscience 
of sorts.
218
 Kant similarly refers to the apparently innate notion of good will.
219
 Darwin 
himself refers to this vague compulsion as ―the moral sense‖, a faculty he views as the most 
important of all differences between Homo sapiens and the lower animals.
220
 Therefore, 
there is a paradox in need of resolution. The asymmetry of the theological assumption of 
goodness and need to explain evil becomes inverted from the perspective of evolution; it is 
now goodness that requires explanation. 
 Although Darwin himself was perplexed by this issue, he pointed out that this 
question of moral instincts had not, at the time of writing, been approached purely from the 
perspective of natural history.
221
 In a similar respect, Nietzsche predicted that this question 
should in the future be examined in terms of science; the philosopher‘s voyage of attempting 
to understand morality will be first mapped by the scientist.
222
 On humanity‘s moral sense, 
Darwin reluctantly differed from ―so profound a thinker‖ as John Stuart Mill, who felt that 
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moral tendencies are not innate but acquired.
223
 Darwin believed that the moral sense was 
indeed inherited, though he also acknowledged that pertaining to certain virtuous tendencies, 
social instruction and habit may play a more dominant role in the development of 
individuals‘ moral character.
224
 On this point, Darwin was not too far removed from 
Aristotle, who felt that moral virtues needed to be acquired through habit.
225
 Evolutionary 
ethics, therefore, is understood here as the attempt to provide an account of the origin of 
ethics (equated roughly to altruism, as declared in section 1.1) in light of the seeming 
dichotomy of altruistic behaviour and the ‗struggle for existence‘. 
 
2.2.2 Evolutionary Explanations for Altruism 
Theorists within the field of evolutionary ethics or sociobiology as they are understood in 
this chapter, have proposed a framework as a solution to the paradox of altruism in an 
evolutionary context. This framework is the crux of what evolutionary ethics is understood 
here to entail. To illustrate, three distinct elements of the evolutionary framework for 
understanding ethics will now be highlighted (though these may not be exhaustive); i) 
kin/gene selection, ii) group selection, and iii) reciprocal altruism. It should also be noted 
that these particular facets of evolutionary explanations for morality may not be mutually 
exclusive – a point also acknowledged by Edward Wilson.
226
   
 
Kin/Gene Selection 
An important feature of evolutionary ethics as it is understood here is the kin or gene 
selection model for explaining morality. This model stems from the convergence of 
Darwinian natural selection and the principles of genetic inheritance, originally deduced by 
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Gregor Mendel in the nineteenth century. This vision of evolution, known as the ‗neo-
Darwinian synthesis‘ or in the writings of certain authors, ‗gene-selectionism‘, was 
popularised by Ronald Fisher in his work The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection.
227
 It 
centres on the premise that nature ‗selects‘ at the level of the gene as opposed to the 
individual – though this vision of evolution is not universally held.
228
 The advent of genetics 
led to the discovery that the traits to which Darwin referred, are chemically encoded in 
strands of DNA – genes. Neo-Darwinian theory understands, therefore, that the survival of 
the fittest pertains to genes; genes which contribute to individuals‘ fitness will be passed on 
and become more numerous in the gene pool than genes which have a negative effect on 
individuals‘ fitness. 
 The British biologist J.B.S. Haldane outlined a gene-centred perspective which 
sought to explain altruistic behaviour. He proposed that from the hypothetical point of view 
of a gene, it would be beneficial to sacrifice oneself to save another if the benefactor of such 
sacrifice carried the same gene. In terms of natural selection‘s struggle for survival, the cost 
of the sacrifice would be negated by the benefit. Haldane proposed that within families, 
altruistic behaviour could emerge given that such behaviour ultimately aids the altruist‘s 
genes. He uses the example of a parent saving a drowning child to illustrate: 
 
Let us suppose that you carry a rare gene which affects your behaviour so that 
you jump into a river and save a child, but you have one chance in ten of 
being drowned, while I do not possess the gene, and stand on the bank and 
watch the child drown. If the child is your own child or your brother or sister, 
there is an even chance that the child will also have the gene, so five such 
genes will be saved in children for one lost in an adult. If you save a 
grandchild or nephew the advantage is only two and a half to one. If you only 
save a first cousin, the effect is very slight. If you try to save your first cousin 
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Haldane was able in this model, to logically postulate how altruistic behaviour may not 
necessarily conflict with the competitive principles of natural selection, albeit in familial 
situations. Furthermore, he notes that some circumstances may provide highly suitable 
conditions for such a model to work; beehives and ants‘ nests for example, as in these 
situations all members are ―literally brothers and sisters.‖
230
 This idea of kin selection seems 
to allow for a more lenient description of the struggle for existence; one which allows for 
concern for the welfare of others as opposed to the concern for only one‘s own welfare; 
natural selection, then, is not necessarily an uncompromising war of all against all. 
 The biologist W.D. Hamilton later developed upon this notion of kin selection by 
explaining how pro-social behaviour, morality included, would be consistent with the 
principles of competition in natural selection if it helped to maximise relatives‘ fitness – a 
concept he terms ‗inclusive fitness‘. This, he believed, ―... implies limited restraint on selfish 
competitive behaviour and the possibility of limited self-sacrifices.‖
231
 Hamilton suggested 
that the probability of whether or not an individual would be expected to act for the benefit 
of another is directly proportional to the probability of the ‗other‘ sharing the individual‘s 
gene. He suggests that a gene which causes altruistic behaviour towards brothers and sisters 
will only become prominent in the gene pool when the circumstances are ―generally such 
that the gain is more than twice the loss‖ as siblings have a fifty percent chance of carrying 
the same gene.
232
 Adhering strictly to this model, which as Hamilton rightly notes is merely 
a model, ―we expect to find that no-one is prepared to sacrifice his life for any single person 
                                                          
229 J.B.S. Haldane, ‗Population Genetics‘, New Biology, 18. (1955) p. 44 
230 J.B.S. Haldane, ‗Population Genetics‘, p. 44 
231 W.D. Hamilton, ‗The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour I‘, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 7. (1964) p. 1 
232 W.D. Hamilton, ‗The Evolution of Altruistic Behaviour‘, The American Naturalist, 97.896 (1963) p. 355 
77 
 
but that everyone will sacrifice it when he can thereby save more than two brothers, or four 
half-brothers, or eight first cousins....‖
233
 
 Of course, it is important to note that the principles of kin selection outlined by 
Haldane and Hamilton are general principles. Their examples of self-sacrificing kin are not 
illustrative of how individual humans consciously behave; for example, they do not take into 
account psychological motives/personal characteristics which may perhaps maintain a 
greater influence on our behaviour. Notwithstanding, the models of gene/kin selection 
presented demonstrate that the long term average outcome of behavioural strategies will be 
such that pro-social/altruistic predispositions will evolve, and moreover, will be to an extent 
dependent on the relatedness of the individuals involved in a given situation. As Hamilton 
notes, he seeks to hazard a ―generalised unrigorous‖ principle, outlined as follows, ―The 
social behaviour of a species evolves in such a way that in each distinct behaviour evoking 
situation the individual will seem to value his neighbour‘s fitness against his own according 
to the coefficients of relationship appropriate to that situation.‖
234
 
 Following from, and building upon Haldane, Hamilton and others, Richard 
Dawkins proposed an analogical framework for understanding how altruism can evolve 
from the gene-centred perspective. Dawkins finds it instructive to envisage individual bodies 
as fleeting, temporary amalgams of genes which replicate themselves and ―leap from body 
to body down the generations‖ with near immortality.
235
 In addition, Dawkins characterises 
these genes as fundamentally ‗selfish‘. However, he is not using the characteristic of 
fundamental selfishness in the same way that Augustine or Hobbes might; that humanity is 
fundamentally inclined towards the evil or selfish action. Dawkins‘ selfish gene theory 
exemplifies the problem to which Nietzsche once alluded, as he wrote that science is 
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―exposed to the seduction of language.‖
236
 The literal understanding of selfishness, as it is 
used in common language, is not what Dawkins implied by the term. As a result, his use of 
analogical language was challenged by philosophers such as Mary Midgley, who rebuked 
the idea that genes could be selfish, given that they are not conscious entities.
237
 Dawkins‘ 
intentions, however, were not to ascribe conscious characteristics to genes, but rather to 
illustrate from a behaviouristic context, how genes function.
238
 Henceforth, I may employ 
such analogical language here in order to illustrate certain points pertaining to evolutionary 
ethics – though I am mindful that strictly speaking such language is not correct. 
 From this point of view, differential selection occurs at the level of the gene; the 
principle of survival of the fittest does not apply to individuals. Dawkins uses 
anthropomorphic language to illustrate the behaviour of genes; if genes had conscious 
intentions, they would seek to become more numerous in the gene pool – their primary 
wants would be to replicate and proliferate.
239
 However, in achieving these purely selfish 
aims, genes can, as in the models of Haldane and Hamilton, aid replicas of themselves in 
other bodies. Therefore, by distinguishing between the gene and the individual, it becomes 
possible to maintain the fundamental principle of a struggle for existence whilst also 
accounting for altruistic acts at the level of the individual. The Hobbesian war of all against 
all can transpire at the level of the gene whilst altruistic acts can flourish at the level of the 
individual without any apparent contradictions. In other words, what appears to be altruism 
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Another aspect of evolutionary explanations of altruism pertains to the concept of ‗group 
selection‘. Edward Wilson defines group selection as when selection ―affects two or more 
members of a lineage group as a unit. Just above the level of the individual we can delimit 
various [sic] of these lineage groups: a set of sibs, parents, and their offspring; close-knit 
tribe of families... and so on.‖
241
 Although natural selection would be expected to ‗oppose‘ 
altruistic behaviour if such behaviour is detrimental to the survival of the individual, group 
selection would ‗allow‘ for such behaviour if that behaviour was of benefit to a group, i.e. a 
family, tribe, etc. Although Darwin conceded that the circumstances under which virtuous 
tendencies evolve would become too complex to follow through, he did allude to this idea of 
group selection.
242
 He postulated that if such behaviour was profitable to the community, 
then no tension arises between the principles of competition and altruism, as the behaviour is 
still consistent with survival of the fittest – though the fittest becomes the group as opposed 
to the individual.
243
 Dawkins outlines the concept as follows: 
 
[A] group, such as a species or a population within a species, whose individual 
members are prepared to sacrifice themselves for the welfare of the group, 
may be less likely to go extinct than a rival group whose individual members 
place their own selfish interests first. Therefore, the world becomes populated 





This model of selection would appear to explain how altruistic behaviour could exist without 
conflicting with the principle of competition.  
 Despite the appeal of such a model (Dawkins acknowledges that it was long 
assumed to be true) there are significant challenges to the theory. If a minority of individuals 
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(cheats) in the group exploit the altruistic behaviour of others, thus benefiting from the 
group without incurring any ‗cost‘ to themselves, then their behaviour would subsequently 
proliferate the group at a greater rate than the altruists. Dawkins articulates this problem 
with group selection:  
 
Even in the group of altruists, there will almost certainly be a dissenting 
minority who refuse to make any sacrifice. It [sic] there is just one selfish 
rebel, prepared to exploit the altruism of the rest, then he, by definition, is 
more likely than they to survive and have children. Each of these children will 
tend to inherit his selfish traits. After several generations of this natural 
selection, the ‗altruistic group‘ will be over-run by selfish individuals, and will 
be indistinguishable from the selfish group.
245
   
 
In highlighting this problem with group selection, Dawkins thus seeks to justify his own 
favouring of gene selection as a model for explaining altruistic behaviour.  
 Whilst this problem with group selection is substantial, it may not be a situation of 
exclusivity; as Wilson noted, despite certain problems with the model of group selection, it 
may still play some role in altruistic behaviour.
246
 For example, philosophers of biology 
Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson offer a defence of group selection by acknowledging 
the complexities of social behaviour, particularly the ability/tendency to punish the 
―dissenting minority‖, to use Dawkins‘ term quoted above.
247
 As such, they suggest that the 
―wholesale rejection of group selection‖ is misconceived.
248
 In their view, group selection 
may play a strong role – though not necessarily an exclusive one – in explaining the 
―ultrasocial‖ characteristics of human behaviour, such as altruism.
249
 Further dispute 
surrounding the significance of group selection arose with E.O. Wilson‘s co-authored paper 
‗The Evolution of Eusociality‘, when he and his co-authors challenged the models of kin or 
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gene selection for explaining altruism and re-asserted the strength of group selection
250
 – 
E.O. Wilson then furthered this thesis in his book The Social Conquest of Earth.
251
 In a 
review of Wilson‘s renewed interest in group selection, Dawkins was highly critical, 
describing it as ―erroneous‖ and a ―perverse misunderstanding‖ of evolutionary theory.
252
 
Irrespective of whether one aligns themselves fully with group selection or not, it can be 
stated here that group selection may play some role, and therefore, is an element of 
evolutionary ethics as it is understood here. 
 
Reciprocal Altruism 
Another aspect of the evolutionary answer to the altruism paradox, and thus of evolutionary 
ethics as understood in this chapter, is the notion of reciprocal altruism; one acts morally 
towards others with the hope/expectation that they would act similarly in return. This notion 
is not specific to modern genetic theories but has emerged throughout philosophical 
discourse for millennia, as Aristotle wrote, ―Friendly relations with one‘s neighbours, and 
the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man‘s relations 
to himself.‖
253
 This may be an earlier formation of the Christian notion of loving thy 
neighbour as oneself (Mark 12:21), though Aristotle‘s motives are seemingly less noble. 
Hume articulated a similar sentiment in his Treatise, ―Men being naturally selfish, or 
endow‘d only with a confin‘d generosity, they are not easily induc‘d to perform any action 
for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some reciprocal advantage....‖
254
 
                                                          
250 Martin A. Nowak, Corina E. Tarnita and Edward O. Wilson, ‗The Evolution of Eusociality‘, Nature, 466.7310  
(2010) pp. 1057-1062 
251 Edward O. Wilson, The Social Conquest of Earth, (London: W.W. Norton and Co., 2012) 
252 Richard Dawkins, ‗The Descent of Edward Wilson‘, Prospect, (May 2012) 
253 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, p. 1081 
254 David Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, p. 519 
82 
 
Similarly, Adam Smith wrote that ―It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, 
or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.‖
255
  
 From a genetic perspective, however, the virtue of reciprocal altruism is in a sense 
irrelevant; reciprocal altruism is merely posited to add to the explanation of pro-social 
behaviour (and hence, morality). American biologist Robert L. Trivers proposed the idea of 
reciprocal altruism to illustrate how altruistic behaviour can be selectively beneficial 
between more distant relatives than with the kin selection model, which is primarily 
concerned with relatedness. Reciprocal altruism can be selected for even when the recipient 
is so distantly related to the altruist that kin selection could not apply.
256
 Dawkins provides 
an illustration of how reciprocal altruism could be played out in a real-world scenario: 
 
Suppose a species of bird is parasitized by a particularly nasty kind of tick 
which carries a dangerous disease...  Normally an individual bird can pull off 
its own ticks when preening itself. There is one place however – the top of the 
head – which it cannot reach with its own bill...  An individual may not be 
able to reach his own head, but nothing is easier than for a friend to do it for 
him. Later, when the friend is parasitized himself, the good deed can be paid 




 From the perspective of differential survival, such altruistic acts can, as Trivers 
states, benefit the organism performing them.
258
 In other words, acts of reciprocal altruism, 
whilst seeming to be altruistic and thus opposed to the principle of survival of the fittest, will 
ultimately be of benefit to the altruists‘ genes. In addition to such acts of direct reciprocity, 
indirect reciprocity can also occur with a similar premise. Indirect reciprocity can evolve as 
a social norm (not dissimilar to group selection) where altruistic actions may be reciprocated 
not by the original beneficiary, but by other members of a society, as the biologist Richard 
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Alexander explains, ―Indirect reciprocity I have defined as those cases in which the 
dividends from social investments are likely to come from individuals other than those 
helped (or hurt) by the original actor.‖
259
 E.O. Wilson also endorses the idea, as he writes in 
a similar manner, ―A population at large that enters into a series of such moral obligations, 
that is, reciprocally altruistic acts, will be a population with a generally increased genetic 
fitness.‖
260
 Again we should be mindful that the model of reciprocal altruism seeks to 
explain general behavioural predispositions rather than provide a specific account of how 
individuals act in given circumstances; as such they do not take into account the 
innumerable variables that influence specific behaviours. 
 Notwithstanding the mutual benefits that direct/indirect reciprocal altruism brings 
to populations, the problem which was discussed with regard to group selection re-emerges; 
why not cheat? Why not attempt to benefit from the altruism of others without exerting the 
time and energy required to be altruistic in return. Wilson, however, explains that ―in an 
advanced personalised society, where individuals are identified and the record of their acts is 
weighed by others it does not pay to cheat even in the purely Darwinist sense.‖
261
 Among 
species with the capabilities for memory and recognition, such as Homo sapiens, reputation, 
punishments, praise, blame and other social instincts must be considered. Darwin himself 
recognised this point, by discussing how these societal instincts undoubtedly bore weight 
upon people‘s moral actions.
262
  
 Individuals would be unlikely to cheat in social scenarios as they would acquire a 
bad reputation. As a result, others would be suspicious of cheating individuals; a motif 
portrayed through Aesop‘s fable of the boy and the wolf. Humanity‘s complex social 
intuitions allow for extreme plasticity with regard to models of reciprocal altruism; for 
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example, Dawkins considers subtle cheating, and the evolution of mechanisms for detecting 
cheating. As he states, ―There is no end to the fascinating speculation that the idea of 
reciprocal altruism engenders when we apply it to our own species.‖
263
 For some, such as 
Mary Midgley, this issue is a serious weakness in attempts to fully explain altruism in an 
evolutionary framework; human behaviour is far too nuanced to be understood solely in 
terms of evolutionary costs/benefits.
264
 However, the heuristic value of such models 
outweighs the negatives that result from the oversimplifications involved; evolutionary 
explanations of morality may not be able to account for the intricacies of human behaviour, 
but they may provide a solution to the paradox of why altruism should exist at all. 
 Having now outlined what is understood by ‗Christian ethics‘, in section 2.1, and 
what is understood by ‗evolutionary ethics‘, in section 2.2, perceived conflicts between the 
two systems can now be addressed. Evolutionary ethics could be seen to conflict with the 
three tenets of Christian ethics taken in section 2.1; i) moral freedom, ii) agape and 
neighbourly love, and iii) natural law. To illustrate that Christian ethics and evolutionary 
ethics as I understand them do not conflict, these three potential points of conflict will now 
be addressed and ultimately shown to be insubstantial. Moreover, it will be argued that there 
may in fact be distinct points of coalescence between the two systems. 
 
2.3 Perceived Conflict with Moral Freedom 
As discussed in section 2.1.1, an important prerequisite for a Christian or theological 
understanding of ethics pertains to moral freedom; humanity must have free will in order for 
their moral decisions to be meaningful. However, following from the theories of 
evolutionary ethics as discussed above, it could be argued that genetic predispositions could 
mitigate human freedom with regard to moral behaviour. If moral behaviour is merely a 
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result of genetic tendencies, then perhaps it is not ‗free‘ in the sense required by Christian 
ethics; it is merely the manifestation of genetic ‗wants‘ – permitting anthropomorphic 
language, given that genes cannot ‗want‘. By explaining altruism in terms of genetic 
selection, it has been argued that evolutionary explanations of ethics ―take the altruism out 
of altruism.‖
265
 Daniel Dennett labels this evolutionary understanding of altruism as a 
‗pseudo-altruism‘; a form of altruism ultimately founded upon self-interest.
266
 Dennett, 
moreover, suggests that no distinction can be made between this mode of altruism and 
‗genuine‘ altruism. Indeed, he feels that ‗genuine‘ altruism is a vacuous and indefinable 
concept; those who seek a Platonic vision of altruism may be searching in vain.
267
 As such, a 
prominent interpretation of evolutionary altruism proposes that altruism is merely a surface-
level manifestation of genetic differential selection, and therefore, not the result of free 
choice (though I will disagree with this premise below).  
 One such proponent is Wilson, who distinguishes between hard-core and soft-core 
altruism. Hard-core altruism, Wilson states, ―can be irrational and unilaterally directed at 
others; the bestower expresses no desire for equal return and performs no unconscious 
actions leading to the same end.‖
268
 This might be an approximation of what one would 
consider as genuine altruism, which is not dependent upon consciously selfish desires for 
reciprocation. Such morality, Wilson suggests, is unique to close relatives (kin selection) 
and would steeply decline in frequency and intensity as the relationship becomes more 
distant.
269
 Soft-core altruism, however, is fundamentally selfish. It is ―calculating, often in a 
wholly conscious way‖ and is ―orchestrated by the excruciatingly intricate sanctions and 
demands of society.‖
270
 In Wilson‘s view then, morality is not a free decision to be moral for 
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morality‘s own sake, but a kind of self-serving, Machiavellian genetic cunningness. For 
Wilson, human altruism is soft-core, selfish, and only exists in the hard form in kin.
271
  It 
exists to serve the purposes of selfish genes, and has no other demonstrable function.
272
 The 
higher level freedom (however it is understood) necessary for Christian ethics may thus be 
interpreted as being overwritten at the genetic level. Others such as Ruse have agreed. Ruse 
maintains the belief that morality is an illusory concept which has evolved to further our 
reproductive ends, ―nothing more, but also, nothing less.‖
273
 He feels morality is put in place 
by our genes to make us efficient social animals.
274
  
 Midgley articulates a comparable reading of how evolutionary understandings of 
altruism have been presented, though unlike Ruse and Wilson, she disagrees and suggests 
that such understandings are overstating one aspect of multiple interacting causes.
275
 She 
notes that sociobiology has been presented as hostile to the concept of free will and thus, 
may be understood as ‗fatalistic‘; the representation of human behaviour in terms of genetic 
‗purposes‘ denigrates humans to ―being in fact only ineffectual pawns, puppets or vehicles 
of these ‗hidden masters‘.‖
276
 I adopt Midgley‘s use of the term ‗fatalism‘ to characterise a 
particular reading of evolutionary ethics; namely, that our subjective experience of ‗free 
thought‘ is illusory, or more specifically applied in this case, that our ‗free morality‘ is in 
fact a manifestation of genetic intentions.
277
 A fatalistic interpretation views genes as 
parasites whose chemistry continually distorts our mental processes only to secure their own 
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 In effect, this view poses a challenge to our conception of ourselves to the point 
where the statement ‗our morality‘ may seem unintelligible; if ‗we‘ are not necessarily 
entities in ourselves but amalgamations of genes, then it may be difficult to even speak of ‗I‘ 
or ‗we‘ rather than a particular group of genes. However, the conclusion is the same; we do 
not have control over our moral actions, either because the ‗we‘ is eroded, or because our 
actions are fully governed by genetics. This understanding of sociobiology is clearly 
threatening to the theological perquisite of moral freedom; if our behaviour is fully governed 
by our genes, then the freedom essential for morality would be lost and thus, sociobiology 
would clearly conflict with Christian ethics as I understand it.  
 On this reading of evolutionary explanations of morality, Midgley is duly critical. 
She contests that schemes which interpret natural selection as intrinsically selfish bears 
resemblance to a Hobbsian political outlook. Midgley feels that sociobiology as presented 
by Dawkins and others, is a misguided quest to force evolutionary theory to fit the ―old, 
exclusively self-benefiting‖ model of Hobbes‘ egoism.
279
 As such, she challenges Dawkins‘ 
scientific objectivity – a criticism echoed in more recent commentaries.
280
 Midgley‘s 
conclusion is that Dawkins‘ image of ruthlessly selfish genes manipulating bodies for their 
own ends leads us to a ―paralysis of complete despair.‖
281
 In this regard, she would disagree 
with the core message of this thesis – that such evolutionary understandings of ethics can 
provide an optimistic worldview. For her, they provides the opposite – fatalistic nihilism, 
something contrary to the idea of hope. However, the fact that Midgley finds the conclusions 
of evolutionary ethics distasteful does not amount to a substantial flaw in its depiction of our 
self-image; this is a matter of personal, philosophical, or perhaps socio-political inclination. 
Moreover, upon a closer reading of sociobiology, the interpretation which fears the fall of 
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human moral freedom to genetic fatalism can be shown to be ultimately erroneous for at 
least three reasons; a confusion of utility and purpose, a failure to appreciate the role of 
human consciousness, and a narrow reading of the alleged dichotomy of reductionism and 
emergence. 
 
Errors in the Perceived Conflict with Human Freedom: Utility and Purpose  
Firstly is the confusion of utility and purpose. Nietzsche puts it well as he states that ―the 
origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and 
incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate.‖
282
 Anything which currently 
exists, Nietzsche correctly points out, can be constantly interpreted, altered, requisitioned, 
transformed and redirected for new purposes. Therefore, a thing‘s meaning or purpose for 
which it was created or emerged, becomes obscured or completely obliterated.
283
 An organ 
for example, is not necessarily used for the purpose for which it evolved; rather, it has 
undergone a long series of adaptations and fulfilled various needs. Organs can have a long 




 In scientific parlance, this concept has been termed an ‗exaptation‘ by Gould and 
Elisabeth S. Vrba. It refers to when a character (e.g. an organ) evolves for a particular 
purpose, or no purpose, but is later utilised for a different role.
285
 Fingers, for example, may 
have evolved for catching prey or climbing to escape predators, but are now used for a 
plethora of other purposes; typing, playing the piano, etc. Morality then, may be considered 
as an exaptation; it could have evolved to serve a particular purpose (genetic selfishness) but 
may now be used for wholly other, unrelated purposes – for example, legitimate altruism if 
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such a thing is taken to exist. Consequently, the conclusion that morality is an illusory 
manifestation of genetic intentions is misconstrued. Interestingly, Ruse rightly expresses 
caution in this regard, ―To suppose that the story of origins tells of truth or falsity is to 
confuse causes with reasons. In a Spencerian fashion, it is to jumble the way things came 
about with the way things really are.‖
286
 He expresses regret that he has in the past made this 
conceptual error,
287
 yet he still proposes that morality is a manifestation of genetic 
selfishness. 
 The fatalistic interpretation of sociobiology implies that genes are the sole arbiters 
of our behaviour. This makes a substantial conceptual leap deriving ultimate imperatives 
from origins. Our genetics undeniably maintain a powerful influence over our behaviour; 
our innate desires to survive, procreate and care for our offspring, for instance, can lead to 
acts most noble or imprudent. However, it would be fallacious to therefore conclude that our 
genes are the fundamental driving force of our actions. With respect to this issue, Dennett 
follows Nietzsche‘s warnings about inferring utility from purpose, as he states, ―But we 
must not turn this important fact about our biological limitations into the massively 
misleading idea that the summum bonum at the source of every chain of practical reasoning 
is the imperative of our genes.‖
288
 Therefore, just because certain aspects of our behaviour 
may have stemmed from genetic predispositions does not then imply that behaviour is fully 
determined by our genes, as Dawkins states, ―genes have no monopoly on determinism‖ – 
there are psychological, emotional, and other multifaceted factors which influence our 
behaviour.
289
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The Role of Human Consciousness 
A second but related point of error in the fatalistic interpretation of sociobiology is the 
failure to fully appreciate the significance of human consciousness. When envisioning 
morality as an evolutionary exaptation, it could be asked that if morality originally evolved 
to serve genetic selfishness, but now serves another purpose, what is the other purpose? 
What is morality‘s current utility? The answer to this question may not be definitive, given 
that it could be maintained that morality is still in part a manifestation of genetic intentions. 
Notwithstanding, it can be argued that the powerful phenomenon of human consciousness 
may play an even greater role in our behaviour than our genes. This has been stressed by 
Dawkins in his qualifying remark, ―We, alone on earth, can rebel against the tyranny of our 
selfish replicators.‖
290
 Humanity‘s unique capacity for conscious foresight allows us to 
reflect and consider moral issues as opposed to being blindly led by our animalistic urges. 
Within philosophy though, consciousness itself is a contentious issue – at least at present, it 
is a phenomenon we have not yet been able to fully grasp. Yet we are quite adamant it 
exists; we feel it distinguishes us from automatons or mere amalgams of genetic parasites.  
 Dennett, who is himself a philosopher engaged in discourse surrounding the idea of 
consciousness, puts forth a concurrent view.
291
 He feels that the cognitive architecture of the 
self allows us to become moral agents.
292
 Our competence for understanding the reasons for 
morality, and subsequently reflecting upon those reasons, allow us to change them into 
different reasons.
293
 This is not a new realisation; Hume recognised it, as he differentiated 
between natural and man-made virtues.
294
 Huxley too understood that it was humanity‘s 
conscience (understood as an aspect of consciousness) which revolted against the moral 
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 As such, nature is not the sole commander of our moral compass. 
The view then of sociobiology as understood here, suggests that morality indeed has natural 
biological origins, however, these origins no longer dictate our moral fibre; conscious 
thinking, reflection and culture now too plays a prominent, perhaps even greater role. 
Moreover, it is not an either/or situation, but a complex amalgam of motivations which are 
perhaps too intricate to fully understand.  
 
Reductionism and Emergence 
Once the biological principles of life had been unearthed through the study of evolution, 
conjecture began as to what implications this would have for our understanding of ourselves. 
However, the application of scientific theories to the analysis of human nature has been met 
with resistance, perhaps because of the feeling that it undermines human uniqueness. It may 
also be a result of the understanding that human nature or the human self encompasses 
religious experiences and morality; some of the most cherishable features of our existence. 
Defensiveness towards scientific explanations of these phenomena was thus anticipated by 
the seminal psychologist William James in 1902, as he felt it necessary to provide somewhat 
of a disclaimer when attempting to use the sciences to explain religious experiences, ―When 
I handle them (religious experiences) biologically and psychologically as if they were 
curious facts of individual history, some of you may think it a degradation of so sublime a 
subject... Such a result is of course alien to my intention.‖
296
 John Paul II also explicated 
limitations with regard to how the physical sciences can explain human nature by posing an 
ontological discontinuity between humanity, with its capacity for spirituality, and the rest of 
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 John Paul II felt that self-consciousness, self-awareness, and pertinently in 
the context of this thesis, moral conscience, must be analysed through philosophical 
reflection; they are beyond the reach of experimental scientific research.
298
 
 Humanity‘s moral sense is a specific element of human nature which John Paul II 
felt was beyond the ambit of scientific explanation. Though John Paul II appreciates the 
explanatory prowess of the natural sciences in relation to the physical continuity of 
evolution, he draws a partisan when it comes to the social/moral realms – a partisan which, 
as we have seen, is transcended by the sociobiologists. John Paul II‘s search for a partisan 
here points in the direction of an ongoing debate on reductionism and emergence. John Paul 
II feels that higher-level complexes, such as human nature, cannot be explained in terms of 
reduction to lower levels. Such a reductionist explanation would ultimately lead to the 
fatalistic reading of sociobiology; that our behaviour is fatally bound and explicable in terms 
of unscrupulous genetic parasites. Reductionist explanations of this sort are, according to 
John Paul II, ―incompatible with the truth about man.‖
299
  
 It is argued here, however, that evolutionary explanations of ethics are not 
reductionist in this sense. This can be shown to be a narrow view of reductionism that 
suggests all things including human nature can be understood in terms of the principles of 
physics and chemistry, which would again threaten the idea of moral freedom. By 
accounting for higher-level subjects such as human nature and morality in terms of lower-
level constituents, many may believe that the higher-level subjects cease to exist; they are 
merely corollaries of the interactions of their constituent elements. Nancey Murphy and 
George Ellis argue that if one accepts sociobiology, then one arrives at this conclusion – 
though they themselves reject the premise. They feel that the sociobiological project of 
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explaining morality in terms of genetics deprives morality of its own essence; it reduces the 
moral to the nonmoral, hence clearly conflicting with moral freedom.
300
 These narrow 
presentations of reductionism are however, as the late Irish philosopher Ernan McMullin 
incisively writes, based on common misapprehensions of reductionism.
301
 
 McMullin believes that the terms ‗reducitonist‘ and ‗reductionism‘ have acquired a 
negative stigma, derived from the ―widely-shared belief that a reductionist is someone who 
denies the existence of a strongly evidenced reality.‖
302
 This is exemplified with Murphy 
and Ellis‘ criticism of genetic accounts of morality. Yet this criticism is based on an 
oversimplified interpretation. Reductionist accounts of any entity need not deny its essence, 
let alone its existence. Were this to be the case, McMullin admits, reductionism would 
indeed be a threatening programme.
303
 He uses the example of colour to illustrate that 
reductionism has no such repercussions, ―The colour of an object is no less real because it 
can be explained in terms of the properties and configuration of the constituents of the 
body‘s surface layer of atoms.‖
304
 With regard to morality, just because it can be explained 
in terms of genetics does not mean that it is any less ‗real‘ or that we are any less free. 
Furthermore, as we seen, even strident advocates of sociobiology such as Dawkins and 
Dennett would not hold that morality can be explained completely in terms of genetics – 
genetics may merely explain its origins. 
 McMullin also challenges the common view of the nature of reductionism, namely, 
that its chief concern is reduction. He explains this counter-intuitive notion by stating that 
when the science of a complex whole is reduced by the science of its constituent parts, it 
may be better described in some cases as an enlargement of the lower-level science.
305
 The 
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connotations of the term ‗reduction‘ may lead to an unfortunate misappropriation. It may be 
that the higher-level is not so much being reduced as the lower-level is being enlarged. This 
is exemplified in scientific history with the development of sub-atomic physics which 
seemed to require an entirely new mode of science to be developed. Atoms were ‗reducible‘ 
in a sense to constituent particles, but the behaviour of atoms did not directly correspond to 
the interactions of their constituents, which seemed to have a different set of governing 
principles. In terms of the question of evolutionary ethics, it may be then considered that 
sociobiology does not so much reduce morality to a proxy of genetics, but rather, enlarges 
our picture of the differential survival of genes. As McMullin writes in more general terms, 
―... reduction is not necessarily the simple shifting of epistemological and ontological weight 
from whole to parts that it is often assumed to be.‖
306
 As such, there is no need to posit an 
ontological distinction between human nature and the physical chain of living matter, as 
John Paul II has; evolutionary theories, by examining the realm of human moral 
consciousness and interpreting it from a biological perspective, do not necessarily conflict 
with the truth of the dignity of the human person. 
 A further issue relevant to the idea of moral freedom in terms of reductive 
explanations of morality, is that such reductive explanations do not completely discount 
‗emergence‘. As contemporary theologians such as Willem B. Drees and Philip Clayton 
note, rhetoric usually portrays emergence and reductionism as sharply opposed.
307
 However, 
this is not necessarily the case. McMullin provides a more subtle and nuanced 
understanding. He roughly defines emergence as when a higher-level property is irreducible 
by the sciences governing the constituents from which it derives.
308
 Morality may be held as 
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an example of an emergent property; it is not wholly reducible to the sciences governing the 
constituents from which it derives, given the importance of human consciousness as 
discussed above. Morality‘s origin may be explained in terms of gene/group selection, but it 
is no longer completely governed by the factors from which it emanated. One prominent 
supporter of the notion of emergence in evolution is Gould; he rejects the idea that bodies 
could be considered as passive slaves of controlling constituents – a claim he feels is made 
by gene-selectionists.
309
 Therefore, even beyond the question of morality, the concept of 
emergence is held as a legitimate, if debated, aspect of evolutionary theory – for example, 
debate between Gould and Dennett.
310
 
 McMullin points to the contemporary philosophical problem of consciousness (or 
the mind-body problem) as an exemplar of the ―battlefield‖ between reductionism and 
emergence.
311
 Within this field, McMullin writes, one finds strong support for the claim that 
the realm of the mental is not reducible (in the narrow sense) by the sciences of the brain‘s 
constituents – though there would be disagreement depending on what interpretations of 
reduction and emergence were employed.
312
 With respect to morality, as an element of the 
mental realm, sociobiology can present coherent proposals which reconcile moral instincts 
with the principles of natural selection; they do so by explaining morality (a higher-level 
entity) in terms of its constituents. However, it was shown that such a reductive explanation 
merely postulates the reasons for the origins of morality, that is, to say nothing about its 
current function. Therefore, given that it cannot be fully explained in terms of its 
constituents, morality could also be considered an emergent property as its origins do not 
explain its current utility. Consequently, attempts to definitively categorise morality as either 
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reductive or emergent are unnecessary, perhaps even futile; depending on the interpretation 
of these ambiguous terms, one need not fully discount the other. 
 From a more nuanced appreciation of reduction and emergence, the ontological 
continuity between humans and all other life, made known to us from the science of genetics 
and our shared DNA composition, does not diminish the reality of the human person. More 
particularly, genetic understandings of morality do not relegate it to the realm of 
nothingness; explanations of a property do not deny their existence. Theologian Arthur 
Peacocke recognises this concept; he states that new realities can emerge from the 
continuous process of evolution.
313
 Morality, which is evident in humans and other animals, 
can be held as an archetypal example of a new reality which emerges; a new reality which is 
epistemologically irreducible, though ultimately reducible. This mode of understanding 
evolution will be argued throughout this thesis to be more scientifically accurate and more 
theologically defensible than attempts to postulate humanity as somehow ontologically 
separate. Sociobiological explanations for morality are concerned with reconciling evident 
behaviours with underlying scientific principles; they do not deny its clearly existent reality. 
Fears that explaining morality will erode the cherished dignity and moral freedom of the 
human person are therefore ultimately misplaced.  
 Given these three fallacies of the fatalistic interpretation of evolutionary ethics, a 
strong case can be made for the view that evolutionary ethics does not conflict with the idea 
of human moral freedom, which is intrinsic to Christian ethics as it is understood in this 
thesis – moral freedom will also be a central theme in Chapter Five. Evolutionary ethics 
does not lead one to the conclusion that humans are mindless drones being driven by their 
constituent genes. Therefore, a perceived conflict between evolutionary ethics and Christian 
ethics on the issue of free will is misplaced; sociobiological accounts allow for the idea of 
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moral freedom which is essential for Christian ethics. In addition, it will be maintained in 
later chapters that evolutionary understandings of ethics provide hope in what may be 
otherwise understood as a nihilistic world.  
 
2.4 Perceived Conflict with Agape and Neighbourly Love 
Another perceived area of conflict between evolutionary ethics and Christian ethics as I 
understand it, is the notion of agape and neighbourly love. As discussed in section 2.1.2, 
agape and neighbourly love are unconditional; irrespective of a neighbour‘s gender, political 
affiliation, sexual orientation, etc., a neighbour is to be loved. Distant neighbours and even 
enemies are understood to be morally relevant. Two potential points of conflict can thus be 
discerned between evolutionary ethics and Christian ethics with respect to neighbourly love; 
Firstly, from the perspective of Christian ethics outlined in section 2.1, there should be a 
specific focus on the least advantaged, in a somewhat Rawlsian fashion (an idea particularly 
salient in liberation theologies). Evolutionary views on morality may conflict with the 
emphasis on the least advantaged given that in such a view, morality is ultimately derived 
from the principle of competition. Secondly, given that evolutionary ethics is ultimately 
‗selfish‘ and positively discriminates by degree of relatedness, it may be considered to 
conflict with the indiscriminate, boundless altruism of agape. 
 The first point of conflict could be evident when it is considered that evolutionary 
ethics has been promoted in the past as a socio-political doctrine aimed at ‗improving‘ the 
human race. The principle of competition in evolution, if taken also as a principle of ethics, 
would seem to be in opposition to the ideas of a preferential option for the disadvantaged, 
agape and neighbourly love. Rather than placing the least fortunate as the concern of wider 
society, theorists such as Francis Galton, a first cousin of Darwin, proposed to implement 
measures aimed at preventing certain groups (who could be equated to the ‗least fortunate‘) 
98 
 
from breeding, ―preventing the free propagation of the stock of those who are seriously 
afflicted by lunacy, feeble mindedness, habitual criminality and pauperism....‖
314
 Herbert 
Spencer also produced a view that would seem to correlate to the principles of competition 
and contrast with a preferential option for the poor; he felt that the subordination of egoism 
to altruism would ultimately be detrimental to society and that indiscriminate charity would 
be demoralising
315
 – of course in reading Spencer and Galton, we should be aware that they 
were writing in a specific context, and therefore, as philosopher Paul Thomson has argued, 
are often misrepresented and disproportionately criticised.
316
 
 As a result of such theories, Ruse has argued that evolutionary ethics has ―a 
(deservedly) bad reputation‖ because of the socio-political agendas of particular theorists.
317
 
Ruse interprets Spencer‘s outlook as a metaethic which seeks to morally promote the 
evolutionary process, which progresses ―from simple to complex, from amoeba to man, 
from... savage to Englishman.‖
318
 Ruse claims that the first theorists to begin to reflect on 
the ethical implications of evolutionary theory were led to the conclusion that we should be 
morally obliged to ―let the weakest go to the wall.‖
319
 Such a perspective on our moral 
‗ought‘ saliently conflicts with a fundamental tenet of Christian ethics as understood in this 
thesis, which seeks not ‗send the weak to the wall‘, but to promote a preferential option for 
the poor.  
 With regard to the second point of conflict, whether evolutionary ethics can be seen 
as contrary to the Christian idea of altruistic agape, Ruse elaborates and distinguishes 
between a weak and strong form of the Christian idea of neighbourly love; the weak version, 
defined as ―One‘s obligations are to be a good family man or woman, to be decent and kind 
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to one‘s friends and acquaintances... and to be prepared to lend a hand to a stranger in 
need.‖
320
 The strong form of neighbourly love, however, extends the sphere of morally 
relevant individuals to include enemies. On this stronger Christian interpretation, Ruse 
suggests that conflict does indeed emerge between the two systems.
321
 As noted in section 
2.2, sociobiological accounts of altruism are generally premised on the question, ‗for the 
benefit of who?‘ – kin, the group, the individual, etc. Evolutionary accounts of ethics posit 
that altruistic behaviour is justifiably discriminatory towards closer kin or groups, given that 
they are more likely to share genes. Moreover, in the case of reciprocal altruism (direct and 
indirect), altruistic behaviour would be discriminatory towards those who may reciprocate, 
or towards a society that may reciprocate, as opposed to ‗cheaters‘ in such models. This 
discriminatory factor of evolutionary ethics seems opposed to the stronger representation of 
Christian indiscriminate and boundless love. 
 
Errors in the Perceived Conflict with Agape and Neighbourly Love 
On the first point of conflict between evolutionary ethics and agape/neighbourly love, the 
derivation of an ethical program such as Galton or Spencer‘s is not an evolutionary ethic as 
understood in this chapter. Rather, it is adopting a moral ‗ought‘ from a scientific ‗is‘; using 
detached hyper-rationality over conscience to formulate moral decisions. On this point, Ruse 
endorses G.E. Moore‘s criticism of Spencer and Galton for committing the naturalistic 
fallacy; as Moore wrote, ―These doctrines are those which maintain that the course of 
‗evolution‘ while it shews us the direction in which we are developing, thereby and for that 
reason shews us the direction in which we ought to develop.‖
322
 David Hume had similarly 
forewarned about developing morals directly from reason, as he states, ―Reason itself is 
utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our 
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 Augustine too offered a similar view, perhaps one which could be considered a 
predecessor to Hume, as he expressed scepticism with regard to forming moral judgements 
based on reason alone.
324
  
 Notwithstanding such caveats, evolution may in fact offer some guide for ethical 
conduct; Singer‘s views of the treatment of apes already mentioned section 2.2 is an 
example. Similarly, ethical systems that express particular concern for the biosphere have 
been advocated and grounded in evolutionary theory; Bron Taylor‘s Dark Green Religion 
and Anna Primavesi‘s Sacred Gaia are examples.
325
 Ruse also concedes that drawing ethical 
imperatives is not necessarily erroneous.
326
 However, drawing ethical stances from 
evolutionary theory is not of particular concern at this point. As outlined in section 2.2, I am 
taking evolutionary ethics as a model for understanding how moral behaviour may emerge 
from natural selection. This understanding of evolutionary ethics is essentially 
inconsequential with regard to specific moral issues – despite the fact that ethical 
imperatives have been taken from evolution. Evolutionary ethics provides a scheme for 
understanding how moral behaviour could evolve through the process of natural selection, 
but it is not an attempt to provide a scheme for how to be moral. A parallel could be drawn 
with the oft quoted expression, attributed to Galileo quoting sixteenth century Vatican 
librarian Ceasar Baronius, ―Spiritui Sancto mentem fuisse nos docere quomodo ad coelum 
eatur, non quomodo coelum gradiatur‖ (the holy spirit teaches us how to go to heaven, not 
how heaven goes).
327
 Evolutionary ethics conversely, teaches us how morality becomes, not 
how one becomes moral – nor can it teach us whether what we understand as virtuous can 
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actually be considered to have an a priori virtue, if such a thing even exists. Therefore, there 
is no conflict between my understandings of Christian ethics with regard to agape and 
neighbourly love and the evolutionary principle of competition.   
 The second point of conflict which may be perceived between evolutionary ethics 
and Christian ethics is whether evolutionary ethics has presented morality as ultimately 
selfish (for the benefit of one‘s genes, or group for instance), and thus contrary to the 
indiscriminate and boundless agape and neighbourly love of Christian ethics. Colin Grant 
makes this point as he notes that the morality of sociobiology does not fit the altruism of the 
Gospels; he feels that sociobiology ―naturalises‖ altruism and does not fit the radicalism of 
Jesus‘ teachings.
328
 Yet this issue may be a semantic misunderstanding; in genetics, terms 
such as ‗altruism‘ and ‗selfishness‘ do not carry the same meaning as they do in traditional 
moral discourse. Peter Singer makes this point, as he explains that when speaking of 
biology, altruism and selfishness are consequentialist; they do not pertain to conscious 
motives. Singer explains that sociobiology‘s peculiar use of the term ‗selfish‘ relates solely 
to whether or not actions maximise the number of descendants one has. These terms have 
nothing to do with motives, ―they refer only to actual consequences of the individual‘s 




 This is a similar issue to the previously noted contention between Dawkins and 
Midgley regarding his use of analogical language. Sociobiology is not speaking of conscious 
selfishness but merely using such language as a heuristic method. J.L. Mackie also 
highlights this distinction as he follows the evolutionary understanding of morality, 
particularly as expressed in the work of Dawkins.
330
 Mackie emphasises that evolutionary 
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explanations of morality are theoretical points of biology; they are not meant to be construed 
as ethical subjects in the traditional sense, nor are they offered as psychological 
frameworks.
331
 Mackie refutes Midgley‘s argument that the ‗selfish gene‘ concept leads to 
excessive egoism. Rather, he assures us, evolutionary ethics demonstrates how morality 
emerges from a mixture of biologically determined general tendencies and cultural traits, 
which lead to mixed behavioural ‗strategies‘ between individuals.
332
  
 Morover, again, the role of human consciousness is not taken into account in such 
critiques/perceived conflicts. Sociobiology, as it is presented by Dawkins, Dennett and 
others, clearly indicates that morality is not ultimately selfish; this would be to make the 
error of confusing origins with functions, as discussed in section 2.3.1. In sum, sociobiology, 
given that it acknowledges the powerful role of human consciousness and the differences 
between origins and functions, does not discount the genuine agape of the Christian 
message  
 
2.5 Perceived Conflict with Natural Law 
As outlined in section 2.1.3, natural law can be seen as an interplay between human reason 
and nature; that human reason helps to uncover an inherent moral law which is reflective of 
divine values. There could be a perceived conflict between this understanding of natural law 
and the field of evolutionary ethics given that natural law implies an objective moral code. 
On this point, Edward Wilson makes a sharp distinction between a natural law concept of 
ethics (which he terms transcendentalist) and his own sociobiological account (which he 
terms empiricist) – though I acknowledge here that Wilson‘s two options may not be the 
only ones available.
333
 Interestingly, Wilson points out that neither of these approaches are 
necessarily theistic or atheistic; a transcendentalist approach to ethics can be atheistic, whilst 
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an empiricist approach can be theistic (Wilson himself for example, identifies strongly as an 
empiricist with regard to ethics, but also as leaning towards deism).
334
 In any case, he 
outlines what he perceives as the two ‗options‘ for ethical foundations, ―I believe in the 
independence of moral values, whether from God or not, versus I believe that moral values 
come from humans alone; God is a separate issue.‖
335
 A vision of natural law, as Wilson 
understands it, whether theistic or not, implies a self-evident set of moral principles, whereas 
an empiricist views ethics as conduct ―favoured consistently enough throughout a society to 
be expressed as a code of principles.‖
336
   
 An objective frame of reference against which behaviour can be deemed moral or 
immoral can possibly be signified as conspicuously absent from sociobiology, and thus a 
potential point of conflict between natural law and evolutionary ethics. It was noted in the 
previous chapter that the history of ethics can be contextualised substantially by a theo-
centric notion of an objective set of divinely instituted moral precepts. Evolutionary ethics 
however, is seemingly self-sufficient; it can explain morality without reference to a 
primordial covenant or divine ideal of the good. This apparent point of conflict has also been 
highlighted by Keith Ward, who feels that Christian ethics has a solid foundation or a 
metaethic akin to a Kantian sense of duties; there is a categorical, authoritative command to 
obey moral duties, a command which comes from God.
337
 Without this metaethic, 
sociobiology therefore cannot be an adequate framework for understanding morality, and as 
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Errors in the Perceived Conflict with Natural Law 
The oppositional model of natural law and sociobiology can be discredited when the strong 
parallels between the two systems are acknowledged. The political philosopher Larry 
Arnhart, for example, expresses the view that although we can rationally deliberate upon our 
plans for societal life, and prudently judge what to do in particular circumstances, our moral 
experience is not arbitrary; it is an expression of our nature.
338
 This conclusion can be taken 
from either Aquinas‘ natural law or sociobiology, thus demonstrating similarities between 
the two systems. Arnhart goes as far as to say that sociobiology belongs to the ―tradition of 
moral naturalism that includes the idea of natural law as elaborated by Thomas Aquinas.‖
339
  
Natural law and evolutionary accounts of ethics both specify a general structure of human 
morality, or at least postulate strikingly similar natural origins under the rubric of preserving 
human life and valuing offspring, though neither can adjudicate over disagreements in 
particular cases.
340
 Even stalwart sociobiologists would agree that their accounts of the 
origins of morality cannot indicate what is and what is not moral – though as noted above, 
evolutionary theories can and have been utilised to justify particular moral outlooks with 
regard to the environment and other issues. Aquinas and the sociobiologists both argue that 
morality has its origins in nature. Moreover, further similarities exist pertaining to the role of 
reason; Dawkins and Dennett, for example, are reminiscent of Aquinas in emphasising that 
conscious reason plays a key role in navigating moral decisions, despite acknowledging that 
we may have natural prejudices towards certain actions. 
 However, as theologian Stephen Pope rightly points out, there can be no simple 
synthesis between Thomas‘ ethics and evolutionary theory.
341
 For this reason, Neil Messer 
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critiques Arnhart‘s marrying of sociobiology and natural law as too simplistic.
342
 In spite of 
this caveat, Pope does acknowledge that functional equivalencies can be identified between 
the two systems.
343
 For example, natural law as it is understood here, is an interplay between 
human reason and an innate morality in nature. Similarly, sociobiology suggests that a 
morality arose in nature, and subsequently, human reason took a prominent role in our 
categorising behaviour as moral or immoral. As Pope writes, Thomas‘ ideal of love is an 
―integral personal response ordering and incorporating the appetites as well as the 
intellect.‖
344
 Consequently, it is clear that given these functional equivalencies, there need 
not be direct conflict between the natural law of Christian ethics and evolutionary ethics; 
much to the contrary, there are in fact deep similarities.  
 Despite these similarities and parallels, it could still be argued that in reconciling 
sociobiology with natural law it is necessary to excise the theological element from natural 
law. Philosopher Craig Boyd has stressed this point; that theologians who seek to reconcile 
the two systems are distorting Aquinas‘ ethics to make natural law palatable to 
sociobiologists.
345
 Boyd is correct in stating that the sociobiologist or ethical empiricist does 
not need to appeal to God in their explanations of morality. Wilson, for example, favours ―a 
purely material origin of ethics.‖
346
 However, this highlights another relevant 
theological/philosophical concept, namely, the idea of explanatory pluralism; varying 
explanations for a given phenomena can coexist without being in direct conflict with one 
another. Unless two explanations are demonstrably shown to conflict, then there is no a 
priori reason for discounting one.
347
 It can be argued then that phenomena may have a 
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plurality of explanations of equal authority; a teapot boils because a person wants a cup of 
tea, or because a person turned on the stove, or because the molecules of water are escaping 
as the water heats. Returning to E.O. Wilsons‘ demarcation between two ‗options‘ for a 
grounding of morality (transcendentalist or empiricist), acknowledging the possibility of 
explanatory pluralism may suggest that it is not an either/or situation. A number of 
contemporary theologians engaged in the science – religion dialogue adopt this method of 
understanding, for example, John Haught and John Polkinghorne (who both use the teapot 
analogy).
348
 In this view, sociobiology, despite not directly appealing to God, does not 
discount the theological element of natural law; elements of natural law that are not 
distinctly theological seem to coalesce reasonably well with the principles of sociobiology. 
 On the issue of a metaethic then, is there a possibility of a synthesis between 
evolutionary ethics and natural law on the issue of an objective morality? Even if there are 
similarities between the two systems, understanding morality as having evolved may depict 
it as inherently subjective, given that by definition it has originated as a result of biological 
processes; had these biological processes been different, surely our moral outlook (and 
indeed, much else) would be different. Ruse illustrates this point by postulating the existence 
of extraterrestrials – for the sake of argument I assume he is conceiving of extraterrestrials 
of a similar intelligence and who hold whatever other criteria we may use to classify one as 
a moral agent. He suggests that if such extraterrestrials had different biological 
characteristics, then perhaps they would have different moral outlooks on something such as 
rape.
349
 He suggests that, ―... we cannot automatically assume that our extraterrestrials 
would think rape immoral.‖
350
 Although Ruse himself makes a number of other points in 
relation to this discussion, I raise this issue to illustrate that if our morality is in some senses 
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dependent on our biological heritage, then our morality is inherently subjective and could 
have been otherwise, as it is for Ruse‘s hypothetical extraterrestrials. Hence, subsequent to 
reflecting upon our evolutionary history, we realise that perhaps a Platonic good is a 
redundant notion. This point, as noted above, was where Ward and others took issue with 
sociobiology, and thus felt the need to maintain a more traditional approach; a divinely 
instituted morality.  
 Despite the fact that morality has evolved and is dependant on our evolutionary 
heritage, its reality is not diminished – recall the sentiment of the emergent approach 
discussed above. The same could be said of moral objectivity; there may not be, as Ruse‘s 
extraterrestrial example illustrates, an a priori ethical objectivity inherent in the evolutionary 
process. Yet this does not necessarily discount an objective standard for morality. As John 
Rawls suggested, humanity can develop a system of a basic structure of justice; a social 
notion of objectivity.
351
 Willem B. Drees draws upon Rawls in this regard to suggest that a 
social establishment of a standard of justice can be ―a valuable complement to and 
corrective of our ethical intuitions as rooted in our biology. Ethical objectivity need not be 
linked to a realm of ethereal entities such as abstract values.‖
352
 As a result, in addition to 
the functional equivalencies, it can be argued that evolutionary understandings of ethics 
could mirror natural law in that they both portray human reason reflecting upon human 
nature and uncovering/constructing a moral standard – which reflects divine values in a 
theological interpretation. 
 There are, of course, at least two distinctions to be made when comparing the moral 
objectivity of natural law, and the moral objectivity as it is described in the Rawlsian 
standard of justice. Firstly, the Rawlsian standard of justice is not a priori; it can hardly be 
equated to the Eternal law of Aquinas‘ thought, given that it emerges from the evolutionary 
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process and subsequent reflection upon biological imperatives. That being acknowledged, a 
Rawlsian posteriori appreciation of morality may actually be incorporated into a revised 
theological framework, such as will be advocated in later chapters.  
 The second distinction is that, as Rawls himself acknowledges, ―There is no reason 
to suppose ahead of time that the principles satisfactory for the basic structure hold for all 
cases.‖
353
 Thus, one could question how objective Rawls‘ basic structure actually is. This 
caveat is also dutifully acknowledged by Aquinas, when considering moral precepts of the 
law of nature, ―... one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters.‖
354
 Even in 
Aquinas‘ vision of natural law then, subjectivity is acknowledged. Morality is not seen in 
either natural law or sociobiology as understood here to be fully objective or fully 
subjective; in adopting either view (or indeed, both), one can maintain that some objectivity 
is possible. Moreover, this objectivity is discerned through the interplay of human reason 
and nature. So whilst it is not contested that evolutionary ethics and natural law are identical, 
the similarities do suggest that they are at least not in conflict. Consequently, a perceived 
conflict between Christian ethics and evolutionary ethics on the issue of natural law can be 
argued to be resting upon weak foundations.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The underlying motivations and levels of Christian ethics and evolutionary ethics as I 
understand them are indeed different; Christian ethics is primarily concerned with 
developing a schema for employment in the real world as a guide for how people ought to 
live (the principles of agape, neighbourly love and a preferential option for the poor, for 
example). That being said, it is also concerned with a philosophical metaethic from which 
subsequent moral discourse can emerge (the concept that an ethical ideology has been 
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divinely revealed through Christ, or through natural law, for instance). Evolutionary ethics is 
not as concerned with making moral statements; its focus is an understanding of how ethics 
came to be, though again this is not to suggest that evolutionary theory cannot be employed 
to lend credence to or indeed rebuke moral statements (for example, pertaining to human 
attitudes to the biosphere). In this chapter, the two systems were compared in order to show 
that one does not supersede the other; evolutionary understandings of ethics can co-exist 
with Christian ethics. Arguments have been presented (such as those by Midgley and John 
Paul II, among others) which suggest that human morality is (at least in part) beyond the 
remit of explanation by the natural sciences. However, it was argued in this chapter that 
evolutionary theory does provide insight into the origin and nature of human morality, and 
moreover, that these insights do not conflict with Christian understandings of ethics. 
 To illustrate this, an understanding of what is meant by ‗Christian ethics‘ was 
outlined in section 2.1, explicated in terms of three key motifs; moral freedom, agape and 
neighbourly love, and natural law. Furthermore, an understanding of evolutionary ethics was 
then outlined in section 2.2 – this was understood in terms of the theories/conclusions of 
sociobiology with regard to the questions of the origin and nature of human morality (of 
course noting that sociobiology in general is concerned with wider-than-human behaviour, 
and wider-than-moral behaviour). Perceived conflicts between these insights of sociobiology 
and the three tenets of Christian ethics as I understand them were then considered in sections 
2.3-2.5. Whilst potential conflicts may be discerned between evolutionary ethics and each of 
these three aspects of Christian ethics, I argued that upon a proper reading of sociobiology 
that had a nuanced appreciation of reductionism/emergence and fully acknowledged the 
important role of human consciousness, these perceived conflicts were ultimately specious; 
they were based upon misreadings or narrow interpretations of the key themes of 
evolutionary ethics. Consequently, a strong case is made for the compatibility of Christian 
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ethics and evolutionary ethics; even if they cannot be neatly consolidated, they are not in 
conflict. This allows me to advance the argument of this thesis further which will 
demonstrate how evolutionary ethics can influence a Christian theological worldview and 
provide a glimmer of hope. Before this argument reaches its culmination, it will be 
evidenced in the next chapter how theology can be re-shaped in light of evolutionary theory, 
thus providing a theological worldview which is more amenable to evolutionary ethics than 






AN EVOLUTIONARY THEOLOGICAL METAETHIC 
 
3.0 Introduction 
The first chapter dealt with a ‗traditional‘ framing of good and evil within a theological 
context which was heavily influenced by Augustine; the image of God having created a 
perfect world and instilling in it moral rubrics subsequently neglected by humanity. The 
second chapter then, in part, dealt the approach to good and evil as explicated by 
sociobiologists in light of their attempts to reconcile Darwinian principles with altruistic 
behaviour. Whilst it was argued that such sociobiological appreciations of morality do not 
fully discount the theological understandings explored in Chapter One, there are aspects of 
such understandings that require revision in light of evolutionary theories of morality. For 
example, the traditional narrative understood goodness as an intrinsic element of creation, 
and thus, evil was a conspicuous feature of the world which demanded explanation. 
Evolutionary explanations of ethics reverse this demand, by demonstrating the principles of 
struggle evident in evolution and questioning the origins of good. As such, this asymmetrical 
shift must become an important element in a revised theological appreciation of ethics and 
good/evil. 
 Sociobiological theory therefore, provides significant motive for constructing a 
coherent metaethic which definitively supplants the concept of a ‗golden age‘ of goodness 
which humanity is trying to recover. A reframing of the asymmetry in traditional searches 
for the cause of evil is needed; evil did not enter the world through a primordial misdeed, as 
with Augustine‘s hermeneutical representation of the fall, but only gained intelligibility as a 
concept itself in the evolution of morality, or in a more anthropocentric view, with the 
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evolution of human moral consciousness. The traditional understandings of the fall maintain 
some merit in light of evolution – for example, our understandings of the evolutionary 
principle of competition might lend scientific credence to the aspects of original sin which 
view humanity as destined for evil – if evil is equated with selfishness (see section 1.1). 
However, as an overarching metaethic the traditional fall narrative fails on the issue of a 
primordial good. Thus, there is a need to shift away from traditional understandings of the 
fall in light of sociobiology. 
 The crux of this chapter therefore, is to outline a theological approach which 
appreciates the need for a paradigm shift with respect to the framework of good and evil. 
Such a paradigm shift will be largely (though not wholly) attributed to our growing 
appreciation of evolutionary theory. Contributions towards such a shift in worldview have 
been made by a number of scholars in modern theology. Particularly with regard to 
theologians engaged in the theology-science dialogue, there is a discernable tendency to now 
envisage the world as developing rather than having been created perfect; a move from the 
concept of creatio ex nihilo to creatio continua, in line with our understanding of the 
ongoing process of evolution. However, specific problems and issues within this shift can be 
identified, which lead me to suggest that particularly pertaining to a metaethic, such a 
theological approach needs further reflection and refinement. Consequently, this leads me to 
pose four distinct criteria which much be addressed in a theological worldview appreciative 
of evolutionary ethics; i) it appreciates the evolving nature of the world, the evolving nature 
of goodness, and the evolving nature God‘s creative action ii) it makes reference to the 
divine, iii) it provides a response to the theodicy question, and iv) it appreciates our present 
responsibilities. 
 Section 3.1 will demonstrate that sociobiology has influenced theologians such as 
Neil Messer and Patricia Williams to discard the traditional notion of goodness being an 
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intrinsic element of creation. I will then argue that sociobiology actually offers a 
replacement of sorts for our understanding of the origins of good and evil; they only became 
intelligible with the evolution of morality. Only when the ability to reflect upon right and 
wrong (which is, it is maintained, a characteristic only humans possess) can actions be 
considered morally good or morally evil. This is in contrast to the traditional conceptual 
scaffolding of a preordained good which human moral reflection was then measured against. 
Therefore, the sociobiological account of the knowledge and causal origin of ethics arguably 
has a significant impact on the conceptual status of ethics, i.e. whether ethics can transcend 
its context; if morality (that is beyond the altruism evident in other animals) only emerges 
with humanity, then is morality inherently anthropocentrically subjective? – this issue was 
also addressed section 2.5.    
 In contrast to the vision of an instantaneous creation, section 3.2 will then explore 
how certain theologians have altered their interpretation of God‘s creative action in light of 
our evolutionary understanding. The third section of this chapter, section 3.3, will then 
explore proposals for an eschatologically focused theology in light of evolution; the view 
that evolution is progressing towards a specific goal, namely, a divine Omega. On this issue, 
theological appropriations of evolution may not be able to derive explicit support from 
evolutionary theory, as evolution is not understood as goal-oriented;  Gould stressed this 
point in his popular metaphor of winding back the tape of life and letting it run again, and 
the unlikely possibility that anything like humans would reappear.
355
 This raises the issue of 
teleology, which will be also be discussed in this section. In contrast to theologians who 
draw upon interpretations of evolution which signal some form of teleology, it will be 
contested in this section that conscious teleology emerges only with the evolution of the 
moral sense and is not a priori. Notwithstanding, the developmental aspects of such 
                                                          




eschatological or teleological theologies are worth noting. Sections 3.1-3.3 therefore, deal 
with the first criterion set forth above; appreciating the evolving nature of the world, the 
evolving nature of goodness, and the evolving nature of God‘s creative action.  
 With respect to the emphasis on ongoing development in sections 3.1-3.3, the 
question of how the divine is reflected in this framework becomes apparent. If the divine is 
not reflected in the direct design of life and the world, as with William Paley‘s argument 
from design and other notions of an instantaneous creator, then it needs to be asked how the 
divine is reflected, if at all, in an evolutionary or developmental worldview. Section 3.4 will 
address this question and follow John Haught in referring to Paul Tillich‘s idea of God as 
depth, thus responding to the second criterion set forth above. Section 3.5 will then expound 
on how a developmental or evolutionary view can provide a response to the theodicy 
question –  as required by the third criterion. It will then be discussed in section 3.6 how the 
shift in theological understandings of the world, which stem largely from evolutionary 
theory, can be appreciative of present moral responsibilities. In this section, it will be argued 
that an immanent model of God, such as that explored in section 3.4, coupled with 
evolutionary ethics, provides reasoning for acknowledging present ethical imperatives, as 
required by the fourth criterion. Section 3.6 will then outline how the respective themes 
raised in the chapter culminate to satisfy the four criteria outlined.  
 
3.1 A Shift in the Framework for Understanding Good and Evil 
Evolutionary accounts of ethics demonstrate that moral behaviour as manifest in humans has 
arisen after an immensely long period of time, like all other features of the biosphere. As a 
result, contrary to the traditional image of divinely created perfection, goodness has only 
recently emerged in evolutionary history. It follows therefore, that the universe underwent a 
vast period of moral indifference (save to the extent of potentially moral extraterrestrials and 
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again distinguishing between morality and functional altruism); the universe was originally 
amoral. The traditional portrayal of the biblical narrative begins to buckle as a framework 
for understanding good and evil when this realisation is taken into account. As discussed in 
Chapter One, the Augustinian answer to the theodicy problem, postulating that humanity 
turned its back on a created perfection, no longer seems adequate in light of the evolutionary 
view. This forces a substantial reframing of theological understandings of the good and evil; 
goodness enters the world at a much later stage than originally assumed by Augustine and 
his followers. 
 This realisation recalls a key issue for theological conceptualisations of the world; 
namely, the subjectivity of goodness (also discussed in the previous two chapters). If 
goodness was not as once thought, instilled as a steadfast and ontologically objective set of 
moral precepts, then it leads one to ask how we come to know the good and whether our 
knowledge of the good reflects any underlying moral framework. Of course, it has been 
common to reject this implication of sociobiology. Theologians such as Keith Ward (noted 
in the previous chapter) and John Haught insist on the need for an objective, underlying 
morality in nature that reflects the will of God.
356
 Our knowledge of this underlying 
morality, in the views of Ward, Haught and other like-minded theologians, comes from 
revelation – specifically in their context, from reflection on the Christian scriptures. As such, 
there is a type of moral frame of reference against which behaviour can be assessed; a frame 
of reference they feel is missing from purely sociobiological accounts.  
 Against their apprehensions regarding sociobiological accounts of ethics, it is 
contested in this thesis, that rather than being deficient of a moral frame of reference, 
sociobiological accounts actually provide an indication of the good; evolutionary 
explanations of ethics offer a glimmer of hope/goodness, they show a crack in the surface of 
                                                          




what otherwise seems a nihilistic world (this theme will be explored in greater detail in the 
next two chapters). As argued in the previous chapter, sociobiological accounts of ethics do 
not diminish their significance nor deny their metaphysical reality. It can be through 
evolutionary ethics that we come to know the good. From a Christian context this could be 
immediately critiqued as making Christian revelation redundant and adopting what 
theologian Alistair McFadyen terms a ‗pragmatic atheism‘ where reference to God makes no 
difference in how one acts.
357
 However, it will be argued later that Christian ethics could be 
understood as a manifestation of the good to which nature points. Here, I follow Neil Messer 




 Barth is critical of humanity‘s attempts to comprehend sin and provide for itself 
criteria to become its own law-givers, accusers and judges.
359
 For Barth, the human quest to 
distinguish between good and evil is an element of the sin of pride – perhaps it could also be 
equated to an element of the innate want for more in Rousseau‘s amore propre, or 
Augustine‘s original sin. Barth suggests that our perceived knowledge of good and evil is 
merely self-deception and delusion, which results in us eschewing the good and doing 
evil.
360
 True knowledge of good and evil in Barth‘s view is beyond the scope of human 
comprehension. He then argues that it is only through knowledge of Christ that we ―really 
know that man is the man of sin, and what sin is, and what it means for man.‖
361
 Barth can 
find support for his view in the biblical narrative. The pervading traditional representation of 
good and evil, as discussed, originates in Augustine‘s portrayal of the fall from paradise. 
However, a closer analysis of the scriptures indicates that the fall plays a relatively minor 
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role – this was noted in Ricoeur‘s exegesis in section 1.4. In the scriptures, it is only after 
Christ that Adam gains his significance as the culprit of original sin; it is only in comparison 
to the good of Christ that the sin of Adam becomes explicitly known. In less allegorical 
terms then, this corresponds directly with Barth‘s assertion that it is only through the 
goodness of Christ, that sin or evil can be understood. Similarly, in sociobiological terms, it 
is only with the evolution of goodness/morality that discussion of evil/sin is intelligible. 
Thus, the biblical narrative reflects the introduction of moral awareness through the origins 
of good, manifest in Barth‘s view with Christ.   
 Barth should be critiqued here, though, in terms of the broader dialogue between 
theology and the sciences. Such a resolutely Christ-centric appreciation of good and evil is 
inadequate in this broader setting. Messer, despite being explicitly supportive of Barth, 
acknowledges this point. He notes that attempting to affirm a cosmic and universal salvation 
through Christ can seem a ―scandalous thing to say in a pluralist world.‖
362
 However, the 
parallel could still be drawn, that it is only after goodness emerges that any sense of good 
and evil enters our ontological picture of the world. If we learn from evolutionary theory 
that there was no created perfection where goodness was established, then there must have 
been a transitional period or point where goodness enters – again, if goodness is taken to 
only be fully intelligible in light of humanity or indeed other hypothetical morally reflective 
beings. At this point, the world ceases to be amoral. Barth identifies this as the Christ event; 
thereafter, a true understanding of good and evil can transpire. A broader understanding 
appreciative of evolutionary ethics could in parallel assert that only after the point where 
human morality emerges, can an understanding of good and evil transpire. This is not 
necessarily to suggest that there was no animal sin/suffering before human morality evolved, 
but rather, that our unique appreciation of morality – what Darwin felt was the most 
                                                          
362 Neil Messer, Selfish Genes and Christian Ethics, p. 211 
118 
 
important distinguishable trait of humans – allowed for a full realisation of what we now 
consider as good and evil, right and wrong.
363
 
 Messer, following from Barth, then suggests that Darwin and his sociobiologist 
heirs perform the role of ‗masters of suspicion‘.
364
 Messer proposes that evolutionary 
accounts of ethics have helped to unmask our human pretensions regarding our knowledge 
of good and evil. Therefore, he feels, sociobiology can assist theology in developing a ―more 
trustworthy foundation on which our moral life may be built.‖
365
 The scientific theories 
which underpin sociobiology offer theology a more reasoned vantage point to develop a 
moral framework; it helps theology engage in what Dietrich Bonhoeffer calls the first task of 
Christian ethics, namely, to invalidate our perceived knowledge of good and evil – though 
Bonhoeffer still presents humanity as ―falling away‖ from God.
366
 
 The cardinal point here, is that our knowledge of good and evil can no longer be 
understood as instilled in a primordial creation. Rather, it enters much later, after the good 
has evolved or in Barth‘s view, is brought through Christ. Good and evil enter the world 
then, relatively recently. The position defended here, is that it is through the evolution of 
morality that good becomes intilligible. In some respects, this echoes Spinoza‘s objections 
to the theodicy problem stated in Chapter One; it is only in relation to human senses that 
anything is considered evil – there is no Platonic idea of evil independent of human minds. 
Moral good and moral evil exist as a result of evolved behavioural traits as explored through 
sociobiology; only with human consciousness can altruism transcend its behaviouristic 
functionality and really be considered moral. Representations of an archaic covenant or 
social contract seem too blunt to be consistent with what we learn from sociobiology. 
Notwithstanding, as argued in the previous chapter, this does not diminish the reality or 
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significance of moral values. Moreover, as will be discussed in section 3.4, our evolved 
sense of moral values can still be viewed as a reflection of the divine. 
 A similar position has been defended by Patricia Williams, though she is more 
concerned with the nature of morality (i.e. whether or not there is a normative morality 
evident in nature) than with its origins. Williams offers a critique of Christian ethics, when 
such ethics are premised by the notion of an inherent goodness in nature – what she 
understands as a natural moral law. She feels that such visions of morality are far too 
simplistic, as sociobiology indicates that some aspects of ‗nature‘s way‘ are deemed sinful 
(e.g. polygamy), whilst others are deemed good (e.g. altruism).
367
 The distinct caveat 
mentioned in the previous chapter again emerges here, which relates to the complexities of 
natural law and the subsequent difficulties in making any definitive statement about it; as 
Stephen Pope writes, Aquinas‘ work has always been discussed selectively.
368
 However, this 
caveat conversely strengthens Williams‘ stance, as it is the over-complexity of relations 
between sociobiology and natural law that for her, prevents there being any cohesion. In this 
sense, her view differs in nuance from that of Pope and Arnhart in the previous chapter.  The 
position defended in this thesis does coalesce with Williams by pointing out that 
sociobiology ―disproves‖ a simplistic vision of morality as innate in nature.
369
 Consequently, 
there is clear evidence of a need for a shift in thinking of good and evil as innate concepts 
created with the world. Furthermore, as seen in the writings of contemporary theologians 
such as Messer and Williams, this shift is in part catalysed by evolutionary ethics. 
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3.2 The Shift In Understanding God’s Creative Action 
Traditional understandings of God-as-Creator envisage a creation event, and thereafter, a 
God who maintains direct involvement with the world, usually through miracles. This is, of 
course, somewhat of an oversimplification and there are important texts which are 
exceptions to the more common Christian representations of creation.
370
 Indeed, Augustine‘s 
own reading of Genesis was far more nuanced than proposing an instantaneous or 
hexaemeral (six-day) creation. Augustine astutely differentiated between the ―Let there be... 
‖ and the ―Let the... bring forth...‖ – the ―Let the... bring forth...‖ representing a less 
stringently instantaneous creative action. As Ernan McMullin states, through this distinction 
Augustine had discussed a developmental understanding of creatures and humans‘ coming 
into being long before Darwin.
371
 Furthermore, according to McMullin, it was only since the 
sixteenth century that a literal interpretation of Genesis became popular.
372
 Despite noting 
these points, the developmental nature of evolutionary theory has still spawned the need for 
a reconsideration of how God creates and acts. In this respect, there has been a discernable 
shift in certain theologians‘ thinking towards viewing God as creating and acting through or 
with the laws of nature (perspectives on divine action will be explored in greater detail in the 
next chapter). In contrast to envisaging God‘s creative action at the beginning, there has 
been a discernable shift among certain scholars towards viewing God‘s creative action as 
ongoing; a point which has been presented as an eschatological view, as will be explored in 
the next section. 
 In an originally unpublished essay of 1920, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin considers 
the traditional way of understanding God‘s operative activity in the world as a dominant 
causality among other causalities, ―a force interpolated into the series of experiential 
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 He states that although this image of God‘s action has been often ―more or less 
unconsciously accepted‖, it is a rudimentary understanding which cannot be taken as it 
stands.
374
 Teilhard uses the analogy of a sphere packed with a large number of springs to 
represent nature‘s causality – each spring represents a causality and impacts on other 
springs. He envisages the traditional notion of God as another spring, though one which is 
more dominant; God is a causal force, in the same way that Peter or Paul were causal 
forces.
375
 In this representation, God acts in particular events in nature. However, Teilhard is 
discontent with such a view. He proffers another way in which to view God‘s action, ―A 
first, and peculiarly divine, way by which the First Cause can affect lower natures consists in 
its ability to act simultaneously on their whole body.‖
376
 Rather than acting on specific 
events, Teilhard views God as acting on all events at the same time. In his analogy of the 
sphere of springs, Teilhard imagines God as ―exerting so skilful a pressure over the whole of 
the surface of the system at once that it can, infallibly, produce whatever modification it 
wishes at any point inside the sphere.‖
377
 
 From this vantage point, Teilhard sees God as acting through nature, as opposed to 
contra naturam, as in the more traditional perspective of miraculous events. Teilhard thus 
suggests that God is active where we ―see only the work of nature.‖
378
 This is not quite to 
suggest that Teilhard was proffering a pantheism of sorts – indeed such compartmentalising 
of thought patterns may take us too far away from the discussion at hand, although in recent 
years there has been some interesting discourse regarding how models of divine action 
through nature could be expressed and categorised.
379
 Interestingly, though, Teilhard does 
himself raise the issue of pantheism and reflects positively upon its concern with viewing 
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the world as ―the Whole‖; this admiration of pantheism was in contrast to the widespread 
association of such philosophies with paganism and anti-Christianity at the time of 
writing.
380
 In any case, what is evident in this aspect of Teilhard‘s writing is the shift away 
from an ancient and instantaneous creation, which God later intervenes in, and towards the 
recognition of a more intrinsic relationship between the divine and the natural. As such, 
Teilhard is in a certain sense, presupposing a natural approach to theology; again, a theme 
which will be analysed in the next chapter.  
 As it pertains to the topic of evolutionary theory, Teilhard is explicit in stating that 
our scientific study of the universe and humanity is indicative of an evolutionary process.
381
 
Consequently, Teilhard sees God as working through the processes of evolution, of which, it 
is maintained in this thesis, evolutionary ethics is an important element. Teilhard‘s 
understanding of the God-world relationship thus catalyses him to propound on the nature of 
God‘s creative action. In line with evolutionary theory, and in contrast to the view of a 
Creator who completed heaven and earth with all their array
382
, Teilhard envisages an 
ongoing, evolving creation. He seeks to realise the presence of the divine current running 
beneath the causal nexus of the world; to comprehend ―creative transcendence through 
evolutive immanence.‖
383
 Such a vision of creation is in stark contrast to the traditional 
representations of a perfect creation as extrapolated from the Genesis narrative. 
 Whilst there are various idiosyncrasies with regard to particular perspectives on 
divine creative action, some of which will be explored in the next chapter, a shift in thinking 
regarding God‘s creative action is also present in a number of more recent scholars; that is to 
say, despite significant differences, there is an evident shift in contemporary theology 
towards viewing God as continually creating through the physical laws. Teilhard‘s theology, 
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as we shall see, still offers a blueprint for modern theologians‘ approach to evolution and as 
such, his work has been held as a prominent example of a revised approach to considering 
God‘s action, but there are others. Arthur Peacocke, for example, proposes a view which 
envisages God acting through what he calls ‗whole-system causation‘; God acts upon the 
whole of the universe and thus influences events from the top down.
384
 Peacocke 
acknowledges that in light of evolutionary theory, the temporal framework which shaped 
Judeo-Christian religious beliefs now has to make way for an image of God continuously 
creating.
385
 Concurrent endorsements of a continuing creation can be found with Ian 
Barbour and others.
386
 The theologian Robert John Russell, for example, explains that ―an 
increasing number of theologians working to appropriate a scientific perspective seem to 
agree on the emerging vitality and importance of creation continua.‖
387
 An ongoing creation 
is also a key theme of process theology, based upon the philosophies of Alfred North 
Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.
388
 Consequently, there is evidence of a shift in 
theological worldview away from the traditional image of an instantaneous (or at least 
hexaemeral) created perfection. However, a continuous creation may still be considered 
haphazard, aimless or with no particular goal. On this point, there has been a marked 
emphasis on viewing this continuing creative process as teleological and eschatological. 
 
3.3 The Shift Towards an Eschatological View 
Teilhard sought to outline an ontological vision which is reflective of the evolutionary 
nature of the living world as we have come to know through evolutionary science. 
Therefore, he suggests a shift from the traditional tendency to look back to God at the 
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beginning, and look towards God as the future; he proposes an eschatological focus for 
theology:  
 
Ever since Aristotle there have been almost continual attempts to construct 
‗models‘ of God on the lines of an outside Prime Mover, acting a retro. Since 
the emergence in our consciousness of the ‗sense of evolution‘ it has become 
physically impossible for us to conceive or worship anything but an organic 




There is therefore, a decisive shift evident in his thinking, from the idea of God as Alpha to 
an eschatological vision of God as Omega – biblical support for such an Omega vision of 
God can be found in Revelation 2:13. The concept of an instantaneous, perfect creation is 
not agreeable with Teilhard. In fact, he goes as far as to suggest that there is an ontological 
contradiction latent in the association of the terms ‗instantaneous‘ and ‗creation‘.
390
 
Moreover, he argues that in the case of a static creation, God is necessarily structurally 
independent of his creation, and is thus, ―without any definable basis to his immanence.‖
391
 
The static creation is interpreted as Teilhard as too separatist; indeed such a view may be 
deistic in its character. In Teilhard‘s view of God working through the laws of nature, God 
has a more intrinsic relationship with the world; God is involved in the here and now 
(however, he still emphasises God as Omega, which will be the subject of critique in section 
3.6).   
 John Haught thus categorises Teilhard‘s theology as a ‗metaphysics of the 
future‘.
392
 In Teilhard‘s theology, not only does he emphasise the developing, evolving 
nature of the world, but also, he suggests it is progressing towards a point; God as Omega. 
He takes from science the idea of a world in a process of maturation, that will in the 
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Christian worldview, eventually be unified with God in the eschaton.
393
 On this point, 
Teilhard may differ from the approach of scientists such as Jacques Monod, who interprets 
evolution as governed purely by fortuity and totally unrelated to whatever its effects on 
teleonomic functioning.
394
 However, Teilhard is adamant that his eschatological vision is no 
mere ―flowering of the imagination‖ or metaphorical understanding, but is grounded in 
literal, scientific terms.
395
 In his reading of evolutionary science, he recognises a distinct 
orientation – a teleology of sorts, though the notion of teleology in evolution can be 
problematic, as will be discussed below. 
 Teilhard‘s teleology is somewhat similar to Hegel‘s philosophy of mind/spirit 
(depending on the translation of the German term geist), in that they both view mind/spirit 
as an epoch of nature – though Teilhard‘s vision is explicated more in terms of evolution 
than Hegel‘s pre-evolutionary philosophy.
396
 Teilhard perceives the state of nature as an 
original state of discordance or purposelessness – perhaps comparable to more modern 
understandings of evolution such as Monod‘s. In the ‗tree of life‘, Teilhard posits that 
originally, humanity was no more than one line among many others.
397
 However, at a certain 
point, he suggests that life perforated a significant boundary when consciousness emerged, 
―But it happened, for some reason of hazard, position or structure, that this sole ray among 
the millions contrived to pass the critical barrier separating the Unreflective from the 
Reflective – that is to say, to enter the sphere of intelligence, foresight and freedom of 
action.‖
398
 The emergence of mind in life was for Teilhard a momentous event which 
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represented a transition in evolutionary nature from a state of aimless meandering to one 
with distinct progress:  
 
[T]he whole essential stream of terrestrial biological evolution is now flowing 
through the breach which has been made. The cosmic tide may at one time 
have seemed to be immobilised, lost in the vast reservoir of living forms; but 
through the ages the level of consciousness was steadily rising behind the 
barrier, until finally, by means of the human brain (the most ―centro-complex‖ 
organism yet achieved to our knowledge in the universe) there has occurred, at 
a first ending of time, the breaking of the dykes, followed by what is now in 
progress, the flooding of Thought over the entire surface of the biosphere. 
Thus regarded, everything in the history of the world takes shape, and what is 




 Teilhard refers to the emergence of consciousness as the ―sequel‖ to the 
monumental event of the origin of life itself;
400
 it is the key for explaining the progress of 
evolution. Consciousness, for Teilhard, is something which is markedly unique from the rest 
of life. In his view, human consciousness can be clearly discerned as the goal of evolution 
(of course this differs significantly from the understandings of biologists such as Monod), as 
he states:  
 
If the universe, regarded sidereally, is in process of spatial expansion (from 
the infinitesimal to the immense), in the same way and still more clearly it 
presents itself to us, physicochemically, as in process of organic involution 
upon itself (from the extremely simple to the extremely complex) – and, 
moreover, this particular involution ‗of complexity‘ is experimentally bound 





He sees in evolution an evident convergence towards consciousness.
402
 Consequently, his 
interpretation of evolution is decidedly teleological, allowing him also, to interpret evolution 
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eschatologically. Although Teilhard‘s writing predates much of our modern knowledge, it 
has also been suggested more recently that evolution is somehow converging towards 
certain goals. One proponent of such a view is the British palaeontologist Simon Conway 
Morris, who suggests that the reoccurrence of certain physical characteristics in life is 
indicative of a general teleology in the evolutionary process.
403
 Moreover, reminiscent of 
Teilhard‘s suggestion that consciousness is exhibitive of a deeper purpose within the 
unfolding drama of the cosmos, the physicist Paul Davies asserts that the self-genesis of 
self-awareness in the universe is ―no trivial detail, no minor by-product of mindless, 
purposeless forces.‖
404
 Therefore, Teilhard‘s views on consciousness do have modern 
parallels (though particular issues with the concept of teleology will be addressed below). 
 Teilhard builds upon the idea that evolution seems to be progressing, with 
consciousness signalling a significant milestone along the way – an idea he speculated 
would soon become generally accepted.
405
 In his eschatological theology, he maintains that 
the universe is continually being created and progressing towards a goal in the future, a 
unification of consciousness, ―Through its axial, living, portion, the universe is drifting, 
simultaneously and in just the same way, towards the super-complex, the super-centred, the 
super-conscious.‖
406
 This future pinnacle, what Teilhard calls the ‗Omega Point‘, is for him 
the source of salvation in a Christian context, ―Surely, this ‗Omega Point‘ (as I call it) is the 
ideal place from which to make the Christ we worship radiate.‖
407
 He goes further, then, by 
postulating that at this Omega Point, the conscious aspects of the universe will converge 
upon themselves – this, he feels will be humanity‘s redemption. At this point, Teilhard feels 
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he has produced a new theology, though the notion of a convergence of consciousnesses at 




Clarifications on Teleology 
A shifting attitude towards a more progressive vision of the world in line with evolutionary 
theory is thus evident in Teilhard‘s work. The conceptual deviation away from the 
traditional ‗backwards-looking‘ framework for understanding humanity and the world gives 
way to a ‗forward-looking‘ understanding. The world is not, as Plato thought, a creation 
made as perfect as possible, but rather an incomplete ‗work in progress‘. There is, in 
Teilhard‘s theology of Omega, a discernable teleological element – a problematic concept 
which requires clarification. 
 Teilhard‘s advocacy for a shift in perspective of the religious worldview, from a 
historically felled creation to an unfinished, eschatological view, has been taken as a 
framework for modern dialogue between theology and evolution, notably by John Haught. 
Haught points to Teilhard, suggesting that he was one of the first scientists to fully realise 
that the world is presently and continually coming into being.
409
 Haught takes from Teilhard 
the idea of progress in evolution; that there is a definitive ―coming of future‖ evident in the 
process.
410
 He feels that, ―in spite of the protests of many biologists, a cosmological 
perspective shows that there is a net overall advancement or ―progress‖ in evolution after 
all.‖
411
 However, this concept may lead Haught into an intellectual cul-de-sac, given that he 
is very much aware and appreciative of the ―randomness, struggle and seemingly aimless 
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meandering that the evolutionary story of life discloses....‖
412
 How can Haught reconcile the 
vision of progress he takes from Teilhard, and the chance and necessity of the evolutionary 
process? 
 He attempts to reconcile this dichotomy by allowing for a ―loose kind of 
teleology.‖
413
 He suggests that whilst evolution has the freedom to explore a multitude of 
avenues, he places constraints on such possibilities; the possibilities of life are not 
limitless.
414
 As a result, Haught rejects the view of biologists who view the evolutionary 
process as completely governed by chance and necessity. Regarding how such ‗limits‘ to the 
possibilities of evolution may actually apply, Haught refers to Morris‘ theory of 
evolutionary convergence mentioned above.
415
 The independent recurrence of particular 
features of life, (eyes and limbs, for example) leads Morris and Haught to the conclusion 
that there are underlying parameters within which evolution operates. Consequently, Haught 
adheres to a vision of evolution which from the outset, is governed to proceed in a certain 
way, culminating eventually in human consciousness. His approach seeks to appreciate the 
habituality and redundancy, along with the novelty of the evolutionary narrative.
416
  
 Although adopting Teilhard‘s framework for revising traditional understandings of 
God‘s creative action brings more consonance between a religious worldview and 
evolutionary theory, Haught‘s reliance on Morris‘ theory of convergence can be disputed for 
at least two reasons. Firstly, although Morris‘ argument has been adopted by theistic 
interpreters of evolution –  John Polkinghorne is another example
417
 –  a hermeneutic of 
suspicion is immediately required when approaching such a position, particularly given that 
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Morris‘ view may be an attempt to rebel against, as he himself writes, ―our deracinated and 
nihilistic culture....‖
418
 More significantly still, evolutionary theory has been interpreted 
more commonly as an open-ended, indeterminate process; that the apparent teleology or 
patterns are merely a reflection of the self-contained processes of evolution themselves 
(prominent examples of such a view include Gould and Dawkins).
419
 Secondly, and more 
pertinently from a theological perspective, is the acute implications for the problem of evil 
that evolutionary convergence brings; it implicitly denotes God as the creator of a process 
that is teeming with suffering from the outset (see section 1.6.2) – though this is stated 
whilst also being mindful of the fact that the interpretation of a ‗world teeming with 
suffering‘ could be challenged.  
 Teilhard, as we shall see in section 3.5, believed the problem of evil was made 
impotent in light of a creation that is still being created. However, if creation has in place 
particular guidelines which it must follow, as in Morris‘ understandings of evolutionary 
convergence, then it must be asked why these guidelines allow for suffering. The degree of 
teleology implicit in evolutionary convergence, however ―loose‖ it may be, inevitably 
revitalises the problem of evil. Indeed, Teilhard may well have agreed with Haught and 
Morris, but what I adopt from Teilhard in this thesis is to place greater emphasis on the 
notion that teleology emerges only once that sphere of intelligence has been penetrated – see 
the previous section.  
 In opposition to this assertion, the position could be defended that teleology was 
present throughout the process. In fact, if the first instance of true teleology in evolutionary 
morality for instance, is its manifestation in human behaviour, then this may ignore the long 
history of the development of morality in other species; altruism is not specific to humans, 
and therefore, to suggest that teleology only emerges in human manifestations of evolved 
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morality may be a self-contradictory statement. Cambridge theologian Sarah Coakley, in her 
Gifford Lectures of 2012, developed such an argument which could be used as a critique of 
my view in this regard. She notes, with reference to the work of biologist John Maynard 
Smith, that evolution has seen various transitions, originally from the inorganic to the 
organic, then from individually-replicating molecules to chromosomes, from prokaryotes to 
eukaryotes, from single-celled organisms to multi-cellular organisms, from individuals to 
groups, and so on.
420
 She argues that evolutionary theory has indeed presented an image of 
the world that is seemingly ―progressivist‖; it has a sense of development.
421
 Consequently, 
she suggests, ―It would seem, then, that teleology – in this first and basic sense of goal-
directed forms of life – is impossible to completely expunge from evolutionary-biological 
analysis....‖
422
 In contrast to the views of those such as Dawkins, who suggest that speaking 
of nature in terms of purposes or goals is an erred projection of human concepts onto a 
purposeless nature, Coakley feels that purposeful language can be appropriate. Alisdair 
MacIntyre offers a similar perspective, as he writes that when we speak of gorillas or 




 There are two distinct problems, however, with this assertion that teleological 
language is appropriate when discussing non-human life. Firstly, it may be conflating the 
purpose of individual organs or animals, with the purpose of nature. There is no 
contradiction in suggesting that animals (gorillas or dolphins for instance) do indeed act 
purposefully, with holding that there is no inherent purpose in the evolutionary process 
itself. Secondly, it may conflate the notion of teleology and development; as Coakley rightly 
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asserts, evolution does present an image of progression or development to some extent – yet 
this development does not imply teleology. Development can be non-teleological. 
 Coakley herself acknowledges that use of such teleological terminology can be 
deeply problematic, and she therefore ensures us that she does not use the term ‗teleology‘ 
in an extrinsic or theological way.
424
 She claims that she is not suggesting that this apparent 
teleology should be explained by referral to an extrinsic designer, for this she rightly 
indicates, could be seen as a ―last gasp of the extrinsic ‗God of the gaps‘....‖
425
 Moreover, as 
Coakley dutifully points out, the phenomenon of seemingly teleological structures of 
evolutionary order could easily be attributed to the evolutionary processes themselves.
426
 
Pertaining to morality, then, viewing the overall evolutionary process as non-teleological as 
I do, could be ‗explaining away‘ morality, as several critics suggested in the previous 
chapter. Why should one consider human morality as indicative of anything more than a 
facade for genetic desires, when this is how one views altruism in the rest of the natural 
world?  
 The answer I propose, also mentioned in the previous chapter, is that human 
morality is reflective of a particularly significant transition in evolutionary history, a notion 
taken in part from Teilhard. Though altruistic behaviour exists among animals, there is 
something distinct about human morality. For example, Coakley refers to humanity‘s 
capability for ‗supernormal‘ morality, which becomes the context for theological 
reflection.
427
 This refers to the concept that human morality can transcend its genetic 
predispositions and become an indiscriminate moral sense – for example, in the Christian 
notion of agape. The advent of human consciousness, and hence free will, moves morality 
out of the realm of evolutionary functional behaviour, as evident in ants and bees etc., to a 
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genuine morality. To use Dawkins‘ phrase, the rebellion against the tyranny of our genes 
signifies ‗something more‘ – which will be equated to Paul Tillich‘s notion of depth in 
section 3.4. It is this supernormal morality that, as discussed in the last chapter, is an 
emergent property, and thus not completely explicable in terms of functionality. With the 
onset of human supernormal morality, indications of actual teleology, in a more theological 
understanding, emerge. It is the evolution of morality that points to a greater depth in the 
natural process, rather than the seeming physical convergences throughout. 
 Consequently, evolutionary theory has a marked impact on how theology presents 
its understanding of morality, good, and evil, by forcing a shift in understanding away from 
one of historicity, and perhaps, to one of futurity, as expressed in the work of Teilhard and 
adopted by Haught – though there are also further problems with this eschatological view 
which will be discussed in section 3.6. For Haught, a major implication of this shift in 
worldview is that it provides hope – thus, being congruent with the central message of this 
thesis, ―One implication of our living in an unfinished universe is that we can become 
attuned to the deep promise of nature only by wagering to indulge our native propensity to 
hope.‖
428
 So the shift in worldview does contribute to the central argument of this thesis, 
though I will be more specific by highlighting evolutionary ethics as the indicator of 
hope/teleology. 
 Notwithstanding, it must also be acknowledged here that we (theologians and 
others) should be very cautious in how we approach the idea of progress towards the future; 
I have suggested that an appropriate way to proceed is to envisage evolution as an aimless 
process until the unique period of the evolution of consciousness, or more specifically here, 
morality. Contrary to the notions of evolutionary convergence, or indeed intelligent design 
or biblical literalism, it is only at this point, that discussions of conscious teleology become 
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intelligible. It could be then asked, whether or not there was any necessity that morality 
would evolve. This is where, as Teilhard suggested, creation can be seen as ―an adventure, a 
risk, a battle‖ – though this does not subtract from the religious picture.
429
 The very idea of 
morality or consciousness being a foreseen event may in fact diminish its significance. 
Haught goes as far as to suggest that a world which was foreseeable by God becomes a 
pointless puppet.
430
 Haught‘s sentiment may be too strong in this respect, and thus a weaker 
(though similar) premise is accepted here; knowing the outcome of events may diminish 
their significance. Conversely, one could argue that, for example, re-reading a novel where 
one knows the outcome may not be pointless; even if the outcome is known, intellectual 
stimulation, enjoyment, etc. can still occur. However, I argue that such a reading would not 
be as significant as the first reading of the novel; it is akin to watching an sporting event 
already knowing the outcome; not completely pointless perhaps, but less significant than if 
the result were not yet known. 
 Teilhard poses similar reflections with respect to the significance of unforeseen 
events by referring to the biblical narrative. He suggests that the expiatory vision of a 
transgression which God could have averted is difficult to look upon sympathetically.
431
 If 
God had planned the world, then the inevitability of the fall would not represent much of a 
transgression, but merely be the manifestation of planned events. It is only when we opt for 
a panoramic perspective of the universe in a struggle against evil in being created, that 
goodness can take on the importance and beauty which it should be afforded.
432
 
Furthermore, as stated in section 3.1, it is only with the evolution of the moral sense that talk 
of evil becomes intelligible – a framework of morality predictive of human pain and 
suffering would allow the theological critic to argue that evil is a condition from the outset, 
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and thus, a responsibility of an architect image of God. Therefore, there is significant reason 
to adhere to a non-teleological model of the world up to the point of the emergence of 
human consciousness/morality (though strictly speaking, this is not as much a ‗point‘ as a 
period).  
 The cardinal message from the above analysis, is that evolutionary theory has 
forced a shift away from visions of a historical fall, and towards more developmental (or 
often eschatological) conceptions of the world; this shift is evident in varying degrees in the 
theology of Teilhard, Haught and others. Although the thrust of sociobiological theory under 
specific investigation in this thesis had not emerged at the time of Teilhard‘s writing, he was 
fully cognizant of the implications an evolutionary worldview brought for theological 
understandings of good and evil. Teilhard was certainly aware that his views represented a 
deep shift from the prescribed Catholic vision as set forth in the Council of Trent in the 
sixteenth century. Yet his scientific background forced him to strongly appeal for renewal 
on this important understanding: 
 
I fully appreciate the seriousness of the changes introduced by these new 
views. I am familiar with the solemn decrees of the Council of Trent on the 
subject of original sin. I am aware of the infinite network of formulas and 
attitudes through which the idea that we are the guilty children of Adam and 
Eve has percolated into our Christian life. Yet I beg my readers to reflect, 
calmly and impartially... for all sorts of reasons – scientific, moral and 
religious – the classic depiction of the Fall has already ceased to be for us 
anything but a straight-jacket and a verbal imposition, the letter of which can 
no longer satisfy us either intellectually or emotionally. In its material 





3.4 The Divine in an Evolutionary Worldview  
Having expressed how evolutionary theory has forced a re-imagined outlook on the 
ontological framework within which good and evil are understood, attention must now be 
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given to how the divine may be understood within this framework. As Haught points out, on 
this issue, he finds Teilhard‘s theology deficient.
434
 Whilst Teilhard succeeded in 
articulating the importance of evolution for religious ideas of reality and human existence, 
Haught suggests that ―his own efforts to construe a ‗God for evolution‘ stopped short of the 
systematic development his intuitions demanded.‖
435
 In this regard, Haught makes the 




 Haught expresses disillusionment at the fact Christian theologians have, with the 
exception of a small minority, neglected the natural world – theology predominantly exists 
as divorced from the cosmos.
437
 A preoccupation with the transcendent ‗beyond‘ has led to a 
spurning of the immanent ‗here‘ – a critique of religious thought also expressed at least 
implicitly by Nietzsche‘s fictional Zarathustra, ―I love those who do not first seek behind 
the stars for a reason to go under and be a sacrifice, who instead sacrifice themselves for the 
earth, so that the earth may one day become the overman‘s.‖
438
 Ultimately, Haught still feels 
that Tillich‘s theology falls short of a proper integration of theology and evolution; Tillich‘s 
idea of existence erupting as a separation from a Platonic notion of being still, for Haught, 
places too much emphasis on a narrative of loss followed by a sought-after reunion.
439
 That 
caveat being acknowledged, however, Haught still points to Tillich‘s notion of our having 
the courage to orient our lives towards the future as a key step towards a theology of 
evolution.
440
 Tillich appreciates our responsibility to become participatory, creative co-
creators in an interdependent world.
441
 This theme is echoed and explicitly articulated in 
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more modern theological dialogue with evolutionary theory, such as that of Philip Hefner 
who argues that our existing and participating in our evolutionary reality is God‘s will.
442
 
Therefore, given that Tillich does appreciate our responsibility in a forward-looking 
metaphysic, it may still be instructive to refer to Tillich as it pertains to envisioning the 
divine in the evolutionary setting presented above.  
 The developmental or evolutionary aspects of an eschatological theology, such as 
those of Teilhard and Haught, are appropriate reflections of what we have learned from 
evolutionary theory. In addition, it has been asserted in this chapter, that any sense of 
teleology only emerges with the evolution consciousness and the moral sense – it is that 
sense which, in line with Paul‘s Adam-Christ dichotomy, signifies a transition in the world 
from moral indifference to a moral reality; it is only with the good, that we really know the 
bad. What is to be added to this perspective here, is how one envisages God in this context; 
no longer is the architect, expiatory vision of God appropriate. It is proposed thus, that 
Tillich‘s understanding of the divine as depth is a good candidate for a suitable 
understanding of the divine in light of our understanding of nature and evolutionary ethics.  
 Tillich takes as his starting point, scriptural references to the theme of depth, ―these 
things God has revealed to us through the Spirit; for the Spirit searches everything, even the 
depths of God‖ (1 Cor. 2:10). He uses the concept of depth not as spatial, but as a lexical 
symbol for a spiritual dimension.
443
 The banalities of everyday life, Tillich writes, are 
surface-level distractions which drive us from own existence, as opposed to us being in 
command of it – and here is where Haught‘s apprehension about the inadequacies of 
Tillich‘s theology may be apparent, as it is still quite transcendental.
444
 True being, Tillich 
feels, is beneath our surface experiences; there is a depth beneath our day-to-day 
experiences, which he identifies as true being. It is this infinite and inexhaustible depth 
                                                          
442 Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Religion and Culture, (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993) p. 27 
443 Paul Tillich, The Shaking of Foundations, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1966) p. 59 [Originally published 1949] 
444 Ibid., p. 62 
138 
 
which Tillich identifies as God.
445
 The aspects of our human experience, which seem to be 
more than what we experience on the surface level, are indicators of depth. Tillich notes that 
it is that spiritual dimension which religious symbolism attempts to signify. In the context of 
this thesis, it can be argued that consciousness (as with Teilhard) or the evolution of the 
human moral sense, are examples of indicators of depth. They point to something emergent, 
something more than the sum of their parts: ‗depth‘.  
 Viewing morality or consciousness in this way as an indicator of depth is not to 
stand in opposition to a physicalist view, as advocated by philosophers of mind such as 
Daniel Dennett.
446
 It is to acknowledge that consciousness and morality are emergent 
properties – they can be somewhat explained by reference to physics/chemistry/biology, 
though this does not diminish their reality or significance (recall the discussion on 
emergence and reductionism in Chapter Two). Therefore, even though Tillich‘s concept of 
the divine as depth is rather transcendentalist, this does not prevent one from adopting it as 
an element of a theology that does appreciate the natural world – in other words, to adopt 
Tillich‘s notion of depth is not to persist with a theology which Haught classifies as 
―divorced from the cosmos‖ but rather to contribute to a theology that is in fact, inspired by 
the cosmos, or more specifically in this case, the evolutionary process and evolutionary 
ethics.    
 Admittedly, as any critic could point out at this stage, Tillich‘s notion of the divine 
as depth is deeply ambiguous. However, this critique may stem from an intellectual 
paradigm which seeks clarity when none may be possible. In this regard, Coakley makes the 
relevant point that since the advent of science, which she approximates with Francis Bacon 
in the sixteenth/seventeenth century, there has been a shift in theological understandings of 
God which in line with science, seek God in the natural world. She argues that those such as 
                                                          
445 Ibid., p. 63 
446 Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained, p. 33 
139 
 
William Paley and modern intelligent design proponents are attempting to rationalise an 
extrinsic divine designer ―who implicitly inhabits the same time and space spectrum as the 
creation itself, and thus competes for space within it.‖
447
 These understandings of God, she 
feels, have shrunk to mechanistic accounts of efficient causation; they are nothing like ―the 
earlier, scholastic, divine Being as found in Thomas Aquinas‘ theology: atemporal, 
possessed of all omni-perfections to an eminent degree, the necessary sustainer of all that is, 
and utterly ontologically distinctive qua creator ‗out of nothing‘.‖
448
 
 Therefore, Tillich‘s association of the divine with depth, whilst perhaps not in line 
with modern preoccupations with clarity and temporality, is more akin to the God of 
classical philosophers such as Aquinas. Tillich explains that depth then, whilst perhaps 
ambiguous, abstract, and ineffable, can be evidenced in many places, for example, in the 
characters of those with whom we form interpersonal relationships on a daily basis; we can 
dig deeper into people‘s true being.
449
 Interestingly, Tillich also finds support for the reality 
of depth with Nietzsche, who despite his advocacy of atheism, wrote, ―The world is deep, 
and deeper than the day could read. Deep is its woe. Joy deeper still than grief can be. Woe 
says: Hence go! But joys want all eternity, want deep, profound eternity.‖
450
 
 The apparent reality of depth can be taken then as indicative of the divine. For 
Haught, more specifically, it is indicative of a progressive creation; he considers particularly 
important Teilhard‘s vision of God as Omega.
451
 In this sense, he consolidates Tillich‘s idea 
of God as depth with Teilhard‘s eschatological theology. God is evident in the depth of 
experience, though the world is an ongoing creation. Therefore, Haught provides a 
metaphysical appropriation which places God at the end of creation – one which fits far 
more comfortably with our knowledge of evolution than the traditional framework of an 
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instantaneous creation.  Concurrent themes which stress the futurity of God can also be 
found to varying degrees in other important theologians such as Rahner and Wolfhart 
Pannenberg.
452
 In addition, it could be argued that the evolution of morality is an appropriate 
indicator of teleology, and thus, depth – though I differ from Haught on a priori 
teleology/eschatology. 
 
3.5 Eschatology and Evil 
The move towards an evolutionary or eschatological worldview explored thus far in this 
chapter has been largely concerned with metaphysical systems. However, Willem B. Drees 
makes the important assertion that eschatology could be viewed as a counterpart to axiology; 
a reflection upon values, ―... the task is to detect what is going on in the events that take 
place and to determine in which direction we should go.‖
453
 Moreover, Drees suggests that a 
merging of an axiology with a cosmology (whether or not one assumes that cosmology to be 
eschatological or not) is a heuristic formulation of what theology is or should be.
454
 Drees‘ 
statements here are particularly judicious in the context of the current discussion which very 
clearly treads between axiological and cosmological frameworks; how our broader, 
metaphysical or cosmological picture of God and creation is influenced by our 
understanding of evolutionary morality. Consequently, Drees advocates that eschatology 
should be understood as ―... almost the worldly component of a theodicy, a defence of the 
compatibility of a good God with the evil in the world....‖
455
 
  Although evolutionary theory re-frames the question of how evil entered a world 
made good, it does not fully negate the problem of evil. The Augustinian theodicy which 
underpins the traditional appreciation of good and evil is indeed made obsolete in light of 
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sociobiology. But the problem remains; why would God create a world which exhibits so 
much pain and suffering? Moreover, as Messer notes, even the Augustinian vision of 
sin/punishment becomes problematic on a reading of Genesis; why did God create the 
subtlest of all creatures, the serpent?
456
 So the theodicy problem must be kept in mind when 
formulating a new metaphysic/metaethic to succeed the Augustinian conception. A new 
vision must acknowledge the theodicy problem whilst at the same time be appreciative of 
evolutionary ethics.  
 However, as noted in the first chapter, there has been some hesitation regarding 
such a revision; theologians such as Johnathan Chappell, Raymond Schwager, and R.J. 
Berry persist in some notion of a fall, albeit modified to be amenable to scientific theories 
(see section 1.5.1). More previously, the significant contributions to this field by Teilhard 
were strongly opposed, thus highlighting some scepticism regarding moving away from 
traditional representations of a sin/punishment theodicy. Teilhard was eventually forbidden 
to teach in the Catholic Institute in Paris because of the perceived unorthodoxy of his 
beliefs.
457
 Furthermore, in his encyclical Humani Generis, Pius XII implicitly condemned 
Teilhard‘s thinking and persisted with a more traditional understanding of original sin.
458
 
Teilhard‘s theology, which was deeply influenced by his background in palaeontology and 
what he saw as a progressive world, conflicted starkly with the mainstream notion of an ex 
nihilo creation as expressed in Pius XII‘s 1941 address to the Pontifical Academy of Science 
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 Despite this resistance, Teilhard made some headway with the theodicy question by 
considering how an eschatological vision of an evolving creation negates in his opinion, the 
problem of evil. In an evolving, unfinished creation, evil becomes a natural feature. This 
approach is not wholly dissimilar to the one which will be advocated in the next chapter; at 
this point, however, a framework for responding to theodicy which is consistent with what 
we learn from sociobiology, must be considered as another element of the broader shift in 
worldview.  
 
Moral Evil as a Consequence of Incomplete Progress 
Teilhard‘s outlook on theodicy is an interesting element of his eschatology, and is relevant 
in the context of this work given the centrality of theodicy in the Augustinian framework for 
appreciating good and evil explored in Chapter One. Teilhard‘s eschatological metaphysics 
discounts the traditional sin-punishment model, and as a result he must consider how this 
problem may be appropriated in his new ‗metaphysics of the future‘. The crux of Teilhard‘s 
approach to the problem of evil is ultimately perhaps one of resignation as he feels it is a 
conceptual fantasy to envisage a world without evil.
460
 He challenges an implicit assumption 
of the problem, namely, that God could ever ―draw from non-being a world without sorrows, 
faults, dangers – a world in which there is no damage, no breakage.‖
461
 For Teilhard, evil is 
a strictly inevitable concomitant of creation, as Matthew (18:7) exclaims, ―Woe to the world 
because of stumbling blocks! Occasions for stumbling are bound to come....‖
462
 The shift in 
the conceptual asymmetry of good and evil –  from conceiving a good creation, questioning 
evil, to a natural struggle for existence, questioning goodness – is very much evident in 
Teilhard. He writes how the challenge for the religious worldview is no longer to expiate 
and restore a lost perfection, as in the Augustinian tradition, but to create and fight against 
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 Put simply, evil is the antithesis to creation; in Teilhard‘s words, it is the ―negative of 
the photograph... the shadows on the landscape... the abysses between the peaks.‖
464
 
 By positing that evil was not necessarily a positive force but rather a necessary by-
product of an unfinished creation, Teilhard is comparable to Augustine‘s notions of evil as 
privation of good – see section 1.3. However, Teilhard‘s assessment of creation contrasts 
with the conventional ex nihilo view. He is emphatic that a paradisiacal past is an untenable 
vision in light of our understanding of evolution, ―Yet, however far back we look into the 
past we find nothing that resembles this wonderful state. There is not the least trace on the 
horizon, not the smallest scar, to mark the ruins of a golden age or our cutting off from a 
better world.‖
465
 He acknowledges that the history of the world is dominated by pain and 
suffering, and thus to combine the doctrine of the fall with our scientific outlook, would lead 
us to become ―victims of an error in perspective.‖
466
 
 Notwithstanding his repeal of a more historical appropriation of creation and the 
fall, Teilhard does continue to use the concept of original sin, though re-imagined to 
appreciate evolutionary theory. In his understanding of an evolving, unfinished creation, evil 
is an intrinsic side-effect. Therefore, he uses original sin to represent the ―actual medium in 
which the totality of our experience develops.‖
467
 The Fall is understood not as a historical 
event, but rather, ―as a general condition affecting the whole of history.‖
468
 Original sin is 
not a teaching of science or theology, Teilhard writes, but a teaching about human nature; 
this understanding of original sin gives further weight to the parallels drawn in Chapters One 
and Two, between original sin and the philosophies of Schopenhauer, Huxley, and perhaps 
even Darwin. 
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 Although Teilhard‘s opinions on evil are worth noting, Drees argues for emphasis 
to be placed on an eschatology which expresses concern for justice and the brokenness of 
creation – in other words, an eschatology that make a contribution to theodicy.
469
 
Consequently, it could be argued that Teilhard‘s negation of the problem of evil is 
insufficient. If Drees‘ argument is taken on board, then it is important to consider how 
current injustice may be understood as an element of our worldview, in a way which is also 
fully cognizant of evolutionary ethics. As noted in Chapter One, the existence of injustice or 
evil has been a staple argument in the arsenal of religious critics, as well as eliciting many 
attempts to reconcile divine beneficence with experienced reality. Despite this plurality, 
John Hick discerns two major approaches from the history of Christian thought; one he 
attributes to Augustine, and the other, to Irenaeus. Substantial arguments have been 
presented hitherto, which have demonstrated the serious deficiencies in Augustine‘s 
theodicy in terms of understanding original sin and the fall as a historical narrative in light 
of evolution – despite of course noting the correspondences between original sin as an 
outlook on the human condition and the Darwinian principles of survival of the fittest. 
Therefore, I look to Hick‘s understanding of Irenaeus for a response to theodicy that can 
comfortably coalesce with the developmental nature of evolutionary theory (again, being 
mindful of the use of the word ‗developmental‘ and whether or not this is taken to be a 
priori development, or development from within – as discussed in section 3.3).       
 It has been maintained here that evolutionary theory requires theologians to make a 
definitive shift away from the Augustinian understanding of the fall and develop a 
framework that is more developmental, or perhaps eschatological, in its orientation. This 
shift in focus, I have argued, can be discerned in the writings of Teilhard, and more recently 
Haught, amongst others. As noted above, Teilhard does give some attention to the theodicy 
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question in the context of his evolutionary theology. Hick‘s approach is similar, and could 
therefore also be considered an element of an appropriate response to theodicy that fits 
within an eschatological framework; it is an approach which could be called 
‗developmental‘. Regarding this response to theodicy, two points must be made.  
 Firstly, what Hick calls an Irenaean theodicy is not a theodicy explicitly 
pronounced in the writings of Irenaeus. Rather, Irenaeus is discerned as the first great 
Christian theologian to think along systematically developmental lines and thus, Hick feels, 
it is proper that Irenaeus‘ name be associated with this type of theodicy.
470
 A more accurate 
description of what Hick terms an Irenaean theodicy would be to point out that a particular 
understanding of evil and the world was common amongst early Eastern Christian writers, 
and Hick‘s own view seeks to return to this position as an alternative to the more dominant 
Augustinian representation of a fall narrative. Secondly, what spurs Hick to seek an 
alternative to the Augustinian view is what he feels is the ―radical incoherence‖ of the 
Augustinian model itself, whereas in this context, an alternative to the traditional narrative is 
being sought due to its inadequacies in light of evolutionary theory.
471
  
 Furthermore, in turning to Hick and his Irenaean theodicy, the distinction between 
natural and moral evil becomes important. In light of evolutionary theory, and specifically 
evolutionary ethics, Hick‘s Irenaean theodicy is an appropriate starting point for a response 
to theodicy with regard to moral evil, that is, the moral imperfections of humanity 
poignantly apparent throughout our history. Natural evil is not as easily reconciled in this 
view, and my motivation for departing from his view in that respect will be discussed in 
section 4.2.2. Hick summarises the Irenaean theodicy in contrast to the Augustinian tradition 
as follows: 
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Instead of the doctrine that man was created finitely perfect and then 
incomprehensibly destroyed his own perfection and plunged into sin and 
misery, Irenaeus suggests that man was created as an imperfect, immature 
creature who was to undergo moral development and growth and finally be 
brought to the perfection intended for him by his Maker. Instead of the fall of 
Adam being presented, as in the Augustinian tradition, as an utterly malignant 
and catastrophic event, completely disrupting God‘s plan, Irenaeus pictures it 
as something that occurred in the childhood of the race, an understandable 
lapse due to weakness and immaturity rather than an adult crime full of malice 
and pregnant with perpetual guilt.
472
   
 
The crux of this theodicy, is that humanity‘s moral sense is at present, deeply imperfect and 
incomplete, thus accounting for acts of moral evil. Our sinful nature is not a stark rebellion 
against a perfect creation, but rather, a corollary of our incomplete development.  
 Ireneaus‘ own view of a developing morality is articulated by distinguishing 
between the ‗image‘ and ‗likeness‘ of God in Genesis 1:26, a distinction which Hick 
considers exegetically dubious. As Hick explains, ―His view was that man as a personal and 
moral being already exists in the image, but has not yet been formed into the finite likeness 
of God.‖
473
 The imago dei as Irenaeus understands it, pertains to humanity as personal and 
moral beings. The likeness of God, however, pertains to a certain valuable quality of life 
which reflects the divine, ―This represents the perfecting of man, the fulfilment of God‘s 
purpose for humanity....‖
474
 Irenaeus pictured humanity as transitioning from the image 
towards the likeness. In a similar vain to Teilhard, the Irenaean theodicy is thus 
―developmental and teleological. Man is in the process of becoming the perfect being whom 
God is seeking to create.‖
475
 
 This developmental understanding of our morality aligns comfortably then, both 
with a developmental metaphysic, and an evolving picture of human morality understood 
through evolutionary ethics. Our appreciation of evolutionary ethics requires a necessary 
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shift in understanding towards a developmental worldview, such as outlined in this chapter, 
and subsequently, it requires a developmental theodicy to replace the previously dominant 
Augustinian theodicy. Irenaeus‘ theodicy as explored by Hick, is an example of such a 
theodicy. It becomes then, a further example of a shift in theology towards a more 
developmental vision; in Hick‘s account, human morality is developing towards a goal, the 
‗likeness‘ of God, and is thus eschatological (which for Hick, culminates after death).
476
 The 
evolving view of morality as understood through evolutionary ethics endorses this shift, 
given the mutual emphasis on development or progress (though of course, evolutionary 
accounts of ethics are not necessarily eschatological, and thus it is the developmental aspects 
of eschatological theology I adopt, rather than the eschatology itself). Yet a developmental 
view still requires a theodicy, and this necessary theodicy may be found with Hick, at least 
as it pertains to moral evil. If this theodicy is coupled with the developmental aspects of the 
metaphysical frameworks of Teilhard, Haught, Tillich, Rahner, Pannenberg and others, it 
provides a theological view which has consonance with evolutionary theory, or more 
specifically, evolutionary ethics. 
 
3.6 Eschatology and Present Moral Responsibilities 
Whilst there has been a decisive shift in thinking towards a developmental or eschatological 
view in certain branches of contemporary theology, inspired either by evolutionary theory 
(as with Haught/Teilhard) or by the apparent self-defeating statements of the Augustinian 
view (as with Hick), such an eschatological worldview could be problematic. Although it 
can be contended that the eschatology and theodicy explored above are appropriate 
responses to evolutionary theory, it must be understood that they are not without their own 
inherent problems. One substantial caveat is identified by Drees; an eschatological vision 
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may render itself acquiescent to present injustice, ―An evolutionary faith is in danger of 
subsuming present suffering and injustice under a future happiness and thus becoming the 
optimistic expectation of ‗an other time‘.‖
477
 
  Upon reflecting on our knowledge of evolutionary theory, theologians such as 
Haught have placed greater emphasis on development, progress and future. Haught for 
example, is explicit in this regard; his worldview is anticipatory, ―grasped by the futurity of 
the divine promise.‖
478
 Similarly, although Hick‘s Irenaean theodicy can account for current 
suffering as a result of incompleteness, it is expectant that perfection will eventually be 
manifest in a ‗good eschaton‘, as Hick explains, ―This is the belief that the Kingdom of God, 
as the end and completion of the temporal process, will be a good so great as to justify all 
that has occurred on the way to it, so that we may affirm the unqualified goodness of the 
totality which consists of history and its end.‖
479
 Such a hopeful vision may be, as Drees 
suggests, in danger of diverting our attention from the injustices of the present. The 
anticipation of a future perfection which will appear irrespective of current evils provides no 
incentive for us as humans to become responsible and participatory co-creators.
480
 It should 
be noted, however, that in this regard, the Augustinian conception fares no better, as it too 
expects perfection in a spiritual realm, again diminishing the relevance of the present, and 
our activities of the present.
481
 
 An important point can be taken from Drees with regard to why even an 
eschatological theodicy such as that of Hick/Irenaeus might be considered insufficient. Our 
understanding of cosmology clearly indicates the vastness of the timescale we occupy. 
Therefore, when we think of the eschaton in relation to cosmology, we realise that this event 
may be billions of years away, perhaps with the burning out of the sun or the eventual 
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demise of the universe, be that through heat death, a ‗big crunch‘ or another scenario. 
Therefore, by locating hope/perfection and the justification of evil at the Omega, as in the 
theology of Teilhard, Haught, Hick and others, it is so far away that it becomes severely 
diluted. As Drees explains, the locating of hope in a bright future puts it at too great a 
distance, ―The next few generations, say children and grandchildren, have relevance by 
virtue of their relation to us. Beings a few thousand generations hence, or even much further 
away, do not inspire us to do something about the quality of their lives.‖
482
 
 We are left then, with the question of how to interpret the divine and a metaethic to 
frame discussion on good and evil in light of Drees‘ critique of the perhaps untenable 
emphasis on the distant future apparent in eschatological visions. In highlighting the 
problems with a God ―pushed to a distant past or future‖, Drees then argues that it is in fact 
the present that is God‘s primary locus.
483
 However, he goes on to also place emphasis on 
God‘s otherness, thus returning to the image of the God of the philosophers, such as 
Aquinas. This makes evident again the distinction drawn by Coakley between an atemporal 
God, and the temporal idea of God evident in William Paley and others‘ search for a ‗God of 
the gaps‘.
484
 The term Drees uses to describe God‘s relationship to the world is ‗present 
transcendence‘.
485
 God is other than the world, though not at a distant past or distant future, 
but in the present. This otherness, could be equated to what Tillich terms ‗depth‘, and was 
argued in section 3.4 to be a suitable understanding of God. Moreover, if we recall the 
previous chapter, evolutionary understandings of ethics stress the role of consciousness. 
Therefore, an evolutionary understanding of ethics appreciates the importance of our present 
responsibilities in moral behaviour; we cannot rely on our nature, nor can we rely on a future 
so distant it becomes irrelevant. We must rely on ourselves and our present consciousness. 
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We may not need evolutionary understandings of ethics to be moral and appreciate our 
present responsibilities, but in a metaphysical framework, these understandings can provide 
more support for acknowledging our responsibility than eschatological worldviews alone.   
 
3.7 Culmination of Evolutionary and Axiological Themes 
Consequently, whilst evolutionary theory has in part inspired a shift to an eschatological 
vision in contemporary theology, there are issues with such a shift; namely, the relegation of 
the present into irrelevance, and the non-directionality of evolutionary theory. 
Notwithstanding these important problematic issues, the developmental aspect of the 
eschatological worldview is something worth retaining, given its clear consonance with 
evolutionary theory and evolutionary ethics. Again, this is not a mere compliant 
accommodation of science in a cheap attempt to retain intellectual credibility in a scientific 
age, but a commitment to acknowledging the progress that science has made in contributing 
to our understanding of the world. Therefore, as stated in the introduction, what is required 
is an axiological theology that satisfies the following four criteria; i) it appreciates the 
evolving nature of the world, the evolving nature of goodness, and the evolving nature of 
God‘s creative action ii) it makes reference to the divine, iii) it provides a response to the 
theodicy question, and iv) it appreciates our present responsibilities. I argue that elements of 
the above theologies satisfy these four criteria when conjoined with our understandings of 
the evolution of our moral sense. 
 Firstly, the evolving view of the world as made known through evolutionary 
science has clearly been accommodated by contemporary theologians, Teilhard in particular, 
and those such as Haught, on whom Teilhard had an instrumental influence; therefore, the 
first criteria has been satisfied. However, as this developmental view is considered, for the 
purposes of clarity, distinct issues require attention, for example, whether this evolving 
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world is considered teleological (either broadly teleological as with Haught and others who 
lean on the thesis of evolutionary convergence, or teleological after the sphere of 
intelligence has been penetrated – I argue in favour of the latter). Secondly, the question of 
how the divine is reflected in such an evolutionary worldview becomes important; a 
developmental vision of the world may correspond to evolutionary theory, but if it makes no 
reference to the divine it can hardly be considered theological. On this point, I have argued 
that the introduction of values to the world through the process of evolving ethics offers a 
glimmer into what Tillich terms ‗depth‘ – that depth being the divine. The ambiguity of this 
notion was noted as a distinct caveat of this argument, however, it was noted that this caveat 
may stem from a cultural preoccupation with clarity – though this is not to say that we 
frivolously abandon the search for clarity, rather, it is an acknowledgement of subjective 
realities. Therefore, the natural evolution of morality is seen to be reflective of God‘s values. 
 The third criterion is the requirement for a theological worldview grounded in 
evolutionary theory to provide a response to theodicy. This, I have suggested, can be found 
in Hick‘s representation of Irenaeus and the vision that moral evil exists as a result of our 
incomplete moral development; morally, our species is still in its infancy. In this context, 
this response to theodicy was presented with a focus on moral evil and not natural evil, 
which will discussed in the next chapter. Moreover, as Drees has pointed out, such an 
eschatological theodicy may diminish the importance of the present and our responsibility to 
react against injustice. This problem begets the fourth criterion; the need to appreciate our 
present responsibilities. In response to this, viewing our values as emergent from 
evolutionary ethics satisfies this criteria, because it places the responsibility on human 
consciousness. As argued in the previous chapter, evolutionary ethics demonstrates that our 
moral values are our responsibility; they were not established in an archaic society or 
provided by a primordial covenant. Rather, our moral values are the result of a long process 
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of evolution and are now governed by our own consciousness and free will. We are not 
being blindly led by genetic determinism nor are we bound by sacred laws; we are the 
commanders of our own moral code, and as with the second criterion, we can see God‘s 
values reflected through our evolved sense of right and wrong.  
  
3.8 Conclusion 
In congruence with evolutionary theory, there is evidence for a shift in theological thinking 
from viewing good and evil within the scheme of a fallen perfect creation, to conceiving a 
continuous creation; creatio continua. This changing of perspective was demonstrated in 
this chapter by highlighting five distinct theological themes and discussing how attitudes 
towards these themes can progress in light of evolutionary theory. The first of these themes 
was explored in section 3.1; the framework for understanding good and evil. Progress in 
evolutionary theory has made evident the fact that goodness is not latent in creation, as 
assumed in traditional theological and philosophical systems – an assumption which 
spawned the asymmetry of the theodicy question and inspired Augustine‘s portrayal of the 
fall; goodness was taken as a given, whilst evil required explanation. A new approach to 
understanding good and evil is evident amongst contemporary theologians such as Messer 
and Williams, who now appreciate sociobiology and how good and evil may only become 
intelligible concepts subsequent to the evolution of morality.  
 The second of these five themes was investigated in section 3.2, which discussed 
approaches to God‘s creative action that can be re-appropriated to be accommodative of an 
evolving world. Section 3.3 then discussed the third of these five themes; a move towards an 
eschatological picture of creation. In this approach, humanity is progressing towards 
perfection at the eschaton, rather than attempting to restore a historical perfection that went 
awry. Section 3.4 outlined an approach to the divine that was consistent with this renewed 
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evolutionary theological framework. This approach followed Haught in relying on Tillich‘s 
understanding of the divine as depth. Section 3.5 then explored how an evolutionary or 
developmental theology could provide a necessary response to the problem of evil. Sections 
3.4 and 3.5 thus discerned the fourth and fifth respective theological themes which exhibit a 
decisive shift in contemporary theology post-evolutionary theory.  
 Furthermore, section 3.6 discussed the issue of how our present responsibilities 
could be appreciated within the context of a developmental worldview. Section 3.7 then 
outlined how various issues raised throughout the chapter culminated to satisfy four distinct 
criteria set forth in the introduction. The culmination of these points is illustrative of my 
own position with regard to a theological framework for morality that is appreciative of 
evolutionary ethics. The central argument of this thesis is to show how evolutionary ethics 
can provide a glimmer of hope in what may otherwise be considered a nihilistic world. In 
presenting this argument, this chapter has acknowledged the theological context within 
which this thesis rests, which is characterised by a marked emphasis on a continuing 





CHAPTER FOUR:  
A THEOLOGICALLY APPROPRIATED NATURALISTIC ONTOLOGY  
 
4.0 Introduction 
In Chapter Three, it was argued that a theological worldview, particularly one which seeks 
to provide a framework for our understanding of ethics, needs to provide a response to the 
theodicy question. In theologically appropriating descriptions of the world which in part 
stem from evolutionary theory, I argued that an appropriate response to theodicy can be 
found with the developmental aspects of John Hick‘s representation of Irenaeus; evil exists 
as a result of humanity‘s moral immaturity. However, I do not take this as an all-
encompassing response to evil as whilst it responds the problem of moral evil, it is still 
susceptible to the problem of natural evil (although Hick does address natural evil, I will 
argue that his response is insufficient in that regard). Natural evil can be understood in this 
context as something which causes suffering/pain which is not the result of a moral action, 
for example, natural disasters. It should be noted that a strict separation between natural evil 
and moral evil is not always easily defined. Ambiguity may arise particularly in modern 
times where moral actions may have direct or indirect consequences exacerbating events 
which would have in previous ages been understood as natural evils. Humanity‘s 
technological developments have had at times detrimental effects on the Earth‘s natural 
workings and may have intensified various weather phenomena resulting in greater degrees 
of natural evil. Further ambiguities exist on the question of what constitutes a moral action 
or a moral evil; whether it is the intentions or consequences of an action, what degree of 
freedom the agent had, etc. – but addressing these questions is not of concern at this point.  
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 In furtherance of outlining a theological position which appreciates our scientific 
knowledge of the world inclusive of evolutionary ethics, natural evil must be addressed in 
providing a response to the theodicy question. Although there have been multifarious 
responses to theodicy, what will be proposed here as a response to natural evil is a 
naturalistic or material ontology. I argue here that in light of philosophical reflections on 
science, and indeed theological considerations, the world can be understood as naturalistic 
or material; a view which may be defined as naturalism – a somewhat ambiguous term 
which needs further discussion. Therefore, section 4.1 will further outline my understanding 
of a naturalistic ontology. Distinct caveats and criticisms of a naturalistic ontology will also 
be considered in this section, but ultimately rejected. This section will also refer to recent 
developments in science to further demonstrate the coherence of a naturalistic ontology.  
 Theological arguments in favour of a naturalistic ontology will then be considered 
in section 4.2. A number of alternative possibilities will be considered, particularly in terms 
of models of divine action which my understanding of a naturalistic ontology precludes. 
Based upon weaknesses of these models, and more significantly, theological proposals in 
favour of precluding any mode of divine action (interventionist or non-interventionist), my 
understanding of a naturalistic ontology will be argued to be more theologically coherent 
than any model of divine action – noting that certain models of divine action may also be 
considered naturalistic. The problem of evil and the integrity of contingency will be 
presented in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 respectively as theological reasons for adopting a 
naturalistic ontology. In section 4.3, I will then turn to the themes of kenosis, the autonomy 
of creation and atemporality in order to theologically appropriate a naturalistic ontology, 
given that it may be vulnerable to the criticism of making the divine superfluous.  
 Even though a naturalistic ontology can be theologically appropriated, it must also 
be acknowledged that this approach still may lead one to a nihilistic conception of the world. 
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An interpretation of inevitability may result from viewing everything in the universe 
including conscious thought as aspects of an unbroken causal chain of physical reactions; 
that all our actions/thoughts were inevitable. As I argued in the previous chapter, such 
inevitability/fatalism could be interpreted as nihilistic, if one accepts the premise that the 
significance of an inevitable world is less than an open-ended world. To avoid this 
conclusion, and suggest how a naturalistic ontology can be affirmed whilst also maintaining 
a non-nihilistic view of the world, I propose the cardinal argument of this thesis; that 
evolutionary ethics offers a glimmer of hope in what may be perceived as an otherwise 
nihilistic world. This argument will be presented in the next chapter. For now, the coherence 
of a naturalistic ontology with science and a particular theological approach will be 
presented, even if it leads to nihilism. An attempt to overcome this nihilism will be the task 
of the next chapter.    
 
4.1 A Naturalistic Ontology: Overcoming its Discontents  
As this chapter centres on the prospect of a theological appropriation and advocacy of a 
naturalistic ontology, it must be clearly articulated what is understood by this term. A 
naturalistic ontology, as understood here, is usually referred to as ‗naturalism‘ of some sort; 
a term that is significantly ambiguous. As a starting point, a functional definition of 
naturalism has been provided by theologian David Ray Griffin, ―naturalism is the doctrine 
that this causal web with its general causal principles cannot be interrupted from time to 
time.‖
486
 Notwithstanding this functional definition, naturalism so construed has also been 
subject to a variety of further clarifying definitions. Griffin, for instance, distinguishes 
between a minimalist ‗nonsupernaturalist naturalism‘ and a maximal ‗sensationist, atheistic, 
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 Willem Drees makes a distinction between ‗soft, non-reductive 
naturalism‘ and ‗hard reductive naturalism‘
488
, whilst philosopher William A. Rottschaefer 
distinguishes between supernaturalistic naturalism and naturalistic naturalism.
489
 Indeed, 
each of these categories of naturalism can require further clarifications pertaining to whether 
such naturalism is methodological, epistemological, or ontological, and can further be 
interpreted as atheistic or theistic. Given that the term ‗naturalism‘ thus clearly seems to 
have much plasticity, it needs to be clearly articulated what is meant when it is stated in this 
context. This section will thus outline what is meant here by a naturalistic ontology, and 
address various potential criticisms in order to further clarify my position. 
 A naturalistic ontology adopted in this work is an assumed ontology that echoes an 
approach established among the Greeks, particularly Aristotle, who endeavoured to 
understand the world by examining the ‗why‘ of things, or in other words, causes.
490
 
However, it is not an ontological naturalism as understood by scientists Karl Giberson and 
Mariano Artigas, as a position which denies the existence of anything which cannot be 
studied through the scientific method.
491
 On the contrary, as will be discussed below, my 
version of a naturalistic ontology actually assumes the existence of something beyond the 
universe. A naturalistic ontology as understood here takes it that anything within the realm 
of the physical world can in principle be understood naturally, pertinently, the evolution of 
life and morality. The Aristotelian quest to understand the operations of the physical world 
by examining the relationship between cause and effect has been influential in the fact that it 
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is a presupposition for modern scientific thinking; as Martin Heidegger wrote, ―Without 
Aristotle‘s physics, there would have been no Galileo.‖
492
  
 Modern science, it is contested, has followed the assumptions of an unbroken chain 
of causality which can in principle, explain every phenomena in the universe. Although 
there are ‗gaps‘ in our current understanding of this causal process, naturalism as understood 
here assumes that any non-natural or supernatural events are precluded. The continuing 
successes of science imply, as Ernan McMullin explains, an ontology.
493
 McMullin 
acknowledges that the ontology implied by science, which I understand as a naturalistic 
ontology, is incomplete and tentative.
494
 There are a number of reasons for this; we may 
view as a cautionary tale the proclamation of Lord Kelvin circa 1900 that there is nothing 
new left to discover in physics, shortly before Einstein‘s revolutionary discovery of the 
photoelectric effect and his theory of special relativity. We should be aware of the 
provisional nature of any scientific worldview and not be too quick to assert our confidence 
in any one scientific picture, such as a particular naturalistic ontology. Moreover, following 
the sentiment of Karl Popper, it could be argued that a naturalist may never be able to 
definitively prove that all of the world‘s phenomena are explicable naturalistically, as the 
criterion for the demarcation of truth may lie not with verification but with falsifiability.
495
 




 The naturalistic ontology adopted here infers from the successes of science that any 
phenomena can be explained naturally even if we cannot yet provide a natural explanation. 
The origin of life is an interesting example, given that heretofore, chemists and biologists 
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have been unable to definitively explain beyond mere postulation how the first DNA or 
RNA molecules formed. However, on the naturalistic view, it is inferred that this formation 
occurred naturally, and not supernaturally as a result of divine action. This is inferred 
because almost all observed physical and chemical events seem to be open to natural 
explanation (even if one has not yet been found), and thus, there is no reason to assume that 
the significant event of the origin of life is any different. Yet it could be argued along with 
Hume that such inferences are naïve. Hume critiqued the assumptions we make regarding 
predictions of the future based on observations of the past by pointing out that there is no a 
priori reason why certain processes will have the same effect if repeated; the eating of bread 
may nourish a person today, but that does not ‗prove‘ that it will nourish a person 
tomorrow.
497
 Similarly, just because all observed events seem to have natural explanations, 
does not mean that all events will always have natural explanations. One could 
consequently, for these and other reasons, reiterate John Locke‘s suggestion that a definitive 
scientific understanding of the world, and thus an exhaustive scientific naturalism, is strictly 
speaking beyond our grasp.
498
  
 There are also further considerations such as the debate over whether what we 
perceive through science is an accurate representation of reality. Ackowledging this 
question, it could be argued somewhat tentatively that whilst we can be aware of the 
limitations of our grasp on knowledge, science can provide a good approximation of 
reality.
499
 Being aware of these limitations and caveats does not require that the scientific or 
naturalistic enterprise be abandoned; rather, it merely suggests that we proceed with caution 
and in a somewhat Socratic fashion, agree to perennially demand that such assumptions hold 
up to scientific and philosophical scrutiny. Bertrand Russell for example, suggested that 
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whilst an absolute truth about reality may be ultimately unattainable, science can provide a 
technical truth useful for making predictions – it gives an approximation of reality.
500
 
Though even then, the ambiguity of the notion of a ‗technical‘ or ‗approximate‘ truth raises 
further issues, as McMullin suggests, it raises the question of ‗how approximate‘.
501
 
 Whilst being mindful of these caveats pertaining to adopting a naturalistic 
worldview, it is argued here that a naturalistic ontology understood as precluding 
supernaturalism is an appropriate position based on the coherence and successes of science. 
The universe is assumed to obey laws which are in the still incomplete process of being fully 
understood by the sciences in respective disciplines. The universe is, on this understanding 
of naturalism, fully explicable in terms of these laws even if we are not yet fully aware of 
them. All that exists in the universe can be understood in terms of their physical constituent 
atoms, sub-atomic particles, or further constituents that are as of yet unknown; quantum 
fields, superstrings and the like. In this respect, I also follow Drees when he asserts that 
naturalism can be understood as a close synonym of ‗hard naturalism‘, ‗physicalism‘, 
‗materialism‘, and ‗physical monism‘; all that exists in the world, again including moral 
thought, is made up of one substance, matter.
502
 This form of naturalism can be 
distinguished from that of Griffin, who finds such a view severely limited in scope and 
opposed to a theological view, as we shall see in section 4.2.
503
 Such a naturalistic outlook 
of the world is not unique to modern science; it echoes the thought of the Greek atomists 
such as Leucippus and Democritus (though not Aristotle, who rejected the physical theories 
of the atomists and Plato).
504
 In modern times, it can be stated that science‘s continuing 
predictive and cumulative success provides a strong basis for asserting (or re-asserting) that 
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the contingency of the universe is steadfast, even if this position may be vulnerable to the 
critiques of naïvety a la Hume, Popper and others. 
 Although the naturalistic ontology advanced here uses the coherence and success of 
science as an argument for its validity, it also must be acknowledged that it is ultimately a 
metaphysical position. Drees, who advocates a naturalistic approach, thus asserts that 
naturalism necessarily goes beyond the details provided by science in assuming a wider 
view of reality.
505
 Scientific naturalism is scientific in the sense that it is based upon, or 
perhaps inspired by science. Yet it is not scientific in the sense that it cannot be 
demonstrably proven through experimentation. One cannot escape the confines of the 
universe in order to conduct an experiment on its nature; all of the knowledge on which 
naturalism is predicated stems from inside the world. Therefore, it must be considered 
ultimately a philosophical position, indeed one which may seem difficult for a theologian to 
adopt. Therefore, five distinct objections to a naturalistic viewpoint will now be addressed; 
irreducibility, mind-body causation, self-reference, matter, and atheism. Of course, this is 
not an exhaustive review of potential critiques of naturalism, but rather an attempt to further 
clarify the naturalistic approach adopted here and to address issues which are pertinent in 
this context.  
 
Irreducibility 
As stated above, a distinct aspect of the naturalistic ontology espoused in this chapter, 
assumes that everything in the universe can be ultimately realised in terms of reduction to 
material components. This assumption lies at the heart of the scientific method; the idea that 
there is no external quality at work. However, on certain issues which we experience as 
intangible, such as love, music, poetry, or pertinently, freedom and morality, a degree of 
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scepticism may arise with regard to reductionism. In espousing a naturalistic view, Drees 
outlines six premises which characterise his naturalistic position, three of which concern 
reduction; constitutive reductionism (that the world is in a unity in that all entities are made 
of the same constituents), physics postulate (that physics offers us the best available 
description of the constituents of the natural world) and conceptual and explanatory non-
reductionism (that the description and explanation of phenomena may require concepts 
which do not belong in the vocabulary of fundamental physics).
506
 On this view, a 
Shakespearian sonnet or Beethoven symphony can ultimately be realised in the form of ink 
and paper, or vibrating strings and sound waves, which in turn can be ultimately understood 
in terms of atoms (as with constitutive reductionism and physics postulate). However, in 
terms of conceptual and explanatory non-reductionism, it is acknowledged that such entities 
require explanations that are beyond fundamental physics – explanation through literary 
theory, musicology, or more commonly, in terms of subjective human experience and 
emotion, even if ultimately, such events are atomic interactions. Daniel Dennett, who 
advocates a similar approach to reductionism, describes as preposterous the notion that one 
could critically compare Keats and Shelly from a molecular perspective; the higher level 
sciences are not at risk of being abandoned in favour of lower-level physics, even if at 
bottom, anything can be understood in terms of lower-level physics.
507
   
 Despite these stipulations, reductionism in its various forms – such as conceptual 
and explanatory non-reductionism (discussed above) or nonreductive physicalism (which 
will be discussed in the next chapter) for example – has still been viewed with suspicion by 
philosophers/theologians such as Griffin.
508
 Griffin worries that a reductionist understanding 
of the human mind in particular makes subjective experiences of conscious thought 
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 A resultant implication of reductionism is for Griffin and others, the potential 
elimination of the notion of free will, a prerequisite for morality (this criticism of 
reductionism is akin to that which was held against evolutionary explanations of morality in 
section 2.3). However, it will be argued specifically in the next chapter, that such material 
reduction does not preclude the subjective experience of freedom. In addition, such 
reservations about material reduction again underestimate the significance of the concept of 
emergence, which was also discussed in further detail in section 2.3. Therefore, it is argued 
here that naturalism, whilst indeed being reductionist, does not deny the realities of 
subjective experiences, such as music, poetry or freedom – certain properties can be 
emergent and thus inexplicable directly in terms of the fundamental sciences, though again 
ultimately there are no forces at work other than those of fundamental physics.  
 
Mind-Body Causation 
As stated, I roughly equate a naturalistic view of the world with a material view of the 
world. With regard to the natural sciences, such a view is often assumed; as Bertrand Russell 
states, a material view is almost synonymous with science.
510
 Notwithstanding, on certain 
issues such as the human mind/consciousness, a material understanding is often more 
contentious. Griffin, for example, presents the concept of conscious thought as indicative of 
a fatal problem for a material outlook, ―Materialists still face the problem of how a brain 
consisting of nonexperiencing neurons could produce conscious experience.‖
511
 Similar 
scepticism regarding a material understanding of consciousness has also been articulated by 
scientists and philosophers such as Paul Davies, Bernard d‘Espagnat and more recently 
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 To substantiate his critique of a material view of mind, Griffin points to 
the problem of mind-body causation. He feels that materialism cannot explain how mental 
experience can have a causal effect on the physical body.  
 Griffin also discusses the implications that naturalism/materialism may bring for 
the issue of freedom (also alluded to above). Griffin expresses his belief that based on a 
physicalist understanding of science, free will must be illusory. In a world consisting of 
mindless physical particles, there could be no place for free will.
513
 The similar issue of 
sentience has also been cited as a key problem for a materialist vision, and as a result, 
theologians such as Richard Swinburne have suggested that only God‘s actions can solve the 
mind-body problem.
514
 For Griffin to overcome these issues (the mind-body causal problem, 
and the issue of free will), he leans on Whitehead‘s non-materialist ‗panexperimentialism‘ 
which he roughly summarises as the doctrine that all things including particles of matter 
have some level of experience.
515
 Of course this is not conscious experience, but rather an 
understanding that atoms for instance, may be conceived as relative to our minds – such a 
view has also been expressed by physicists such as d‘Espagnat.
516
 
 These objections to a material worldview are important as they present a challenge 
to the version of naturalism adopted here; it must be expressed how the naturalistic ontology 
can coherently account for the existence of mind/consciousness. On a terminological note, I 
use the term ‗mind‘ both for brevity and for the purposes of comparing two views, as strictly 
speaking, when I use the term ‗mind‘ I use it as a synonym for mental phenomena as 
opposed to an entity in itself (which is how Griffin et al. presumably understand it given 
their opposition to reductionist views of the mind). Here, I argue that the model of 
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consciousness outlined by Daniel Dennett satisfies a naturalistic/material view of the mind. 
Dennett, in opposition to Griffin, actually uses the ‗mind-body causality problem‘, what 
Schopenhauer called the ‗world knot‘, as the fatal flaw of Cartesian dualism,
517
 a critique 
also echoed by the philosopher of mind Jaegwon Kim.
518
  
 Dennett is consequently in favour of a material view of the mind; that the mind is 
comprised of matter which is subject to the laws of the natural sciences.
519
 For Dennett, the 
mind is the brain. In order to explain how mindless entities, atoms, etc. can produce the 
apparent phenomenon of conscious thought, Dennett puts forth a model of consciousness he 
labels the ‗multiple drafts model‘.
520
 He suggests that in the brain, a multitude of processes 
interpreting sensory perception operate in parallel. There is no one centre, no locus of 
consciousness which could be called the ‗I‘ (which Descartes postulated to exist in the 
pineal gland of the brain). The efficacy of these multiple drafts gives the impression of a 
single unit, because they have evolved to work well in tandem. Therefore, the intricate 
integration and assimilation of mindless physical properties can account for the experience 
of mind or conscious thought, and is thus consistent with a material/naturalistic ontology.  
 Given our understanding of evolution, there is also no reason other than general 
intuition why we should expect any aspects of our being, including our minds, to be 
different from the properties dealt with by physics and chemistry – though as noted above, 
this is not to say that mental life is not different in some senses; it clearly has more complex 
forms of organisation and thus cannot be fully explained without recourse to higher-level 
systems of analysis. The bio-mechanical processes of genetic replication and the processes 
of natural selection have led to the evolution of the human mind in the same way in which it 
has led to the evolution of any other feature of the biosphere; through a long cumulative 
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process leading to greater degrees of complexity.
521
 Similarly, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
this process also resulted in the evolution of human morality. By incorporating Dennett‘s 
views on the material realisation of consciousness, an exhaustively naturalistic ontology can 
be defended, one which pertinently in this context, includes moral thought and behaviour 
(through sociobiological theory discussed in Chapter Two).  
 
Self-Reference  
A further potential critique of a naturalistic worldview is the issue of self-reference. As 
stated above, the naturalistic position as adopted here is based upon the successes of a 
scientific appreciation of the natural world and physical processes. An issue arises with this 
naturalistic position when it is considered that our knowledge of the physical processes stem 
from the physical processes themselves. If our experience of physical processes is 
understood as another physical process, then our attempt to understand physics is in some 
respects, physics trying to understand itself. Therefore, our understanding of the physical 
processes cannot be separated from the physical processes under investigation, perhaps 
highlighting an intrinsic subjectivity in scientific investigations. Bertrand Russell makes this 
point when discussing materialism:  
 
[T]he data of physics are sensations, which are infected with the subjectivity 
of the observer. Physics seeks to discover material occurrences not dependent 
upon the physiological and psychical peculiarities of the observer. But its facts 
are only discovered by means of observers, and therefore only afford data for 





Such objections to materialism (in this context, taken as a close synonym of naturalism) are 
for Russell insurmountable when it comes to developing a metaphysical system (though he 
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notes materialism‘s practical use in deciphering scientific laws), ―(materialism) cannot be 
regarded as definitely true without a wholly unwarranted dogmatism.‖
523
  
 Notwithstanding this inherent subjectivity, such limitations regarding an espousal 
of a naturalistic ontology do not fully discount the strong case that can be made for 
naturalism, namely the coherence and successes of science in predicting future events. 
Indeed, the scepticism regarding the subjectivity of our knowledge is not limited to science; 
the scepticism of Descartes, for example, outlined how there may be no compelling 
argument to assume that any of our perceptions accurately reflect reality.
524
 This problem 
may be particularly acute for a naturalistic/material ontology, given that it views our 
understanding of physical events as physical events themselves. Similar caveats are 
discussed by Drees, who also notes the impossibility of an independent justification of 
naturalism because naturalism is all-encompassing; there is no place outside of naturalism 
from which naturalism can be evaluated.
525
 Although such caveats can be duly 
acknowledged, it is argued here, following from Drees, that we cannot do better than use the 
best available knowledge and thus build upon stable insights from science in espousing 
naturalism.
526
 A naturalistic ontology, like any position among others, is not perfect, though 
a case is made here for its coherence and its adoption from a theological perspective.   
 
Matter 
A further problematic aspect of the adoption of a naturalistic ontology, particularly as it is 
understood as a close synonym of a material ontology, is the division among the scientific 
community on the nature of matter itself. Physicists Paul Davies and John Gribbin, for 
example, argue in their work The Matter Myth, that the advent of quantum physics early in 
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the twentieth century has revealed matter to be far less substantive than we might believe.
527
 
Modern physics, Davies and Gribbin argue, portrays matter as more elusive than the 
materialist model; it behaves in ―nonlinear‖ and ―seemingly miraculous ways‖. Elsewhere, 
Davies explains how various features cardinal to physics, such as atoms and subatomic 
particles, ―inhabit a shadowy world of half-existence.‖
528
 Thus, Davies and Gribbin title the 
first chapter of their work ‗The Death of Materialism‘.
529
 This may be a distinct caveat of 
adopting a naturalistic framework. Indeed, advocates of materialism must acknowledge that 
there is much about matter we do not yet fully understand. Perhaps then, a serious caution 
must be adopted; is it wise to adopt an ontology based on an as of yet incomplete knowledge 
of the very basic components of science? In this regard, Davies and Gribbin advise such 
caution. They note that, for example, until the nineteenth century, physicists assumed the 
existence of ether which filled space, something which the paradigm shift following 
Einstein‘s elucidation of relativity proved false.
530
 Therefore, to reiterate a theme also raised 
earlier, we should not assert too much confidence in what we think we know. 
 In a similar regard, there are numerous examples of areas in science in which 
consensus on issues consequential for our general view of reality has not been reached; a full 
appreciation of the nature of quantum physics, for example. Moreover, there may be theories 
which form part of the consensus view at present which will be superseded in the future, 
similar to the concept of ether, or substantially revised, such as understandings of gravity 
and atoms. Despite the provisional nature of science, the wider picture assumed by the 
naturalistic ontology adopted here (a closed causal system), will be assumed not to change. 
For example, physicists such as Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow have recently 
defended an amalgamation of various theories known as M-theory, which they feel gives us 
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a complete picture of the physical nature of reality.
531
 An analysis of the merits of such a 
view is beyond the scope of this thesis and indeed, perhaps beyond the gift of the theologian 
or philosopher (despite the fact that it may indeed have implications for them). The 
programme of Hawking and Mlodinow rests on the same assumption of a naturalistic 
ontology; that the world is a closed causal system. It may be that M-theory will be 
superseded in the future, but if the naturalistic ontology holds, then the new theory would 
still adhere to the principles of naturalism; a closed causal web. Moreover, even if an 
element of genuine randomness exists, within quantum physics for instance, it would be 
argued that the world‘s causal system is still not susceptible to outside interaction. Despite 
many scientific revolutions and paradigms, this naturalistic ontology has hardly changed 
since the ancient Greeks, and still provides, it is argued, the most appropriate outlook on the 
world in light of the predictive successes of science, even if a degree of caution is duly 
acknowledged on the issue of matter itself. 
 
Atheism 
As stated above, the naturalistic ontology assumed in this chapter can be roughly equated to 
materialism or physicalism. Naturalism so supposed has in turn been equated by scholars 
such as Griffin to what he terms sensationist, atheistic, materialistic naturalism. This brand 
of naturalism, he suggests, is incompatible with religious belief.
532
 Contrary to this assertion, 
the naturalistic/material ontology assumed here is not atheistic, it merely assumes that no 
supernatural or spiritual realm interacts with this world. In fact, in following this naturalistic 
ontology to its logical conclusion, we encounter what Drees terms ‗limit questions‘.
533
 
Questions arise at the boundaries of science such as why there is something rather than 
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nothing, or why the universe is lawful, as Einstein stated, the fact that the world is 
comprehensible is a miracle.
534
 In this regard, it is understood here that a naturalistic 
ontology cannot just leave room for, but actually be consistent with a transcendent God; 
though I do not seek to advance that argument here. On this issue, the theological aspect of 
my version of a naturalistic ontology becomes implicit; with respect to limit questions, I 
hold a stronger view than the agnostic stance of other ‗religious naturalists‘ such as 
philosopher Jerome A. Stone, whose approach is essentially atheistic, though he 
acknowledges the value in using religious language.
535
 
 A naturalistic ontology may indeed preclude particular theological concepts such as 
God‘s providential action. The preclusion of such action for Griffin, does not do the 
Christian tradition justice.
536
 Yet, it is argued here, that a naturalistic ontology with the 
notion of a transcendent realm implied by the limits of the ontology aligns more with theism 
than atheism, despite the fact that such theism may not be representative of the 
understandings of God portrayed in particular religious traditions – indeed, there is no a 
priori reason to assume that it should; religious texts such as the Bible are understood in 
most Christian denominations to rely on myth and reflect the level of scientific knowledge 
of the period, which precedes modern science by millennia. However, it will also be argued 
in section 4.3 that the transcendent God viewed as consistent with a naturalistic ontology can 
also be seen as consistent with a particular interpretation of God as portrayed in the 
Christian narrative.  
 To summate, the naturalistic ontology espoused in this chapter is one which is 
inspired by natural philosophy and modern science, though this approach is taken with due 
caution. Five caveats were addressed to demonstrate that this approach is not naïvely 
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adopted, but rather the result of careful and critical reflection on science and philosophy. 
The key feature of the naturalistic ontology as pertinent in this theological thesis is that the 
world is a closed causal system which is not vulnerable to interaction from the outside, 
namely, from a divine realm. Whilst it is acknowledged that there are ‗gaps‘ in the scientific 
picture of this causal system, it is assumed that these gaps are at least in principle explicable 
through scientific analysis of causation. Moreover, the naturalistic ontology advocated here 
is not atheistic, but rather, implicitly theistic (or at least, deistic), given that we ultimately 
encounter ‗limit questions‘.  
 
The Coherence of a Naturalistic Ontology with Modern Science 
Recent developments in science give extra weight to the continuing understanding of all 
aspects of the world, including conscious thought, as physical. The naturalistic ontology of 
the ancient Greek atomists can still be maintained in light of modern science. To illustrate, 
three brief examples can be given. Firstly, the advent of recent developments in brain-
computer interfaces may be interpreted as human thoughts being ‗read‘ by computer 
programmes.
537
 Of course, such developments cannot be considered ‗proof‘ that human 
thoughts are ‗readable‘ and thus physical. Hume‘s criticism of inference again becomes 
apparent; there is nothing to necessarily preclude an immaterial feature causing the physical 
reactions of the brain which can be subsequently ‗read‘. Notwithstanding this point of 
caution, the ability to ‗read‘ human thought, however elementary such technology is, would 
be consistent with a material understanding of consciousness, and thus coherent with a 
naturalistic ontology. A second development pertains to the advances made in constructing 
an artificially conscious system. In his explication of his material view of consciousness, 
Dennett suggested that if such a model of consciousness was to hold true, then an artificially 
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conscious machine was a legitimate possibility given that there is no nonmaterial element of 
consciousness.
538
 Although a machine with the same degree of consciousness as a human 
has not yet been realised, projects such as the ‗Blue-Brain Project‘, a supercomputer 
attempting to mimic a mammalian brain, are making progress towards that goal.
539
 A third 
example is the first synthetically created living cell by a team led by American scientist 
Craig J. Venter in 2010.
540
 Though not specific to the issue of consciousness/mind, the 
creation of synthetic life provides further substance to the argument that life is material and 




 Consequently, based on the overall coherence of the naturalistic picture of the 
world as portrayed through the natural sciences, perhaps taken as an updated version of 
Aristotelian causality or Democritean atomism, it is suggested that this ontology be adopted. 
Though distinctive criticisms of the naturalistic ontology can be acknowledged, several of 
the more prominent of which are present above, no such criticisms seem to pose a strong 
enough challenge to discount such a view. In fact, recent developments in science and 
technology, whilst not presenting definitive proofs, seem to add further significant weight to 
the coherence of a naturalistic/material worldview. In addition to the scientific coherence of 
a naturalistic ontology, it is also contested here that a naturalistic ontology is more 
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4.2 The Coherence of A Naturalistic Ontology and Theology 
As asserted above, the naturalistic ontology assumed in this chapter is steadfast to the point 
where the causal processes are never violated by a spiritual, transcendent or divine realm.
542
 
On a first reading of this statement, it may be understood as conflicting with any theological 
appreciation of the world as it seems to preclude any divine involvement in the world, 
through miracles or other forms of divine action. Therefore, a naturalistic ontology such as 
that adopted here, has often been seen as antithetical to a religious worldview; the 
association of naturalistic materialism with science and of supernaturalism with religion has 
formed the basis for much apparent conflict between science and religion, as Griffin notes, 
―Given this twofold equation (the association of naturalism with science and 
supernaturalism with religion), the ‗scientific worldview‘ necessarily conflicts, in various 
ways, with the worldview presupposed by religious believers.‖
543
 Although Griffin himself 
believes that this conflict can be overcome, depending on further clarifications on what is 
meant by ‗naturalism‘ and ‗supernaturalism‘, he and others would still perhaps argue that 
the naturalistic ontology adopted here would indeed conflict with a religious outlook, given 
Griffin‘s critiques of similar perspectives.
544
  
 In order to illustrate how a naturalistic ontology can be coherent with a theological 
view, prominent alternative models of divine action will be considered in section 4.2.1, but 
ultimately rejected. Aside from particular weaknesses in these models themselves, a 
theological argument against any model of divine interaction will then be outlined based on 
the theological problem of evil and the integrity of creation, discussed in sections 4.2.2 and 
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544 For example, David Ray Griffin, ‗A Richer or Poorer Naturalism? A Critique of Willem Drees‘ Religion, 
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4.2.3 respectively. I consciously use the term ‗interaction‘ as opposed to the term 
‗intervention‘ given that certain models of divine interaction (which will be discussed 
below) are specifically presented in certain contexts as non-interventionist. I use the term 
‗interaction‘ in a broader sense to encompass both interventionist and non-interventionist 
models of divine action, all of which are rejected in my approach.  
 
4.2.1 Alternative Possibilities 
Although I argue that a naturalistic ontology precludes intermittent divine involvement in 
the world, what is perhaps more common is to persist in postulating some form of direct 
divine interaction with the world – again, note that divine interaction can be differentiated 
from divine intervention; certain models of divine interaction (e.g. through indeterminacy or 
whole system interaction) could be considered naturalistic given that they do not conflict 
with the laws of nature, though these views are also precluded on my understanding of a 
naturalistic ontology. To illustrate, four examples will be briefly considered; miracles, 
indeterminacy, mental interaction, and whole-system causation. This is not an exhaustive 
review of models of divine action. A complete critical review of the body of work presented 
by the various theorists in question, and the nuances of their proposals, is beyond the scope 
of this work.
545
 My brief illustration of such models serves only to further articulate my own 
position by way of contrast with other prominent positions, some of which could be 
considered naturalistic. It will also be stated why other prominent views are ultimately 
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A traditional if ambiguous model for understanding divine interaction with the world is the 
concept of miracles. Indeed, miracles could also be used as a blanket term which 
encompasses all models of divine interaction, including those to be discussed below. For 
present purposes, miracles will be assumed to be an expression of God‘s omnipotence by 
causing an occurrence which is inconsistent with the natural causal process, or as John 
Polkinghorne states, is ―... radically unnatural in terms of prior expectation.‖
546
 Such an 
understanding of miracles is akin to the oft cited definition put forth by Hume; that miracles 
are a transgression of the laws of nature.
547
 
 It is assumed here that within the framework of a naturalistic ontology, the natural 
laws are never transgressed. Again, the predictive success and continuing developments of 
science seem to cohere with the perspective that the laws of nature are exceptionless. 
Theologically too, there are substantial reasons to espouse a naturalistic ontology and 
discredit miracles. For example, Aquinas discussed the idea that having created the laws of 
nature, God cannot act against himself, ―God the author of all natures does nothing against 
nature.‖
548
 If one were to allow for the opposite, a perplexity arises; if God created the world 
as lawful, why would God then interrupt God‘s own laws? Would this not undermine God‘s 
creation? Theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg elaborates on this point by arguing that the idea 
of a miracle construed as Hume‘s idea of something which violates the laws of nature is a 
self-defeating concept.
549
 He articulates the premise as follows:   
 
The logic of the concept of natural law requires that there be no exceptions –  
otherwise the pretended law in question would turn out not to be truly a law of 
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nature. The concept of miracle as a violation of natural law subverts the very 




The notion of a law implies universality, otherwise it would not be a law but rather a 
tendency or habit; the notion of a law may be undermined if such a law can be readily 
violated. Furthermore, Pannenberg explains that the concept of a miracle as a violation of 
the laws of nature is a relatively recent understanding, arising only subsequent to the 
medieval period.
551
 If the laws are understood to have come from God as Creator, the notion 
of a miracle may violate Gods‘ self, as in the sentiment of Aquinas. Thus, it may be more 
logically coherent to assume that the laws are not broken as with the naturalistic ontology. 
This theme will also resurface in section 4.2.3. 
 However, an argument could be presented to the contrary. It may be stated that 
there is no a priori reason to insist that an intervention in the physical laws constitutes an 
undermining of such laws. Keith Ward, for example, finds arguments based on the 
inalienability of physical laws ill-founded. He suggests that rather than interpret the laws of 
nature as universal and absolute, they could be interpreted as useful general principles.
552
 
Ward finds the arguments of theologians such as Rudolf Bultmann, who sought to 
demythologise the Christian tradition,
553
 ―extremely odd‖ if God is taken as a personal 
entity.
554
 For Ward, the personal character of God offers justification for some occurrences 
to transcend general law-like principles; human experience is rarely clear-cut, but often 
exists in a blur of grey areas. Why should God and his laws be any different? In contrast to 
Ward‘s suggestion that physical laws may be better conceived of as general principles, it is 
understood here that given the coherence of a naturalistic ontology with scientific and 
philosophical principles of causality, a stronger case can be made in favour of unalterable 
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laws. Moreover, as Bultmann points out, the understandings of the world presented in the 
New Testament for example, are pre-scientific and therefore we should be aware that we 
cannot expect the biblical texts to live up to the same degree of scientific scrutiny we 
employ in our current worldview; in short, there is no reason to assume that the supernatural 





The general understanding of miracles as discussed above is significantly problematic, both 
in terms of the theological argument in favour of the integrity of God‘s creation evident in 
Aquinas, and also from the scientific/philosophical image of causality. However, arguments 
in favour of the divine realm directly and fruitfully engaging with the physical world have 
been put forth which do not consider such action as contravening the physical laws. One 
such approach has been to interpret the apparent indeterminacy in physical laws evident 
through quantum physics or chaos theory as evidence that the world is not purely 
mechanistic as a material ontology would perhaps assume. John Polkinghorne, for example, 
illustrates that a fully causal and mechanistic world makes God redundant, limiting his 
action to the initial construction of the cosmic machine.
556
 One chief reason for 
Polkinghorne‘s rejection of such a view is the twentieth century discoveries of quantum 
theory and chaos theory, ―The widespread intrinsic unpredictabilities that these theories 
entail show that the physical world is not simply mechanical....‖
557
 Quantum theory, for 
Polkinghorne, illustrates a degree of plasticity regarding the causal nexus of the world. He 
states that physical reality as understood from quantum theory is an exquisitely sensitive 
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 Following from this, the openness of the causal nexus might allow for God to act in 
the world without violating the natural laws, given that the natural laws are not closed 
systems. Quantum uncertainty may allow God to act in a way that is non-interventionist, as 
Gods‘ actions would not be contradicting laws, but rather working through the open laws, 
―within the grain of nature, rather than interventionally against it.‖
559
 If quantum theory 
illustrates an indeterminate system, then God‘s acting through such indeterminacy would not 
be contra naturam, and thus the integrity of the physical laws would be maintained, making 
prevalent the difference between divine interaction and divine intervention, a point stressed 
by Robert John Russell.
560
 Therefore, envisioning divine action through indeterminacy 
would not be divine action in the traditional understanding of a miracle defined by Hume as 
a transgression of nature. Such a view has proved appealing, and has thus been adopted in 
varying degrees and guises, and with various nuances by theologians and scientists such as 
Russell
561
, Nancey Murphy and George Ellis
562





amongst others.  
 Contrary to prospect of direct divine action at the level of quantum uncertainty, 
however it may be expressed, the naturalistic ontology adopted here maintains that there is 
no direct expression of the divine in the natural world. The rationale for discounting divine 
action at the quantum level can be taken as twofold, though there may be further problems. 
Firstly, it is contested here that such a view appeals to a ‗God of the gaps‘ mentality and 
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may only be understood from a particular interpretation of science and quantum theory. 
Though the nature of the physical world as explained through quantum physics or chaos 
theory does indeed appear less mechanistic than our image of the macro-world, physicists 
such as Hawking are cautious in asserting that matters are actually resolved.
564
 In other 
words, quantum physics still represents ‗gaps‘ in a scientific ontology which may be 
explained in the future, through something like M-theory or another as of yet unknown 
mathematical formulation. This point is also raised by Drees in his critique of Polkinghorne 
and others‘ promotion of quantum interaction (however, Drees does acknowledge that the 
quantum ‗gaps‘ are quite different from earlier ‗gaps‘ in scientific knowledge – the question 
of humanity‘s origin, for instance).
565
 Consequently, it is argued here that it is less coherent 
to postulate divine interactions at the quantum level then to persist with a naturalistic 
ontology which precludes any divine interaction with the natural world. The second aspect 
to my rejection of divine interaction in the apparent indeterminacy in the physical laws 
pertains to the problem of natural evil to be discussed in the section 4.2.2. 
 
Mental Causation 
An alternative model of viewing divine interaction with the world rests on an analogy 
between mental and physical causation. One particular proponent of this view is Philip 
Clayton, who acknowledges that in light of modern science, the apparent rigour of the 
world‘s causal nexus seems to exclude God.
566
 Clayton proposes a nuanced and perhaps 
dialectical view of the mind which is a prerequisite for his model of divine action. He does 
not propose a complete dualism in which the mind is fundamentally different from matter; 
he opts for a more emergent approach, similar to that explored in the previous two 
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 A distinctive issue which Clayton contends is that the emergence of the mind or 
consciousness ―suggests a level of reality that breaks the bonds with naturalism.‖
568
 This 
clearly differs from the naturalistic/material view of mind discussed in section 4.1. 
Interestingly, Clayton is very much aware that his position is dialectical, treading perhaps 
with difficulty between two opposing positions (materialism and dualism), drawing an idiom 
from Homer, ―Between Scylla and Charybdis we set our sails.‖
569
   
 Clayton articulates his position then, as envisioning human thought as a natural 
process though one which is not determined by the physical laws, and is thus, open to 
―higher types of causality.‖
570
 If the mind is not purely physical, as in the material view, 
then perhaps the causality of the mind is more open-ended. Such a higher type of causality 
would be, as Clayton suggests, divine influence.
571
 Having asserted his approach to the 
mental realm and his understanding that such an approach allows for divine influence on 
human thought, he proposes a ‗panentheistic analogy‘ which he feels best represents how 
God‘s relationship to the world should be construed: 
 
The body is to mind as the body/mind combination – that is human persons – 
is to the divine. The world is in some sense analogous to the body of God; 
God is analogous to the mind which indwells the body, though God is also 
more that the natural world taken as a whole... the power of this analogy lies 
in the fact that mental causation, as every human agent knows it, is more than 




 Clayton‘s proposal regarding divine influence at the level of human thought, 
however, could be considered significantly problematic. For example, his understanding of 
‗higher types‘ of causation is deeply ambiguous and as he himself asserts, is beyond the 
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remit of unequivocal language.
573
 Ambiguity was considered not to be a substantial 
weakness in arguments such as Tillich‘s notion of depth in the previous chapter. However, 
there is a difference in Clayton‘s views here as such ambiguity is potentially explicable by 
scientific methods given that he is discussing a causal influence in the natural world. As 
mentioned in the previous section, technologies pertaining to artificial consciousness and 
brain-computer interfaces would seem to give weight to the notion that the mind is in 
principle explicable in terms of physics. Thus, the ambiguities in his explication of his view 
of the mind are more problematic than the notion of depth discussed in the previous chapter.  
 In addition, if God interacts with minds in the way Clayton proposes, then it may 
be thought that God‘s actions are extraordinarily local when considering the vastness of 
cosmic space (though this might lead to speculation on extraterrestrials and whether God 
may have interacted with them). Furthermore, though Clayton acknowledges disanalogies, 
theologians such as Arthur Peacocke have criticised Clayton‘s model for not drawing clear 
enough distinctions between God and the world.
574
 The most significant issue taken with 
Clayton‘s panentheistic analogy in this context, however, is again the problem of evil to be 
discussed in the next section. Overall, the coherence of the material/naturalistic ontology 
inclusive of a material image of human thought seems a more viable option than Clayton‘s 
proposal regarding a ‗higher level‘ causal realm. 
 
Whole System Causation 
Arthur Peacocke is considered to have played a significant role in the development of what 
has been referred to as ‗top-down causation‘, ‗downward causation‘, ‗whole-part constraint‘ 
or the term I have used, ‗whole-system causation‘ – noting that these terms may have 
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 Peacocke‘s proposal of God‘s interaction with the world is akin to that of 
Polkinghorne and Clayton insofar as he suggests a model of God‘s interaction with the 
world which does not contravene the physical lawfulness of the universe as explicated 
through physics. However, his model for divine interaction differs from those who appeal to 
quantum indeterminacy or chaos theory, in that it is not the unpredictabilities in these 
theories where God acts. His model also differs from Clayton‘s mind/body analogy, as he 
feels there needs to be more of an ontological difference between God and creation – though 
he does acknowledge some heuristic value in a mind/body analogy.
576
 Peacocke articulates 
his position on divine action as follows: 
 
If God interacts with the ―world‖ at a supervenient level of totality, then God, 
by affecting the state of the world-as-a-whole, could, on the model of whole-
part constraint relationships in complex systems, be envisaged as able to 
exercise constraints upon events in the myriad sub-levels of existence that 
constitute that ―world‖ without abrogating the laws and regularities that 
specifically pertain to them – and this without ―intervening‖ within the 
unpredictabilities we have noted. Particular events might occur in the world 
and be what they are because God intends them to be so, without at any point 
any contravention of the laws of physics, biology, psychology, sociology, or 




 In Peacocke‘s model, God acts externally on the closed system of the world. 
Therefore, Peacocke‘s model may have merit, in that it can be considered more consonant 
with the natural sciences than quantum interactions (given the potential for as of yet 
unknown mathematical formulations to close the ‗gaps‘ in unpredictability) or mental 
causation (given the successes of brain-computer interfaces and artificial intelligence 
projects cited above as indicative of the coherence of a material ontology). As such, 
Peacocke‘s model could be considered consistent with the naturalistic ontology I espouse, in 
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that within the system itself, all events are causal/natural. What distinguishes my own 
position from Peacocke‘s, which could be considered naturalistic, is his additional 
consideration that causal events may be the result of an external force, namely, God‘s acting 
on the whole system. In this context, I reject Peacocke‘s additional consideration of whole-
system causation, not because it conflicts with an understanding of an approach to science, 
but rather for more theological reasons, namely, the problem of evil. 
 
4.2.2 Natural Evil 
It was asserted in the previous chapter that an appropriate response to moral evil in light of 
evolutionary theory and particularly evolutionary ethics was to incorporate aspects of Hick‘s 
representation of Irenaeus with regard to ongoing moral development (though as noted, 
Hick‘s approach is eschatological and continues after death, whereas what I take from him is 
just the notion of moral development). This response need not stand in opposition against 
other responses to moral evil, such as a free-will defence, though the developmental 
connotations of an ongoing moral development seems to coalesce well with evolutionary 
theory. However, as I will argue below, Hick‘s developmental view cannot provide an 
adequate response to the problem of natural evil. On this point, I contest that a naturalistic 
ontology is the most appropriate response to natural evil. Theologically, the problem of 
natural evil provides support for the coherence of a naturalistic ontology over and against 
any model of divine interaction such as those presented above. Drees also highlights this 
point as he articulates, ―If God acts in the world, and especially if God acts in response to 
the needs of individuals, why is there so much evil and suffering in the world?‖
578
 If God 
were to interact with the world, through quantum indeterminacy, chaos, mental causation, 
whole-system causation, or any other way, the problem of evil becomes acute. Therefore, a 
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case can be made that a naturalistic ontology in which God does not interact with the world 
is more theologically coherent than any model of divine interaction, as the problem of evil is 
not raised as acutely.  
 Of course, there are alternative views, some of which need not be asserted in strict 
opposition to a naturalistic ontology. For example, contemporary discussions on the problem 
of evil formulated against the backdrop of evolutionary theory have been put forth by 
theologians such as Christopher Southgate. Southgate‘s theodicy is nuanced and 
multifaceted. One particular aspect he outlines is what he terms in shorthand ‗the only way 
argument‘; ―I hold to the (unprovable) assumption that an evolving creation was the only 
way in which God could give rise to the sort of beauty, diversity, sentience, and 
sophistication of creatures that the biosphere now contains.‖
579
  His argument is reminiscent 
of Leibniz and his ‗best of all possible worlds‘ approach, mentioned briefly in section 1.3.
580
 
However, Southgate also supplements this view with a particularly Christian approach; he 
envisages God as a ‗co-sufferer‘, sharing some of the burden of creation‘s suffering.
581
 
Interestingly and pertinent to the current discussion, this approach is also how Peacocke 
responds to the theodicy problem whilst maintaining the idea that God interacts through 
whole-system causation.
582
 Southgate also leans on the Cross of Christ as ―the epitome of... 
divine compassion, the moment of God‘s taking ultimate responsibility for the pain of 
creation, and – with the resurrection – to inaugurate the transformation of creation.‖
583
 In 
this sense, Southgate‘s view is similar to that of Holmes Rolston‘s Christian interpretation of 
evolution as a sacrificial tragedy, also mentioned in section 1.6.2.
584
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 There are two key reasons however, why particular aspects of Southgate‘s theodicy 
are rejected in favour of my understanding of a naturalistic ontology – although Southgate‘s 
approach could be understood as naturalistic, my own position is different primarily given 
his views on teleology, which is the first reason I find his theodicy insufficient (though he 
also alludes to divine interaction, which also differs from my understanding of a naturalistic 
ontology). As discussed in the previous chapter, an a priori teleology is rejected in my 
approach. In contrast, Southgate presents his understanding of evolution as teleological by 
suggesting a number of potential ways in which teleological evolution may be manifest, for 
example Conway-Morris‘ theory of convergence (discussed in the previous chapter) and 
Robert John Russell‘s perspective that God may act at the quantum level influencing genetic 
mutations and thus guiding the course of evolution.
585
 Such teleology, as Southgate 
acknowledges, raises again the theodicy question. In Southgate‘s perspective, however, 
merging the notions of the ‗only way‘ argument and divine co-suffering provides an 
appropriate response to this particular element of theodicy. The pain and suffering of the 
evolutionary process is ―the necessary price of the realisation of values through evolution, 
and the price is worth it.‖
586
 
 Setting aside the scientific arguments against such a teleological interpretation of 
evolution, a popular objection to such teleology based on theodicy is expressed by Fyodor 
Dostoevsky in his novel The Brothers Karamazov. Dostoevsky‘s character Ivan, contrary to 
Southgate‘s suggestion, suggests that any plan of the world which involves such suffering as 
apparent in this world is unrewarding, ―And if the sufferings of children go to swell the sum 
of sufferings which was necessary to pay for truth, then I protest that the truth is not worth 
such a price... too high a price is asked for harmony.‖
587
 Southgate acknowledges this 
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objection and states that ―This is evolutionary theodicy at its sharpest.‖
588
 Nevertheless, he 
feels his response to theodicy is adequate.  
 It is also Dostoevsky‘s theodicy challenge that leads to my suggestion, in the 
previous chapter and above, that Hick‘s Irenaean theodicy is inadequate in respect of natural 
evil. Hick‘s Irenaean understanding of natural evil can be reconciled with his understanding 
of moral development by the suggestion that the world ―ought to be, as an environment for 
beings who are in the process of becoming perfected.‖
589
 In Hick‘s understanding, a world 
devoid of pain and suffering would not allow for a full moral development, ―... the presence 
of pleasure and the absence of pain cannot be the supreme and overriding end for which the 
world exists. Rather, this world must be a place of soul making.‖
590
 For Hick, the presence 
of natural evil is a means to an end (soul-making) – and significantly, for him, such an end 
could not be realised without it. Southgate similarly, sees whatever natural evil that occurs 
as a means, and in his view the only means possible to an end, namely, the ―beauty, 
diversity, sentience, and sophistication of creatures‖ now existent. 
 In riposte to Southgate‘s position, it is contested here that a teleological approach 
such as the one Southgate considers is too vulnerable to Dostoevsky‘s theodicy challenge, 
which provides adequate reason for discounting it in favour of a predominantly non-
teleological appreciation of evolution such as presented in the previous chapter, and a 
naturalistic ontology as discussed in this chapter. In some respects, one could persist as 
Southgate does, in suggesting that the ‗only way argument‘ is a sufficient response; my 
rejection of it is not based on genuine incoherence in his theodicy but rather, comes down to 
the (somewhat sensitive, perhaps even personal) question of how much suffering can be 
tolerated in a planned world. Notwithstanding, I also relied on the chance/necessity picture 
                                                          
588 Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation, p. 14 
589 John Hick, Evil and the God of Love, p. 258 
590 Ibid., p. 259 
187 
 
of evolution to reject a priori teleology in the previous chapter, which may give my 
approach greater weight though in a different context.   
 The second reason for my judgement on the inadequacy of Southgate‘s response to 
theodicy is that its Christian focus is too narrow in the context of a pluralistic world. This 
point was also acknowledged by Neil Messer in the previous chapter as it concerned Barth‘s 
depiction of the ‗knowability‘ of goodness in light of Christ. Messer holds a view similar to 
Southgate with regard to responding to theodicy within the framework of Christian salvation 
– though he specifically indicates how he differs from Southgate in certain respects, such as 
Southgate‘s eschatology.
591
 However, Messer does appreciate that a Christ-centred theodicy 
may be difficult to affirm in an interreligious setting. Messer seeks to rectify this problem by 
affirming the universality for God‘s saving work through Christ, which may be a promising 
approach.
592
 Nevertheless, I find it more favourable to persist with a more open and less 
specific conception of a naturalistic ontology, rather than one as Christ-centred as with 
Messer or Southgate. 
 Consequently, the particularly acute manifestation of the problem of evil raised by 
a teleological understanding of evolution such as Southgate‘s, and the specifically Christian 
aspects of his response to the problem, give significant weight to the argument that his 
theodicy is less favourable than the one presented in this chapter. The naturalistic ontology 
as understood here presents two distinct points which serve as aspects to a response to 
theodicy. Firstly, as discussed above, there is no specific divine action in the world, which 
subverts the question of why God does not act to prevent suffering. Secondly, as elaborated 
upon in more detail in the previous chapter, there is no broad scheme of teleology existent in 
the universe until the onset of human thought, which is sufficiently distinct from the divine 
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realm that responsibility for evil cannot be inferred upon God; without teleology, evil cannot 
be seen as an element of a divine plan. 
 Ultimately, it is contended here that from the perspective of a moral framework, it 
is highly difficult to persist with the understanding that a distinct causal force in the world 
can be associated with the divine, or that the universe adheres to a distinctive teleology, 
however pliable that teleology is. The challenges presented to causally active or teleological 
understandings of God‘s relationship with the world, by those such as Dostoevsky, are 
substantial enough to warrant a view more closely aligned with a naturalistic ontology. 
Others have presented similar criticisms of a God who maintains a direct causal influence in 
the world, such as the British theologian David Jenkins. Jenkins finds it ―morally 
intolerable‖ to consider God as an additional and occasional causal force given the 
immensity of suffering experienced in the world. The twentieth century Jewish philosopher 
Hans Jonas similarly, in reflecting particularly on Auschwitz, adamantly opposes how an 
omnipotent and omnibeneficent God could allow such suffering to occur; thus, there is a 
need to re-evaluate or re-imagine a conception of God which could be reconcilable with 
such atrocities.
593
 Interestingly, Jonas‘ perspective as a philosopher of biology also supports 
the view presented here; that there is no teleological dimension in the basic process of 
evolution; it is more favourable to envisage God as having relinquished his power – a theme 
to be explored in section 4.3.
594
 Therefore, it is contested here that a naturalistic ontology, 
which precludes both divine action and an initial teleology, can be more theologically 
coherent than a causally active God or a teleological world, as the problem of evil becomes 
too acute in the latter cases.    
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4.2.3 The Integrity of Contingency 
A further argument which illustrates the theological coherence of a naturalistic ontology is 
the issue of the integrity of contingency. It could be argued that it is in fact the inalienability 
of the physical laws which provide a deeper sense of meaning when we approach the ‗limit 
questions‘ of science, mentioned in section 4.1. If the physical laws were more amenable, 
then perhaps their significance in terms of being indicative of depth would be mitigated. 
Miracles are not then seen in various individual instances of divine action; in fact, miracles 
so construed may undermine an appreciation of the holistic structure of the universe and its 
laws. Interestingly, it is the structure of the laws of the universe that form the basis of the 
various incarnations of the anthropic principle or cosmological argument for Gods‘ 
existence, though these are not arguments I wish to advance here.
595
 It is the overall integrity 
or universality of physical laws that may beg questions of why the universe is the way it is, 
reiterating Einstein‘s assertion that the comprehensibility of the universe is a miracle – 
though not a miracle as construed as a transgression of the laws of nature. Pannenberg offers 
a similar reading as he states, ―... the order of nature itself by natural law is one of the 
greatest miracles, in view of the basic contingency of events and of their sequence.‖
596
 This 
is not to advance the ‗first cause‘ argument and suggest that God initially created the 
universe by ‗fine tuning‘ the physical laws, but merely to suggest that the orderliness of the 
universe is indicative of meaning or depth, to again use Tillich‘s phrase – a depth that does 
lie outside of the scope of science at least as currently conceived; it may be impossible for 
science to explain science itself.  
 In viewing the contingency of the natural laws in this way (a holistic picture of the 
physical processes as indicative of meaning) one inevitably faces the question which has 
been touched on at various points in this chapter and the last; whether the contingency of the 
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physical laws implies teleology. McMullin interestingly points out that the contingency of 
the universe has been used both as an argument in favour of and against teleology. For 
example, in cosmology, the contingency or chance of the events allowing the big bang to 
occur and a universe such as this one to form seem strikingly improbable as to imply 
intention. However, in the case of evolutionary biology, the contingency or chance of the 
process seems to exclude purpose and imply relative randomness, at least at the level of 
genetic mutations.
597
 Some have argued that the chances of the universe and life forming are 
so narrow that this implies a creator, for example, William Lane Craig.
598
 Others however, 
have taken these immense chance events to be indicative that there is no teleology in nature, 




 Consequently, the contingency of physical events can be interpreted in such 
opposing ways that they do not necessarily contribute to an argument on teleology. 
However, it is suggested that the overall structure or contingency of the universe is 
indicative of depth or meaning. The theological problem of evil discussed above then gives 
credence to the view that a naturalistic ontology is fully contingent (has no divine 
interaction) and is non-teleological. To reiterate the main points of this section then, it is 
argued that the more prominent approach to viewing God‘s relationship with the world has 
been to persist in some form of direct divine interaction. Several of the more prominent of 
these views were considered. Based on inconsistencies in these views, or more significantly, 
based on the theological problem of evil and the integrity of the contingency of the universe, 
it was argued that a non-teleological naturalistic ontology with no divine interaction is more 
theologically palatable than any alternative model of divine interaction. The question then 
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becomes, as McMullin states, how the contingent processes of the natural world can be 




4.3 A Theological Appropriation of a Naturalistic Ontology 
Hitherto in this chapter, it has been contested that a naturalistic ontology can be a coherent 
system based on recent discourse in science and philosophy, with respect to the philosophy 
of consciousness and modern technological advances in brain-computer interfaces and 
synthetic life. Moreover, it has been contested that a significant argument can be made for a 
naturalistic ontology given that it is less vulnerable to the theodicy problem than visions of a 
teleological world or a world open to direct divine interaction. Such a naturalistic ontology 
also, as it pertains to the focus of this thesis, easily subsumes the evolutionary account of 
ethics, given that it requires no necessary reference to a spiritual or divine realm. Such a 
naturalistic/material ontology is thus, congruent with modern science and the theological 
problem of evil. However, such a vision of a naturalistic/material world, as noted in section 
4.1, will be immediately looked upon unfavourably by many theologians. A naturalistic 
ontology may cause significant tension with a theological worldview as it may leave God 
redundant and shape a deism or even atheism. This implication of naturalism is what has 
spurred theologians such as Griffin to assert its incompatibility with Christianity.
601
 In 
excluding divine action in the physical world, Griffin feels that a naturalistic ontology such 
as the one advocated here denies cardinal presuppositions of the Christian faith.  
 Drees notes this point as he explains that a naturalism which excludes divine action 
may threaten to make our ideas about God superfluous.
602
 As Alasdair MacIntyre states, it is 
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as if theists are giving atheists less and less to not believe in.
603
 Griffin consequently 
criticises versions of religious naturalism, such as that of Drees, on the basis that they are 
minimalist with respect to religion.
604
 Whilst Griffin‘s criticism of Drees is not considered 
substantive here, given that Drees provides a view of the role of religion in his version of 
naturalism
605
, Griffin‘s point does need to be addressed; how can a naturalistic ontology 
which excludes divine action have a theological dimension? The absence of a theological 
dimension has also led theologian Charley Hardwick to criticise almost all forms of religious 
naturalism – ‗religious naturalism‘ being more specific than naturalism, as an absence of 
theological appropriation poses no difficulty for atheistic naturalism. He states that 
representative thinkers such as Michael Hogue, Loyal Rue and others, do not develop their 
religious naturalisms within biblical or theological traditions, and therefore, fail to fully 
appreciate theological themes such as ‗sin‘ or ‗fault‘.
606
 Whilst I do not specifically engage 
with sin or fault here (though they have played a role in the development, or at least the 
contextualising of my approach, as discussed in Chapter One), I will rely on three other 
theological themes, kenosis, autonomy, and atemporality, to illustrate how a naturalistic 
ontology can be theologically appropriated.  
 
Kenosis 
The term ‗kenosis‘, taken from the Greek κένωσις for ‗emptiness‘, is used in this context to 
refer to the theological theme of ‗divine self-emptying‘ present in Christian and Jewish 
thought. The theme of kenosis is particularly prevalent in relation to Christian incarnational 
theology, in God humbly emptying God‘s self in becoming human. The theme of humility is 
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clearly discernable in the Christian narrative; God did not become a great king, warrior or 
political leader. God was not god-like on earth, and in this sense, the incarnate God of 
Christian theology was strikingly different from the earthly gods of previous mythologies. 
The Christian God incarnate was portrayed as a humble carpenter. In his incarnation, God 
―... emptied himself, taking the form of a slave and being born in human likeness. And being 
found in human form, he humbled himself‖ (Philippians 2:7-8). The theme of Jesus‘ 
humility reoccurs at various stages in the New Testament, perhaps most saliently in the 
washing of the disciples‘ feet (John 13.1-20). This deeply symbolic act of humility may be 
interpreted as mirroring the humility of God becoming human, in a sense the relinquishment 
of divine power. 
 This theme is raised here given that it can also be seen as a way of theologically 
appropriating the relationship between God and creation. The concept of envisioning 
creation as an act of kenosis has been considered by a number of contemporary scholars, as 
explored in a volume edited by John Polkinghorne in 2001, The Work of Love: Creation as 
Kenosis. The Christian understanding of kenosis, it is argued here, provides a substantive 
theological understanding of God‘s relationship with creation that is congruent with the 
naturalistic ontology presented thus far. Interestingly, the theologian Jürgen Moltmann 
points out that the theme of kenosis differentiates the Christian understanding of God from 
previous understandings of God which he suggests stems predominantly from Aristotelian 
metaphysics:  
 
The attributes of deity related to the world (omnipotence, omnipresence, 
omniscience, immortality, impassibility, and immutability) derive from 
Aristotle‘s general metaphysics. They have little to do with God‘s attributes 
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There arises thus a dichotomy between the humility/powerlessness of the God of the 
Christian narrative portrayed through the humble carpenter, and the omnipotence etc. of the 
God of classical philosophy. In this sense, the frictions that arise between a naturalistic 
ontology and a theological view are only based on one tradition of God, namely, the God of 
Aristotelian attributes. The interpretation of a humble God in the Christian narrative is more 
amenable to the absence of assertions of omnipotence through miracles or divine action as in 
the view of a naturalistic ontology.  
 In addition, the act of kenosis, the voluntary self-limitation of God, can be 
interpreted as an act of love, and paradoxically, an act of power. God relinquishes power in 
an act of letting creation be, granting it the gift of freedom and autonomy. Moltmann 
encapsulates this understanding as follows: 
 
From the creation... God‘s self-humiliation and self-emptying deepen and 
unfold. Why? Because the creation proceeds from God‘s love, and this love 
respects the particular existence of all things, and the freedom of the human 
beings who have been created. A love that gives the beloved space, allows 
them time... freedom is the power of lovers who can withdraw in order to 
allow the beloved to grow and to come. Consequently, it is not just self-giving 
that belongs to creative love; it is self-limitation too; not only affection, but 
respect for the unique nature of the others as well. If we apply this perception 
to the Creator‘s relation to those he has created, what follows is a restriction of 
God‘s omnipotence, omnipresence and omniscience for the sake of conceding 




From this perspective, rather than envisaging a naturalistic ontology as ‗excluding‘ or 
‗prohibiting‘ divine action, a naturalistic ontology can be understood as a manifestation of a 
gift of freedom. For Moltmann, it is this act of self-limitation that is paradoxically, a sign of 
power.
609
 A theological worldview such as that argued for in this thesis, which promotes a 
naturalistic ontology in which God does not act, thus finds credence in the theme of kenosis. 
Such a naturalistic view can be seen as coherent with a theological conception of God, as 
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well as, crucially, the contingency and self-sufficiency of the causal web made known 
through the natural sciences. 
 Kenosis can therefore be understood as an element of a theological appropriation of 
a naturalistic ontology which does not provision for any direct divine interaction in the 
world. In this way, the theme of kenosis also makes a contribution to addressing the problem 
of evil; God does not act to prevent suffering as God does not act in the world. Polkinghorne 
also acknowledges this important facet of the kenotic view:  
 
Such an understanding is also basic to theodicy‘s disclaimer that God does not 
will the act of a murderer or the destructive force of an earthquake, but allows 
both to happen in a world in which divine power is deliberately self-limited to 
allow causal space for creatures. This qualification of omnipotence is the most 




However, Polkinghorne still persists with his understanding of Gods‘ ability to act directly 
in the physical world, even if in his understanding God‘s action is not an intervention per se, 
as it does not involve a contradiction of the physical laws.
611
 Similarly, other scholars who 
subscribe to various modes of divine action discussed above see serious merit in the kenotic 
view, for example, Barbour, Peacocke, Ward, Ellis, and others.
612
 
 This is where my own position diverges. The integrity and absoluteness of the 
causal nexus is cardinal for the naturalistic ontology espoused here; no form of direct divine 
action is seen. If divine action were allowed, even on a subtle scale, the problem of evil 
would be insurmountable. Even a loosely teleological view of the world is highly vulnerable 
to Dostoevsky‘s articulation of the problem of evil. Consequently, the naturalistic ontology 
adopted here is non-teleological, up to the point of human consciousness. This naturalistic 
ontology however, can be understood theologically in terms of kenosis – a loving act of 
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relinquishing the power to intervene or sculpt the world‘s future. In this sense, I take the 
theme of kenosis further and to its logical conclusion; a total relinquishing of power. A 
partial self-limitation with the provision to continue to causally influence the world and 
allow suffering does not suffice. The Christian narrative presents God as fully relinquishing 
power, eventually making the ultimate sacrifice in Jesus‘ crucifixion. The sense of ultimacy 
portrayed in the crucifixion could be interpreted as giving credence to the notion that the 
kenotic creation is also ultimate – a complete self-emptying, which would cohere with a 
Christian understanding of God and with the naturalistic ontology advocated here.  
 
Autonomy 
A related theme which can be seen as supporting a theological appropriation of a naturalistic 
ontology is the theological necessity of creation‘s autonomy. Similar to the theme of 
kenosis, several scholars engaged in the religion-science dialogue have acknowledged the 
importance of contingency, chance, and how integral these issues are to the scientific 
worldview and indeed the theological problem of evil. Barbour for example, notes that the 
concept of divine self-limitation is more coherent with the biblical depiction of God and 
with current scientific evidence regarding contingency.
613
 However, Barbour is still reluctant 
to accept a worldview that is fully contingent, i.e. not teleological. He discusses an overall 
plan for the world, though one which is not completely predetermined: 
 
We can see design in the whole process by which life came into being, with 
whatever combination of probabilistic and deterministic features the process 
had. Natural laws and chance may equally be instruments of God‘s intentions. 
There can be purpose without an exact predetermined plan.
614
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Contrary to Barbour, I suggest that only the image of a fully autonomous creation can 
provide an aspect of a response to the problem of evil; a naturalistic ontology in which God 
has no direct involvement explains evil by referral to natural processes, which God does not 
directly engage with. Barbour makes a similar appeal to kenotic thought, as he writes that, 
―Voluntary self-limitation exonerates God from direct responsibility for specific instances of 
evil and suffering....‖
615
 Barbour goes on to promote an overall purpose in the world, which 
he himself acknowledges makes God ultimately responsible for suffering. This it is argued, 
is a key weakness in Barbour‘s thought, and indeed the thought of others who view an 
overall plan in nature or divine action. An autonomous and non-teleological creation seems 
more theologically palatable and indeed more congruent with scientific depictions of the 
world‘s causal web. 
 Whilst Barbour, Polkinghorne, Peacocke and others support a degree of divine self-
limitation, they are unwilling to allow a fully autonomous creation, which my understanding 
of a naturalistic ontology requires. Barbour for instance, acknowledges the functionality of 
naturalism, but when understood as a metaphysic he feels it rejects many traditional 
religious beliefs and is minimalist with respect to religion. As such, he classifies forms of 
scientific naturalism such as that espoused here as being in conflict with religion.
616
 
However, contrary to Barbour‘s assertion, it is contested here that a naturalistic ontology 
does not conflict with a religious view; a naturalistic ontology is demonstrably coherent with 
a theological conception based on the themes of kenosis, autonomy, and atemporality which 
will be discussed in the next section; scientific naturalism is thus compatible with a 
theological understanding of the world. It may be the case that science could have fully laid 
waste to any notion of religious belief, in some as of yet inconceivable way (perhaps by 
providing a definitive explanation for the existence of the universe and its orderliness), but it 
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has not. Moreover, if this were to occur, then intellectual honesty would require such a view 
to be accepted, presuming it passed all of the usual scientific and philosophical rigour. It 
would be meaningless to persist with belief in a God in spite of evidence to the contrary. 
However, the picture that is presented from the naturalistic ontology leaves us with a sense 
of depth, on questions such as why the universe exists and why it is comprehensible. 
 Furthermore, the image of an autonomous creation can be argued for from a 
theological perspective even without recourse to science or the problem of evil. For 
example, it can be argued that creation needs to be autonomous in order for it to be 
considered having a relationship with God as opposed to merely being an extension of God, 
or a manifestation of God‘s wishes. A world which is autonomous allows for freedom and 
thus is opposed to a God who maintains ascendency of creation, becoming a tyrant or a 
puppet-master (to use the phrases of Polkinghorne and Haught respectively).
617
 Freedom or 
autonomy is an important facet of theology; without it, the significance of moral actions 
becomes questionable. Similarly, when applied to creation, the significance of any action, 
morality, religious thought, devotion, etc. is diminished if they were predetermined. It may 
not be that the world would be completely pointless if the outcome was foreseen, though it 
could be argued that the significance is diminished, akin to watching a sports event the 
outcome of which is already known. If the world was not fully autonomous, evil acts too, the 
holocaust and the suffering of children, would merely be elements of a plan being unfolded 
– the crux of Dostoevsky‘s theodicy challenge. A free and autonomous creation is then more 
coherent with the theological concept of a good God, as well as with the various other 
themes explored above (scientific knowledge of the natural world and kenosis).  
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Another element of theologically appropriating a naturalistic ontology is the 
acknowledgement of the theme of atemporality. Time itself is a distinct caveat of any 
ontology, theological or otherwise. As Stephen Hawking explains, since the early twentieth 
century and the theories of scientists such as Einstein and Henri Poincaré, time has been 
understood as intricately bound with space; Einstein‘s theory of relativity denies the 
existence of an absolute time as we experience it.
618
 This may have implications for our 
thinking with regard to ‗future‘ events, whether we consider anything to be teleological, 
predetermined, or open ended and contingent. If ‗future‘ is not necessarily as we envisage it, 
given that time is not as we experience it, then this may make unintelligible any talk of 
teleology or non-teleology. Yet it could also be argued that our worldly experience, and thus 
values and religious beliefs are to at least a significant degree dependent upon our 
experience of time. Therefore, we must approach the concept of timelessness with caution. 
Drees makes this point as he expresses concern over diverting attention from concrete 
contexts of injustice and suffering to a timeless and eternal ‗other place‘.
619
 Therefore, a 
theological balance needs to be struck between an acknowledgement of the nature of time as 
presented in physics, and the importance of time in our experience.
620
  
 The image of God acting in the immediacy of the physical world seems to rely too 
much on the notion that our experience of time is universal, a notion which modern physics 
has to some extent, laid waste to. Therefore, considerations of divine action in our world 
may be implying too local a conception of God. A wider image of God as creator must 
acknowledge the far more pliable vision of time on the larger scale. Moreover, the God of 
classical theology/philosophy corresponds to such an atemporal God – a God which is not 
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limited by our experience of time. It is clear in the writings of Augustine, for example, that 
he believed God to transcend time, given that God created time, ―thou art the Creator of all 
times... thou madest the whole temporal procession.‖
621
 Aquinas too, acknowledged God‘s 
timelessness, though for him, this gave God a vantage point from which God could foresee 
events which we experience as the future.
622
 Polkinghorne suggests slightly differently that 
in the thought of many classical theologians, God cannot have foreknowledge of the future 
as all events are equally contemporaneous to the atemporal gaze of divinity.
623
  
 The physical picture of the universe which sees time and space as intricately bound 
together as different dimensions of the universe presents interesting problems for theological 
ideas, a full analysis of which is beyond the scope of this work. The naturalistic ontology 
advocated here is coherent with the notion of a God that is outside of time and space, though 
as stated earlier, it is also necessary for the world‘s freedom as a response to theodicy that 
the unfolding future as we experience it is not predetermined or foreseeable. As Drees 
suggests, there must be a temporal aspect to God in order for our experience of aesthetics for 
example, to be meaningful, ―… God has God‘s time.‖
624
 Polkinghorne also considers a 
similar divine dipolarity of eternity/time; he agrees with the position asserted here, that the 
temporal aspect of the world does indeed preclude God‘s knowledge of the unformed future, 
even though God may be considered timeless.
625
 Given that time appears to be a part of 
creation, in both the Augustinian theological tradition and indeed in terms of modern 
physics, it is assumed here that God is indeed atemporal. This understanding coheres well 
with the prospect of a naturalistic ontology – an autonomous and free wold. Divine 
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atemporality then, can be considered as another facet of theologically appropriating a 
naturalistic ontology, as it places God outside of time and space.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
A theological appropriation of a naturalistic ontology may seem at first glance an oxymoron 
– indeed it is for several scholars discussed above. However, a case has been made in this 
chapter for precisely such a view. In section 4.1, a naturalistic ontology was outlined as 
understood in this context. This ontology, it was argued, stems from Greek philosophies of 
causality and atomism, and has been substantiated over the centuries through various 
scientific paradigms. The key features of this naturalistic ontology are that the world is 
comprised solely of material substance; sub-atomic particles form atoms, which form 
chemicals, which form amino acids, proteins, RNA and DNA, and ultimately there is an 
unbroken causal chain that accounts for all existence including human consciousness and 
morality. The laws of this causal process, the laws of nature, are absolute and unbroken, a 
statement which carries theological relevance given that it does not envisage any direct 
involvement in the world from the divine. It was also indicated that such an ontology has 
discernable caveats and criticisms, which were also acknowledged in this section. Therefore, 
the adoption of a naturalistic ontology was not naïve, but carefully and tentatively 
considered. Ultimately, it was argued that such caveats and criticisms do not amount to a 
substantial argument against a naturalistic ontology. Moreover, developments in modern 
science were also highlighted which add credence to a naturalistic ontology. Whilst 
scientific advancements in brain-computer interfacing, artificial intelligence and synthetic 
life do not definitively validate a naturalistic or material ontology, they would be consistent.  
 The theological coherence of a naturalistic ontology was then considered in section 
4.2. Whilst it was shown that the more prominent approach towards the natural world from 
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theology has been to consider various forms of divine action, it was argued in this section 
that none of these positions can overcome the theological problem of evil. The problem of 
natural evil offers substantial theological reason to adopt a naturalistic ontology, as does the 
argument from the integrity of contingency. The final section of this chapter, section 4.3, 
then sought to theologically appropriate a naturalistic ontology by demonstrating that it is 
consistent with the important theological themes of kenosis, the autonomy of creation and 
atemporality. 
 Despite these arguments in favour of a naturalistic ontology, it is acknowledged 
that envisioning the world as an unalienable causal system may seem nihilistic. Including 
conscious thought and hence, morality as elements of physical causation in the evolutionary 
process, may lead some to discount any element of ultimate hope. There may be a sentiment 
of forsakenness and despair, as Bertrand Russell wrote of evolution, ―So far as our present 
knowledge shows, no ultimately optimistic philosophy can be validly inferred.‖
626
 Here, we 
reach the cardinal argument of this thesis; that evolutionary ethics offers us a ‗get-out 
clause‘ from this nihilistic outlook, and provides a glimmer of hope. This argument will be 
presented in the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
A HOPEFUL THEOLOGY IN THE CONTEXT OF EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter will set forth the culmination and cardinal argument of this thesis; that an 
evolutionary understanding of ethics can provide hope in what may otherwise be understood 
as a nihilistic world – understanding hope as in opposition to nihilism. The previous chapters 
outlined a worldview which drew from evolutionary science and appropriated such science 
theologically. However, in doing so, this theological approach may be left vulnerable to the 
criticism of nihilism or forsakenness. In this chapter, I hope to address this potential 
criticism by offering an alternative interpretation; the fact goodness evolved from a material 
and non-teleological world can offer a glimmer of hope. Moreover, it is because goodness 
was not inevitable that gives morality greater significance than had it been inevitable. This 
glimmer of hope is furthermore, interpreted in the context of a theological metaethic; an 
overarching theological framework for understanding good and evil which has emerged 
from developments in modern science and particularly the field of evolutionary ethics, 
though one which also acknowledges a particular reading of Christian ethics. 
 A further element of this argument is to suggest that my understanding of Christian 
ethics offers a telos or goal for moral progress – the concept of agape. I argue that humanity 
is in the process of moral progress and that in general, this can be evidenced by various 
moral revolutions and the fact that moral atrocities are less frequent and incite more moral 
outrage than in previous centuries. In more forthright terms, this is to state that humankind is 
becoming ‗more moral‘. Whilst this element of the argument is threading together two levels 
of discourse, (a Christian ethical system and an evolutionary meta-ethical framework) it is 
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not necessarily drawing support from one to the other, but rather stating how the two can be 
envisaged in one overarching scheme. The realisation of this goal – the culmination of moral 
progression – may be termed in Christian/theological parlance, the ‗Kingdom of God‘, 
though this is not to take a stance on whether or not such a goal will actually be realised. 
Furthermore, what this may actually be or be like will not be discussed in this chapter, as 
this would require more extensive study than space permits. As such, particular ethical 
issues will not be addressed in any great detail; less controversial moral questions, for 
example war and race/gender equality, will be peripherally considered to make evident 
humanity‘s moral consensus on certain issues, though this is not to take a stance on other 
moral questions such as abortion or euthanasia, or whether animals be considered morally 
relevant. Rather, I will merely put forth a metaethic that suggests a developmental vision of 
morality from its origins in altruistic behaviour as discussed by sociobiology, through to its 
current manifestations, which, since the advent of humanity, can be deemed to be 
developing. This metaethic, I argue, can be understood from a Christian theological 
perspective if the Christian notion of agape is presented as the telos of such moral 
development. 
 In order to demonstrate how a glimmer of hope can be seen in the evolution of 
goodness, the potential material fatalism that may be implied by a naturalistic ontology must 
be addressed. The material depiction of the world such as that espoused in the previous 
chapter may seem to be inimical to the notion of free will necessary for actions to have 
moral worth. In section 5.1, it will be suggested that incorporating a naturalistic version of 
free will can overcome this material inevitability. The naturalistic version of freedom 
suggested is akin to what has been termed ‗compatibilism‘ in other contexts – that physical 
determinism and free will are compatible.
627
 The particular representation of compatibilism 
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adopted here rests on the degree of alternative decisions that are possible in any given 
mental system. Having established how free will and a material ontology can be reconciled, 
section 5.2 will then argue for a hopeful interpretation of this picture of evolution; the 
evolution of freedom and moral values from the material offers an argument against 
nihilism. Section 5.3 will then interpret this point theologically, by reasserting that such 
values as evident in humanity are indicative of depth and reflective of the divine. 
 Viewing values as evolving from the valueless is the first of two discernable 
examples of hope in the theological framework outlined in this thesis. The second is the 
suggestion that morality is progressing. This will be argued in section 5.4, where the analogy 
of an expanding circle of moral relevance will be used to illustrate how humanity‘s 
collective moral conscience is in general, developing. Section 5.5 will then suggest that in 
terms of constructing a Christian metaethic which is incorporative of an evolutionary view 
of ethics, the Christian love commandment could be seen as the goal of the aforementioned 
moral progress. The Christian vision of indiscriminate agape could be taken as the epitome 
of an expanding moral circle. Consequently, a Christian ethical framework can emerge 
enriched by appreciating evolutionary understandings of ethics and scientific understandings 
of reality.  
 
5.1 Overcoming Material Fatalism: The Question of Free Will 
If, as argued in the previous chapter, a naturalistic/material ontology is adopted, then this 
may imply fatalism. I use the term fatalism here, similar to Chapter Two, to suggest a 
nihilistic view of the world; that all events are inevitable and that we do not maintain control 
over our actions; our free will is illusory and our actions are governed by forces beyond our 
control.
628
 In Chapter Two, it was considered whether or not our behaviour is fully governed 
                                                          




by our genetic predispositions (genetic fatalism) –  it was argued that our consciousness 
plays significant enough a role in order for this not to be the case. Presently, however, an 
alternative mode of fatalism will be considered; material fatalism. 
 If a material ontology encompasses the human mind, then a provisional reading 
may seem to suggest that all events are inevitable, including human choices. This argument 
can be advanced by positing two premises; i) that the human mind is comprised of physical 
matter and nothing more as in a material ontology, and ii) that physical matter obeys the 
inalienable laws of physics. If these two premises hold, then one reaches the conclusion that 
human choices are as governed by the physical laws of causality as any other physical event 
such as snowfall or planetary orbits. Bertrand Russell outlined this implication of a material 
ontology as he wrote that if everything we understand as matter (which in this case, includes 
human thought) is subject to stringent physical laws, then ―all its manifestations in human 
and animal behaviour will be such as an ideally skilful physicist could calculate from purely 
physical data.‖
629
 On this reading, Russell suggests, a human would be equivalent to an 
automaton, as even their thoughts can be inferred from physics.
630
  
 In Chapter Two, it was suggested that a genetic fatalist interpretation fails as a 
model for understanding human behaviour, including morality, given that it is not 
sufficiently appreciative of the role of consciousness. However, if consciousness is indeed 
material, as contended here, then this may merely be a relocation of the locus of fatalism to 
lower-level entities, i.e., our actions are not fatalistically determined by genes, but by the 
physical collocations of atoms in our brains. Again on a provisional reading, this prospect 
would seem to cohere with the reductionism of a naturalistic ontology. If this is the case, 
then we may be led to a genuinely nihilistic, fatalistic conclusion; that the universe is merely 
unfolding atomic interactions running their course and even our thoughts and choices are 
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essentially determined by the laws of physics. This perspective carries significant 
theological and ethical implications; if our decisions are merely the manifestation of 
interactions of atoms bound by physical laws, then can we be held responsible for our 
actions? This is a central issue raised by Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown, as they ask:  
 
If humans are physical systems, and if it is their brains (not minds) that allow 
them to think, how can it not be the case that all of their thoughts and 
behaviour are simply the product of the laws of neurobiology? How can it not 
be the case, as the epiphenomenalists argue, that the mental life of reasoning, 
evaluating, deciding is a mere accompaniment of the brain processes that are 




 Murphy and Brown proceed to ask the subsequent question, ―If these questions 
cannot be answered, what happens to our traditional notions of moral responsibility, even of 
our sense of ourselves as rational animals?‖
632
 If the mind is material, and the material is 
governed by fixed unalienable laws, then what of our moral freedom? Would this material 
picture of the world seriously mitigate, if not completely eradicate our understanding of 
freedom, and hence, moral responsibility? A similar question is also posed by Philip 
Clayton, ―It is also questionable whether one can make sense of ethical obligation or moral 
striving given a purely naturalistic ontology... If all that exists are the objective states of 
affairs described by the sciences, then all sense of obligation is ultimately an illusion.‖
633
 If 
moral obligations were indeed illusory, then despite whatever meaning we perceive or 
attribute to our own lives, we would be left ultimately with an ontological nihilism – a world 
in which actions most poignant and profound are merely the results of different 
manifestations of collocations of atoms in individuals‘ brains. 
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 I argue in this chapter that this nihilistic conclusion does not follow from a material 
worldview – evolutionary ethics provides a glimmer of hope. However, before that can be 
argued, the issue of freedom must be addressed (this has been peripherally mentioned 
throughout this thesis, though will now need a more detailed analysis). In order for actions 
to have moral worth, they must be considered free – this was signalled as a key feature of 
my understanding of Christian ethics in Chapter Two, also evident in the thought of 
Augustine. The question arises then, of how free will can be reconciled, if at all, with the 
causal nexus of the material ontology espoused in the previous chapter. Although it will be 
outlined in section 5.1.2 how I suggest this issue be approached, another potential solution 
which is worthy of consideration has been discussed in contemporary theology, though it 
will ultimately be rejected here; an appeal to caveats of a naturalistic ontology. 
 
5.1.1 Free Will Contra a Material Mind 
Criticisms of a material view of the mind with respect to considering free will have appeared 
in contemporary theology, such as the alternative to the material model of free will espoused 
by Nancey Murphy. She has addressed this issue in two important works as a co-author, 
though henceforth, I speak of her view in the singular, being mindful that it has been 
explicated with others. Her argument is nuanced, relying on at least three features; 
nonreduction, quantum indeterminacy, and environmental causation. She does not pose that 
an immaterial mental realm exists, akin to a Cartesian dualism, but rather, suggests that 
―there must exist an adequate physical basis for free actions in the hierarchical structuring of 
the human brain.‖
634
 Whilst she sees merit in an ultimately reductive account of the human 
mind, such as the one I adopt, she argues that the explanation of the mind in terms of 
neurophysiology can only be partial; mental properties have a greater complexity than other 
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physical properties and are intricately related to environmental variables. Therefore, they 
cannot be considered identical to brain states.
635






Objections to nonreduction, such as those explicated in the previous chapter (section 4.1) 
could be recalled at this point. This objection to Murphy‘s view pertains to a difference of 
opinion on what constitutes ‗non-reductionism‘. I suggested following from others (see 
section 4.1) that certain entities cannot be directly explained by their material constituents. 
Therefore, I agree with Murphy on the issue that mental properties cannot be directly 
explained by reduction to their physical constituents, though I differ in that I contend that 
mental properties are ultimately reducible. For Murphy, our experience of an ‗I‘ stems from 
the existence of a higher-order complex state, which offers us the opportunity to choose 
between various lines of reasoning with no overriding reason to choose one rather than the 
other – our mental experience is of a ―global, transcendent state.‖
637
 As she explains, on her 
reading a reductionist view of the mind is not refuted or replaced, but rather supplemented 
by additional considerations.
638
 In contrast to this position, I have argued that no such 
additional considerations are necessary (given that, as noted in section 2.3, reduction is not 
diametrically oppossed to emergence). Reduction does not diminish the significance of the 
mind, and there is not nor should there be any reason to postulate anything ‗more‘ than 
ultimately reductive elements. The ‗additional considerations‘ posited add nothing to the 
view that cannot be understood through material reduction. 
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Mental Indeterminacy  
In addition to her view on the irreducibility of the mind, Murphy also incorporates quantum 
indeterminacy, which she feels may be a necessary condition for true freedom and 
spontaneity.
639
 Her understanding of an irreducible mental process acts downward on a 
genuinely ontologically indeterminate level (the quantum level).
640
 Our thoughts are not 
governed by their constituent elements on this view, but rather the ‗whole‘ of the mind can 
choose between ontologically indeterminate options. It is also worth noting that elsewhere, 
her co-author George Ellis postulated that quantum  uncertainty in brain activity may 
provide a point of divine interaction; God could act in causing different outcomes within 
quantum events in the brain which would be macroscopically amplified and subsequently 
influence our decisions.
641
 In opposition to such a view, I find sufficient reason to discount 
Murphy‘s appeal to quantum physics to provide a facet of ontologically genuine 
indeterminacy given the similar discussion on divine action at indeterminate levels in 
section 4.2.1. Such a view, I argued is an appeal to a ‗God of the gaps‘ mentality – an appeal 
to as of yet incomplete knowledge. In any case, I also contest that ontological indeterminacy 
is not necessary in providing a sufficient account of free will, or at least, it is worth 
conceptually exploring an alternative. 
 
Environmental Causality 
One further aspect of Murphy‘s criticism of reductionist views of the mind is her 
understanding of environmental causality. Murphy interprets reductionism to always assume 
bottom-up causation; that entities‘ behaviour is ultimately governed by ‗lower-level‘ physics 
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thus, all causation occurs from the bottom-up. However, even with this interpretation of 
reductionism, it can be argued that higher-level properties are not illusory nor can they be 
immediately reduced to their fundamental constituents – see section 4.1. Murphy rightly 
notes that the environment, social or otherwise, can have a causal effect on the mental 
system. Therefore, she concludes that mind/brain states cannot be fully governed by their 
constituents, because they can be causally influenced by external environmental contexts, 
not just the physical laws that govern their constituents: 
 
It is obvious, is it not, that the environment (or the broader system of which 
the entity or system in question is a part) often has a causal effect on that 
entity or system? Is it not, therefore, also obvious that the behaviour of an 
entity is often not determined solely by the behaviour (or laws governing the 
behaviour) of its parts? And is it not obvious that a sophisticated entity such as 
an organism has control of (some of) its own parts—the horse runs across the 
pasture, and all of its parts go with it? If all of this is so obvious, why is causal 




 This is where I find Murphy‘s critique of causual reduction too strong. Whilst 
Murphy is, strictly speaking, grammatically correct in stating that external causal influences 
can causally affect the mental system, her point is problematic, as such causal influences are 
not precluded by reduction. Such causal influences are the result of interacting systems, each 
of which are governed by their own constituents. The core of reductionism does not preclude 
reductive causal systems (namely, the environment) interacting, but merely acknowledges 
that ultimately, each of these systems‘ behaviour is reducible. Consider for example, two 
billiard balls. The behaviour of each of the billiard balls on a reductionist view is governed 
physically by their constituent atoms. If the two balls were to collide, they would cause a 
change in the state of each other, therefore, each of the balls‘ behaviour will be influenced 
by an external or environmental force, namely the other ball. However, both would still be 
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governed by their physical constituents. The same too, for a mind and its environment; 
suggesting that the mind is governed by the physical laws of its constituent physical 
properties is not to deny that it can be influenced by an external cause; our thoughts/brain 
states have external causal influences. For example, we feel certain emotions when listening 
to certain types of music, or we feel cold if the temperature falls. Such 
external/environmental influences are easily understood as ‗inputs‘ in a material model of 
the mind such Dennett‘s multiple drafts model discussed in section 4.1.   
 Consequently, I find sufficient reason to move away from Murphy and others who 
critique a causally reductive view of the mind, either by viewing it as irreducible, or by 
postulating quantum indeterminacy as the factor which offers us ‗genuine‘ freedom. The 
task is then to either explain how an ontologically material view of the human mind can 
account for the freedom necessary for actions to have moral worth, or else succumb to the 
nihilistic view that we are not truly accountable for any actions. I choose the former, and to 
do so, I turn to Dennett‘s depiction of free will. 
 
5.1.2 Free Will in a Naturalistic Ontology 
As discussed in section 4.1, I subscribed to Dennett‘s understanding of the mind as a product 
of physical processes. The mind is not exempt from the long chain of causal interactions in a 
naturalistic ontology. Free will, as an aspect of the mind is also no exception on this view; as 
Dennett observes, free will is not ―a God-like power to exempt oneself from the causal 
fabric of the physical world.‖
643
 Notwithstanding, despite the fact that the mind is bound by 
the ―causal fabric of the physical world‖, Dennett challenges the direct linkage between 
physical determinism and inevitability which he feels underpins the polarisation of the 
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debate between hard-determinism (the view that free will is illusory) and agent causation 
(there is a nonmaterial free will).
644
  
 It is contested here that evitability – meaning avoidability – emerges not from a 
genuinely ontological indeterminism but rather from the complexities of deterministic causal 
systems. To proffer an analogy; the throw of a die is considered random, and is thus often 
used to introduce ‗chance‘ into various games. However, in principle, the throw of a die is 
entirely non-random – it is governed and fully determined by the laws of physics. If a skilled 
physicist had complete access to all the relevant information about a die-throw, i.e. the 
weight of the die, the velocity, the wind-drag, the angle from which it is released, and so on, 
then that physicist would be able to calculate using Newton‘s laws of motion, where the die 
would land. In practice, such variables would be so numerous and complex that it would be 
impossible to actually calculate where the die would come to rest; consequently, for all 
intents and purposes, the throw of the die is random. It may be strictly speaking 
determinable by a hypothetical intelligence with a God‘s-eye perspective, such as that 
postulated by the eighteenth/nineteenth century philosopher Pierre Simon Laplace.
645
 
However, from the perspective of our experience, the causal system of a die-throw is so 
complex that we cannot calculate it. The human mind can be considered as an analogous 
causal system, though one exponentially more complex than that of a die-throw – indeed, 
the human mind it seems is the most complex causal system in the known universe. Whilst 
our minds are governed by cause and effect, this causal system is so complex that it is far 
beyond our comprehension. The ontologically indeterminate view of free will thus faces 
significant challenges, which leads me to the consideration of a more pragmatic 
understanding of indeterminacy.  
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 In the example of a die-throw, the result is deterministic but as we have lost sight of 
the laws and variables, given that they are too complex to follow, we envisage the throw as 
random. Laplace offered a similar understanding with respect to the mind and free choices. 
Laplace suggests that we have lost sight of the reasons for choices, and therefore we believe 
that our choices are not determined.
646
 Dennett elaborates on this principle by postulating the 
interdependence of every causal system in the universe leading to the conclusion that whilst 
the universe is governed by physical laws, the degree of alternative possibilities are so 
incomprehensibly vast that events cannot be considered inevitable – he quotes Whitehead in 
this regard, ―The vast causal independence of contemporary occasions is the preservative of 
the elbow-room within the Universe.‖
647
 Therefore, the universe is governed by causal 
deterministic laws, but such laws offer enough ‗elbow-room‘ for events to be considered 
evitable and thus, free. 
 Pertaining more specifically to conscious thought, if freedom is considered to be 
equated to the level of complexity in a causal system, rather than an ontologically distinct 
factor, then Dennett considers that even ‗lower‘ organisms have a degree of freedom.
648
 A 
redwood tree, for example, can ‗decide‘ to blossom in spring, though of course, this is not 
yet a ‗conscious‘ decision. This decision is based on a simple environmental ‗switch‘, ―A 
system has a degree of freedom when there is an ensemble of possibilities of one kind or 
another, and which of these possibilities is actual at any time depends on whatever function 
or switch controls this degree of freedom.‖
649
 Dennett expands on this concept by suggesting 
that over evolutionary time, such ‗switches‘ become more prevalent in systems, and can 
become linked in parallel or in series, eventually forming larger switching networks, rather 
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than a ‗simple‘ on/off switch in systems such as a tree – though perhaps a dendrologist (an 
individual involved in the study of trees) may argue that the process of tree blooming is in 
fact quite complex itself. Given the powers of exponential multiplication, the introduction of 
further ‗switches‘ into a system allow the degrees of freedom to ―multiply dizzyingly, and 
the issues of control grow complex and non-linear.‖
650
  
 This is the crux of Dennett‘s understanding of free will which I argue fits neatly 
into the naturalistic ontology promoted in the previous chapter. The human brain is the 
manifestation of such a system of ‗switches‘; it modulates the enormity of information that 
we perceive through the senses and accesses our past experiences in order to make choices. 
The incomprehensibly vast amounts of information we acquire and innumerable amount of 
choices we can make at any given time gives us free will in the same sense that a die throw 
is random; our free choices are governed ultimately by physics, but the level of complexity 
involved in such choices is so great that our choices are unpredictable or free. Of course, 
critics argue that such a view on free will is not sufficient. The philosopher Jerry Fodor for 
example, feels that Dennett‘s compatiblist explication of freedom only accounts for a 
pseudo-freedom; it falls short of a metaphysical freedom, a ―freedom tout court.‖
651
 Murphy 
offers a similar critique, suggesting that Dennett only explains how ―complex machines 
could appear to have language, beliefs, morality, and free will‖ and fails to give a full 
account.
652
 However, it is contested here that the view of free will put forth by Dennett is 
again more coherent with a naturalistic ontology; there is no reason why we should expect 
consciousness to be exempt from the causal processes of the world. This understanding of 
freedom, it is argued, is sufficient to account for human free will, particularly as it concerns 
the moral worth of actions. Free will can be understood as congruent with a seamless causal 
system – in sum, a naturalistic, material ontology, even one which understands the mind as a 
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physical entity, does not preclude free will; the fatalism that may be presumed to stem from 
a material ontology can be overcome. 
 
5.2 Freedom and Hope 
It is argued then, that freedom can be compatible with a naturalistic/material ontology, if 
freedom is viewed as an incomprehensibly vast array of alternative brain states. If we accept 
this reading of free will (a genuine but physical free will), then we can subsequently state 
that our actions have moral worth. It does not diminish the significance of moral freedom if 
freedom is equated to the degree of alternative possibilities open to our brains, 
responsiveness to our environments and our ability for self-reflection. Dennett 
acknowledges this point, ―... a naturalistic account of decision making still leaves room for 
moral responsibility.‖
653
 The fact that moral decisions are not ‗cause-free‘ or ontologically 
indeterminate does not preclude them. Kant outlined a similar argument, though in a 
somewhat different context, as he argued that moral decisions must have reasons as their 
causes – they are not undetermined.
654
 I advance this argument further here, and suggest that 
not only does a naturalistic account leave room for moral responsibility, but the evolution of 
free will and a moral sense can actually be interpreted as more significant on a naturalistic 
and non-teleological view, rather than as something ontologically distinct, such as a pre-
established morality or dualist position.  
 If morality was inevitable, its significance might then be considered to be 
mitigated; as noted in previous chapters, I attribute some significance to novelty. The fact 
that certain events transpire is given greater significance when such events were not 
inevitable – this is not to say that inevitable events have no significance, but that inevitable 
events would have less significance than evitable events. This argument was stated in 
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section 3.3 though in a wider context; I argued that foreseen evolutionary developments may 
have less significance than developments in an open, non-teleological system. Of course, 
one could disagree and state the contrary; that an absence of teleology is not a prerequisite 
for significance. However, as it was argued in previous chapters, I contest that 
foreknowledge does in fact diminish the significance of events, as in the example of viewing 
a sporting event already knowing the outcome. Although significance may be gained in 
certain respects from foreseen events, it is contested that significance is at least to some 
extent dependent on novelty. The fact that freedom can be the result of combinations of 
mindless particles of matter is the remarkable point, indeed I argue more remarkable than 
had it been specially created or ontologically distinct. Had moral freedom been inevitable or 
planned, then it would not carry the same significance that one can attribute to it from the 
perspective of a material worldview.  
 Arthur Peacocke makes a similar point, though as discussed in the previous chapter 
I differ from him with regard to his belief in divine interaction. He posits the question which 
I address here, ―... how are we properly to interpret the cosmological development (or the 
development of the cosmoses) if, after aeons of time, the fundamental particles have become 
human beings, have evidenced that quality of life we call ‗personal‘?‖
655
 I suggest that this 
premise, the evolution of morality and freedom from mindless matter, be interpreted as 
offering a glimmer of hope in what would otherwise be nihilistic world. 
 Although ‗hope‘ is used here as a term which stands in opposition to nihilism, this 
is not to posit ‗hope‘ as the direct opposite to nihilism; of course, one can maintain an 
ontological nihilism yet find a subjective notion of hope. Indeed, as I will argue, hope can be 
found through the evolution of goodness/morality, which may be subjective. Whilst the idea 
of hope I argue for will be considered in this context to be somewhat theological, I do not 
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conversely equate atheistic/secular visions of the world with nihilism (though atheistic 
perspectives on the universe would seem to imply an ontological nihilism). Therefore, whilst 
I propose ‗hope‘ as a term used here in opposition to nihilism, these terms are not 
diametrically opposed in every context. Moreover, although my understanding of hope is 
theological, it is not eschatological in the sense that other theologies of hope have been, such 
as those discussed in Chapter Three. Hope is understood here as pertaining to meaning or 
purpose; something more than arbitrary interactions of atoms and matter. Whether this hope 
is considered purely subjective (as in an atheistic outlook) or indicative of theological 
‗depth‘ (discussed further in Chapter Three) is not the primary concern in this project, 
though I am in favour of the latter view.   
 
Counterfactuals 
A difficulty with the argument that the evolution of morality may provide a crevice in an 
otherwise nihilistic world is the absence of a frame of reference or counterfactual world. 
Notwithstanding, it is possible to conceive of alternatives, and suggest whether such 
alternatives would be considered nihilistic, or whether the evitable evolution of morality as 
it has transpired could be deemed more significant. For the purposes of illustrating why the 
evitable evolution of ethics offers us hope in opposition to nihilism, three categories of 
worlds will be briefly considered; a universe with no life, a world with no evolved morality, 
and a world not with evolutionary morality but a preordained, inevitable morality. Firstly, 
one could envisage a universe with no life, or indeed a wider conception of the non-
existence of the universe itself. Such worlds would appear nihilistic; being absent of purpose 
or value, particularly if as argued in Chapter Three, the antitheses of nihilism (notions such 
as value and teleology) only fully emerge with human life.
656
 Nihilism is not understood 
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here as an existent force in itself but rather as the absence of value/purpose, and thus could 
exist in a world absent of life – it can exist in our conceptions of such a world. 
 A second category of counterfactual worlds also illustrates the due significance 
attributed to the evitability of morality and how it provides hope in opposition to nihilism; a 
world with evolution, but without the evolution of moral sentiments. As discussed in the 
previous two chapters, the portrayal of evolution adopted here is one which operates within 
the framework described by Monod as chance and necessity. As Gould noted in his analogy 
of winding the tape of evolution back, it is highly unlikely that anything like human beings 
would emerge in an evolutionary process. Consequently, if morality is only considered as 
such – that is differentiated from functional behaviour construed as altruistic – when it 
emerges in humans or other hypothetical self-reflective life, then morality too can be 
considered highly unlikely. Moreover, a premise set forth in previous chapters was that 
teleology or value only exists at the level of human consciousness. Without these values, as 
in non-human life or a conceivable alternative evolutionary world where moral sentiments 
did not evolve, the world could be considered nihilistic; it would be devoid of values or 
purpose. Of course, this raises the important distinction between ‗values‘ and ‗value‘; 
arguing that non-human life does not have values is not to suggest that it does not have value 
– this is a different, ethical issue.
657
 
 A third category of worlds, a world with a pre-ordained, inevitable morality is 
easier to conceive, given that the pre-evolutionary orthodox approach would fall into this 
category; that is the approach discussed in Chapter One drawing on the traditional 
theological narrative of a pre-established (and thus, inevitable) good. On this perspective, 
values existed and moral actions were given significance. However, the important 
clarification which needs to be made, as discussed in Chapter One, is that moral actions 
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were given significance in part as a result of free will, in the view of Aquinas, for 
instance.
658
 It is again, this central notion of freedom which gives moral actions their 
significance. The absence of moral freedom would severely diminish the meaning of 
morality, as expressed in the seventeenth century Unitarian objection to predestination; the 
The Racovian Catechism for example, makes an objection to predestination in terms of 
God‘s punishment, ―And when God punishes the wicked, and those who disobey him, what 
does he but punish those who do not that which they have not ability to execute.‖
659
 
Therefore, in a non-evolutionary view, an inevitable, preordained morality can still be 
significant if the concept of moral freedom with regard to moral actions is acknowledged. 
 Notwithstanding, it can be suggested that such a pre-ordained morality is less 
significant than a non-inevitable morality, given that a non-inevitable morality also 
introduces freedom at the level of the metaethic. In short, moral actions are considered to 
have worth when they are not inevitable but free. I argue similarly, that the existence of 
morality has greater worth as it was not inevitable. These two views are not completely 
dichotomic, given that moral significance can still exist in a world with a pre-existent, 
inevitable morality; in this case, perhaps this world would not be nihilistic. Yet I argue that a 
non-inevitable morality can be more significant.  
 John Hick outlines a similar premise, though in the context of his soul-making 
theodicy. Hick argues that a world with a pre-ordained hedonistic paradise would not lead to 
as valued a moral sense as the exploration of the potentialities of human personality.
660
 I 
argue a similar sentiment though with respect to metaethics; a perfectly planned and instilled 
framework for morality might not be devoid of significance, if free will exists at the level of 
moral actions, though it might be less significant than a world in which metaethics was not 
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inevitable. In this respect, I am attributing freedom not just to the level of the moral action, 
but also to the level of the metaethic. John Haught expresses a similar outlook, though in a 
wider context than morality. Although Haught‘s approach to teleology was discussed and 
ultimately rejected in Chapter Three, he does acknowledge the theological importance of 
evitability, ―Contingency, for instance, may be troubling to those fixated on the need for 
design in nature, but an openness to accidents seems essential for creation‘s autonomy and 
eventual aliveness.‖
661
 The evitability of the world, and in the context here, morality, gives it 
greater ‗aliveness‘ or significance.  
 In comparison with conceivable alternative categories then, it can be evidenced that 
a world which exhibits the evitable evolution of morality offers hope in a world which could 
otherwise be considered nihilistic. In the three categories of other counterfactual worlds 
considered, the first two, a world without life and a world without moral sentiments, are 
argued to be considered nihilistic. The third category, which encompasses the orthodox 
conception of the world in pre-evolutionary thought, may not be considered nihilistic given 
that it exhibits morality and stresses the importance of free will with regard to moral actions. 
Nevertheless, it was argued that an evitable morality in the evolutionary view could be seen 
as more significant than an inevitable morality, as with a pre-established good. It might not 
be that the preordained vision of morality is completely insignificant or completely 
nihilistic, and thus not diametrically opposed to the current understanding of morality 
conceived.  In any case, based on our current scientific understanding as explored from the 
context of a naturalistic ontology, it would seem that only the first two categories of worlds 
(and of course our own) are actually possible.    
 Russell‘s words in the previous section, that a material worldview would imply a 
world with no freedom, can be overcome by incorporating Dennett‘s notion of evitability 
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and the incomprehensibly vast degree of alternative decisions we have available to us. 
Therefore, our freedom offers us the ability to avoid the ‗inevitable‘ – it allows us to avoid 
the conclusion of nihilistic fatalism. Our freedom allows us to contradict the apparent 
inevitability of a material world bound by the physical laws. Similarly, the fact that ethics 
evolved from a non-teleological, material world can be interpreted as offering a glimmer of 
hope. The world is not merely meaningless collocations of atoms, but goodness has emerged 
– thus we find a ‗get-out clause‘ in a world which could otherwise be considered a nihilistic 
amalgamation of particles of matter. Goodness, I argued in Chapter Three, is a feature of 
depth, some profound ‗something more‘. The view that this evolution of goodness was not a 
priori inevitable, I suggest, makes it more significant.  
 
5.3 Theological Interpretations of Naturalistic Freedom 
In further addressing the question posed by Peacocke above, I also put forth the suggestion 
here that the evolution of our moral freedom from material matter can be interpreted 
theologically; that evolved morality is reflective of the divine. It was stated in Chapter 
Three, that although morality is contested here to have arisen from the processes of 
evolution as understood through the field of sociobiology, human morality can in some 
senses be considered unique. I incorporated Sarah Coakley‘s term ‗supernormal‘ morality to 
serve this purpose. Similarly, human freedom can be considered unique; though there is no 
ontological difference between the freedom we possess and the freedom of a redwood tree, 
for instance, there are significant distinctions. Ontologically, human freedom differs from 
the freedom of a tree only in terms of degree. However, our level of self-consciousness has, 
as Teilhard suggested, pierced a significant boundary in biological evolution.
662
 Dennett 
echoes this sentiment, ―Whales roam the ocean, birds soar blithely overheard... but none of 
                                                          
662 Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, ‗Turmoil or Genesis?‘ p. 222 
223 
 
these creatures is free in the way human beings can be free. Human freedom is an objective 




 This degree of moral freedom, I suggest, is reflective of the divine; as stated in 
section 3.4, morality can be equated to what Tillich terms ‗depth‘. Evolved ethics offers us a 
glimmer of something beyond the surface – beyond the purely physical events towards our 
ineffable experience (though to reiterate, this is not to state there is anything ‗more‘ than the 
physical – see section 3.4). Viewing the remarkableness of evolutionary ethics and evolved 
freedom in this way does not discount the fully naturalistic explanations that have been 
explored and defended in this thesis, though it appreciates the ‗miracle‘ of their evolution 
from a mindless world. Coakley suggests that the level of morality apparent in human life is 
not quite evidence of God, ―but... manifestations which demand from us some sort of 
response both rational and affective.‖
664
 On this point I agree, though to a lesser extent – 
evolved morality, in my view, is reflective of the divine, perhaps not quite a manifestation; I 
do not suggest that such morality has a direct, supernatural element. I argue, as stated in 
section 3.4, that such profound goodness as evident in human morality is indicative of depth.  
 Of course, this theological assumption may be challenged; why suggest that this 
supernormal morality is reflective of the divine? Coakley also acknowledges this caveat:  
 
What we do still need to worry about, however, is the classic Humean point: 
that there is no reason why the agnostic or sceptic could not simply stop at the 
phenomenon of evolutionary order kindly supplied by game theory and 
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Coakley offers a response to this caveat by suggesting that it seems impossible to account 
for supernormal morality in any way other than to consider its cause God.
666
 Alternatively, I 
do not suggest that God is the cause of morality – recall my espousal of a naturalistic 
ontology in the previous chapter which suggested that all causes were natural. I argue that 
morality which has evolved from mindless matter is reflective of the divine. In this sense, 
perhaps, my argument is more philosophical. Whilst I do interpret the evolution of morality 
as theological, it could also be stated in more general terms. The fact that goodness evolved 
offers us a glimmer of hope; with the advent of human moral conscience, we are not bound 
to a nihilistic inevitability, we can see hope in the evolution of the moral from the amoral, in 
the evolution of values from the valueless. Consequently, this gives motives for the 
establishment of an optimistic, hopeful worldview. In furtherance of this theme, I also turn 
my attention towards morality as it exists among humans and propose that morality is 
progressing. 
 
5.4 The Expanding Moral Circle 
A further aspect of an evolutionary view of morality that can contribute to a hopeful 
theology is the proposition that we are evolving or progressing morally; in a sense, we are 
becoming ‗more moral‘.  Before this is explored in more detail, it should be clarified that 
there is an important distinction to be made between this notion of moral evolution or moral 
development/progression, and teleology. Evolution, it has been argued here for scientific 
and theological reasons, should be viewed as decidedly non-teleological; it does not have a 
goal. A full and coherent picture of the world can be taken from a non-teleological 
naturalistic ontology which includes evolutionary ethics, to give us a picture of the world 
from the big bang to moral behaviour (noting that this picture is not yet quite complete). 
                                                          
666 Ibid., pp. 18-20 
225 
 
However, non-teleology does not discount the notions of development or progression in the 
realm of moral behaviour.  
 The nineteenth century Irish philosopher William Lecky hypothesised a circle of 
moral relevance which demarcates who might be the beneficiaries of our benevolent actions 
– the centre of the circle being those most relevant in a moral sense, with the degree of 
relevance decreasing as the circle expands. This circle, he suggested, at one time merely 
encompasses the family, but then extends to include ―... a class, then a nation, then a 
coalition of nations, then all humanity, and finally, its influence is felt in the dealings of man 
with the animal world.‖
667
 Lecky felt that our moral conscience was progressing given that 
we were in the process of extending our beneficence to more classifications of people, and 
indeed eventually animals. Whilst I will return to this point, I raise it presently to draw 
parallels with sociobiology. If we recall the theories of sociobiology discussed in Chapter 
Two, we can trace a similar expanding circle of moral relevance though in this case from a 
genetic perspective; altruistic actions emerge from natural selection as a result of the benefit 
they bring to copies of genes in their kin (kin selection). Such altruistic actions however, can 
then extend to include the group; an altruistic group‘s genes may fare better in the fight for 
survival (group selection). In cases where organisms develop more efficacious memory, 
foresight and the ability to recognise others, individuals of a more distant relation can 
benefit from behaving altruistically towards each other given the prospect that such acts can 
later be reciprocated (reciprocal altruism). So as Lecky put forth the idea of our expanding 
moral circle from family to class to nation, sociobiology can also trace an expanding moral 
circle from kin to groups to unrelated individuals outside one‘s group. Morality can thus be 
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 There is however, an important distinction between the moral development as 
explicated by Lecky and that of sociobiology; namely that of teleology. In the case of 
Lecky‘s expanding moral circle, such an expansion could be considered conscious, 
intentional, or indeed teleological. In the case of sociobiology, the developmental expansion 
of the moral circle is guided only by the laws of natural selection; it is not conscious, indeed, 
one could even question whether such behaviour should be classified as ‗moral‘. Peter 
Singer, who takes the title of his work The Expanding Circle from Lecky‘s quote above, 
notes this point as he states that when speaking in terms of genetic motivations, we are 
speaking in terms of consequentialism, and not in any normative ethical sense.
669
 Despite 
this clear point of difference, the evolutionary worldview espoused here sees no ontological 
discontinuity between the ‗moral‘ behaviour evident in the natural world which is governed 
in general by genetic ‗motives‘ and the moral behaviour of humans; consciousness and 
morality are evident in other animals – ours differs only by matter of degree. It can still be 
maintained though, that human consciousness is uniquely complex, and thus, it can be 
proper to speak in terms of intentionality with respect to human moral behaviour in a way 
which is not possible when speaking of altruism in ants, birds, etc. 
 As discussed in section 3.3.1, human consciousness represents a significant 
landmark in evolutionary history; as Teilhard and others suggested, it allows for an 
unreflective process to become reflective. It allows for a supernormal morality, or indeed, a 
supernormal freedom. Even on a material evolutionary worldview, it is still intelligible to 
speak of human nature and human morality in a normative sense – it was detailed in section 
2.3.1 how evolutionary understandings of human morality do not limit its legitimacy. 
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Moreover, as outlined above, human freedom understood in terms of the incomprehensible 
versatility of material brain states, need not deny freedom – even if it is not ontologically 
indeterminate. From this perspective, there is a development from our behaviour being 
governed more prominently by our genes, to being governed more prominently by our 
conscious thought. Our motives for moral behaviour are no longer purely associated with 
our genetic predispositions, but are now also predicated on our reasoned ‗good will‘ to use 
Kant‘s terminology.
670
 From this point, the development of conscious intentions now allows 
for teleology – we can consciously govern our moral behaviour for a purpose. In respect of 
teleology in moral development, the question arises of the telos or goal. I will address this 
question in the next section from a theological context 
 It is important to note that this understanding is not to convey a situation where our 
moral behaviour developed from one sphere (genetic intentions) to another (conscious or 
cultural intentions). The evolution of human freedom/morality is not a break in the causal 
chain – rather, it represents another, admittedly significant chapter in the long narrative of 
evolution. Conscious morality works in addition to evolved morality. Human conscious 
morality can be considered teleological in a way that pre-human morality cannot – though 
this teleology is an additional step in the development of morality and not an ontologically 
‗new‘ step as in the case of divine command ethics or divinely instituted goodness. In this 
regard, Singer suggests that viewing morality as evolved through nature ―upset‖ the 
prevailing wisdom among psychologists – who generally focused on the cultural and 
educational development of our morals – as it suggests an innate morality.
671
 However, 
evolutionary perspectives of moral development need not stand in opposition to 
developmental theories of morality; the two can easily coexist. Evolutionary ethics provides 
a substantial foundation for our understanding of where morals came from, but it does not 
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preclude our cultural influences. Again, even stalwart evolutionists will acknowledge the 
role of human conscious thought, and hence culture, education, and other factors in our 
morality. 
 This vision of morality as a long sequential development – conscious morality 
being another phase in the process – leads me to the argument that morality is continuing to 
develop. Altruistic behaviour became more prevalent in the evolutionary tree as the circle of 
relevance expanded from genes to kin to group, etc. even though at that point it might not 
necessarily be considered ‗moral‘. After the advent of human consciousness however, 
speaking of such behaviour as moral becomes intelligible, though this does not mean that the 
chain of moral development is broken. Rather, it is continuous. Congruently, it is suggested 
here that humanity is continuing to develop morally – in short, we are becoming ‗more 
moral‘ (note here the interesting parallels with John Hick‘s understanding of Irenaeus in 
section 3.5.1). This sentiment was also put forth by Darwin – though he had not drawn the 
direct links between such moral development and evolutionary theory that I seek to here; he 
seems to be speaking solely in terms of human morality. Darwin suggests, ―And it is 
admitted by moralists of the derivative school and by some intuitionists, that the standard of 
morality has risen since an early period in the history of man.‖
672
 More contemporary 
theorists have agreed, for example the linguist and political commentator Noam Chomsky, 
as he suggests that, ―... my general feeling is that over time, there‘s measurable progress – 
it‘s not huge, but it‘s significant.‖
673
 Can this apparent moral progress be evidenced? I argue 
that it can, though somewhat tentatively.  
 The Berkeley philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah offers a useful description of a 
moral revolution as a ―rapid transformation in moral behaviour, not just in moral 
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 On this definition, it could be argued that in general, rapid transformations in 
moral behaviour have been more numerous, prevalent and significant in recent centuries 
than over previous centuries or indeed millennia in human history. It is important that it is 
understood that I speak intentionally and consciously in general terms, and indeed 
tentatively on this point. There are obvious objections to the assertion that we are more 
ethically mature in recent history as there are salient instances of repugnant moral behaviour 
evident in the world today; violent conflicts in certain regions, for instance. Moreover, we 
are faced in modern times with immense ethical dilemmas of our own making; 
environmental issues, threats of nuclear war, or more ambivalent issues such as preventing 
aging, perhaps resulting in unsustainable population expansion.  
 Philip Kitcher also signifies moral subjectivity as a distinct objection which could 
be raised against the assertion of moral progression.
675
 Kitcher distinguishes between ―mere 
change‖ – that moral codes change – and moral progression. It might be clear that moral 
codes have changed, though this cannot be taken as grounds for asserting progression. A 
presupposition of moral progress is that our current ethical code, or one we envisage 
following the future, is ‗better‘ than a previous code or alternative code; in order to consider 
the concept of progress, one must adopt a form of moral objectivism and demand moral 
truths, otherwise, how could one moral vision be considered ‗better‘? This issue can be 
overcome, Kitcher feels, by emphasising progress rather than truth; that progress brings 
truth, ―ethical progress is prior to ethical truth, and truth is what you get by making 
progressive steps (truth is attained in the limit of progressive transitions; truth ‗happens to an 
idea‘).‖
676
  Moreover, Kitcher also points out that even when certain consensuses are 
reached with regard to moral issues, human behaviour is so multifaceted that certain moral 
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progressions may not be ―uncontroversially positive in all respects.‖
677
 He notes that there 
may be disadvantages to certain moral developments, slight in comparison to the large 
positive gains, but existent nonetheless. He gives the example of increased freedom for 
women – a positive gain – which may bring about anxieties of newfound freedom, for 
instance.
678
  A more stark example could be the potential elimination of hunger – a positive 
moral gain – which may exacerbate the issue of unsustainable population expansion. 
Essentially, it is evident that moral progression is a complicated issue. 
 Those caveats being acknowledged, there have been substantial and expedient 
moral revolutions in the last few centuries, even in the last one hundred years, which have 
achieved a degree of moral consensus, even if we acknowledge the difficulties in asserting 
moral claims. For example, although violent conflicts still occur on a large scale, they are 
less frequent and incite more moral outrage than in previous times. Following the brutality 
of the Second World War, the United Nations was established in part, to ―to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow 
to mankind.‖
679
 Although critics such as American Historian Howard Zinn have argued that 
the United Nations is heavily influenced by Western imperialism, the establishment of such 
an organisation can be interpreted to represent a conscious progression in humanity‘s 
attempts to better ourselves morally.
680
 It signified a global consensus that war was morally 
wrong and steps should be taken to avoid it. Similar developments such as the Geneva 
conventions (1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949) and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons (1970) can be taken as further evidence that humanity‘s moral conscience is 
developing. Undoubtedly, there are political issues, ambiguities, and nuances that exist 
pertaining to such treaties, but these are far beyond the scope of this thesis. I merely seek to 
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use these examples as legitimate evidence of moral progression, despite their imperfections 
or multifaceted motivations. 
 Further evidence can be taken from the decline in prejudicial treatment of people 
based on ―race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status‖, to use the terminology of the United Nations‘ 
Declaration of Human Rights.
681
 Although of course, such declarations are not always 
honoured, the establishment of such a charter can be taken as further evidence of moral 
progress; a collective consensus on moral issues. In the last century, we have seen the 
enactment of civil rights in the United States in 1964 and the end of apartheid in South 
Africa in 1994 which were steps towards curtailing discrimination based on race. In my own 
country, Ireland, we have seen legal rights extended to curtail discrimination against women. 
For example, women were not permitted to maintain an employed position in the Irish 
public service after they were married until 1973, nor had they any legal rights to a family 
home once married until 1976, even if they were the sole income provider. Similar 
developments are evident with respect to discrimination based on sexual orientation; to 
again use Ireland as an example, homosexuality was decriminalised in 1993. Again, whilst 
these developments may be vulnerable to criticism from a variety of standpoints, I argue that 
they signal significant ―rapid transformations in moral behaviour‖ to re-use Appiah‘s 
definition of a moral revolution. They represent collective statements against various forms 
of discrimination. As Chomsky suggests, certain moral issues such as slavery and feminism 
have essentially been solved – not in the sense that there is no slavery or subjugation of 
women in the modern world, but in the sense that a moral consensus has been reached with 
regard to these issues.
682
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 To further the argument that morality is progressing, the role that recent 
technological developments may have on moral progression must also be acknowledged. If 
we accept that moral progression stems from a widening of our circle of moral relevance, 
then the exponential growth in technological developments such as the internet and mass 
media could be playing a powerful role. The advances in global communications have led to 
a metaphorical shrinking of our global village – geographical boundaries no longer prevent 
communication between diverse cultures. As a result of globalisation, we are becoming 
more familiar with other cultures, and thus, more inclined to see each other as morally 
relevant. Moreover, the fact that moral atrocities can be communicated instantly and 
globally brings about a further moral awakening. A prominent example is the role of social 
networks in inciting the Egyptian revolution in 2010.
683
 Technological developments may be 
interpreted in this way as promulgating the expansion of our moral circle. Advances, 
particularly in communications, may be a serious contributory factor in the increasing 
number of moral revolutions in the last number of decades since the development of mass 
media; the extent of this would require a more full investigation of this point, which would 
be beyond the scope of this thesis, though may be a fruitful question for future research. 
 Appiah, who takes as examples the ceasing of practices such as duelling, foot-
binding, slavery and honour killings to indicate moral progression, feels that such 
progression is driven by what he terms ‗honour‘.
684
 Appiah‘s use of the term ‗honour‘ may 
be problematic, given that honour may also be associated with pride, and in some senses 
consequently, with practices he has already deemed immoral (his examples of duelling and 
honour killings are based on a certain understanding of honour). Appiah however, equates 
his understanding of honour with Hegel‘s notion of Anerkennung, or in English, 
‗recognition‘. Hegel postulated that an unequal relationship, such as that between a lord and 
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bondsman, prevents self-recognition in both parties. Self-recognition for Hegel is only 
possible in relation to an ‗other‘ – it is the recognition of an ‗other‘ as a self-conscious 
being. If this recognition is achieved, then the inequality of the master-slave relationship will 
be overcome.
685
 This concept of recognising others or acknowledging their ‗honour‘ drives 
moral progress. As Appiah explains, a distinctive feature of the last few centuries has been a 
―growing appreciation of the obligations each of us has to other people.‖
686
 Chomsky also 
agrees upon historical reflection, ―Over history, there‘s been a real widening of the moral 
realm. I think – a recognition of broader and broader domains of individuals who are 
regarded as moral agents, meaning having rights.‖
687
 
 Darwin put forth similar sentiments, though again, his links between moral 
development and evolutionary theory were more implicit than those argued for in this thesis. 
He echoes Lecky in his description of the widening of who becomes encompassed as 
morally relevant:  
 
As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger 
communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to 
extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same 
nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached, 
there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the 
men of all nations and races. If, indeed, such men are separated from him by 
great differences in appearance or habits, experience unfortunately shews us 




Although Darwin acknowledges this moral expansion, he also alludes to the fact that our 
moral sentiments are far stronger for our closer relatives, which would be consistent with the 
theories of sociobiology.
689
 Therefore, I suggest that although human conscious morality has 
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significantly developed from its biological roots, ultimately, the expansion of our circle of 
morally relevant others is a continuation of the expansion of ‗moral‘ relevance in 
sociobiological theory. 
 This expansion of moral relevance, I argue, can be understood as a continuation of 
the expansion of beneficiaries of altruistic behaviour from genes to kin and so on through 
sociobiology – though of course, continually bearing in mind that such altruistic behaviour 
is consequential and not normative. The issue of whether this expansion of moral relevance 
is teleological then becomes apparent. This complex issue was discussed in wider terms in 
Chapters Three and Four, where I argued that there does not seem to be an a priori teleology 
in the evolutionary process. With respect to moral evolution, the same is argued to be true, 
given that the process itself is decidedly non-teleological. Philosophers such as Michael 
Ruse have argued that even though teleological language is beneficial for our understanding 
of biology, it is important that we acknowledge that such teleology is retrospectively 
attributed.
690
 Similarly, teleological descriptions of evolutionary ethics can only be validly 
discussed retrospectively. The absence of a discernable teleology in evolution does not, 
however, preclude notions such as development and progress. Consequently, it is maintained 
that the development or progress in evolutionary ethics, which was a priori non-teleological, 
continues today, and has become more expedient in recent centuries with the perennial 
expansion of moral relevance.  
  In addition, evolutionary theory may also exacerbate this moral expansion given 
that our knowledge of evolutionary theory indicates our close genetic relationship with other 
animals, which may be taken as support for extending our moral circle to include other 
animals. Singer addresses this question by suggesting that our genetic relationship to other 
animals as made known through evolutionary theory makes it ―as arbitrary to restrict the 
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principle of equal consideration to interests of our own species as it would be to restrict it to 
our own race.‖
691
 The potential for drawing ethical conclusions from evolutionary theory is 
not the central issue here; I merely seek to argue that the expansion of our moral circle is a 
development from the original, non-conscious, non-teleological expansion of ‗moral‘ 
relevance evident through sociobiology theory – though evolutionary theory may also offer 
us reason to promulgate this moral expansion. This gives us reason to infer an optimistic 
worldview. The proposition that morality is continually progressing then, gives further 
support to a hopeful theology. At this point, a more specifically theological appropriation of 
moral progress will be discussed. 
 
5.5 A Christian Interpretation of Moral Evolution 
Throughout this thesis, a framework for understanding ethics has been sketched; I argue, a 
framework that, having acknowledged scientific advances and evolutionary theory, is more 
enriched and more coherent than the traditionally dominant frameworks of classical 
theology such Augustine‘s version of the fall/original sin – though this is of course not to 
understate the significant contribution to our understanding made by the Augustinian vision, 
as discussed in Chapter One. In a way that is consistent with theology and science, a 
representation of ethics has been presented from the origins of ethics to current moral 
progression. As this pertains to the central argument of this thesis, how evolutionary ethics 
can contribute to a hopeful theology, two distinct facets of hope can be discerned. Firstly, 
the fact that goodness and freedom emerged out of a purely material world offers a glimmer 
of hope in what might otherwise be considered a nihilistic, amoral universe of inevitability. 
Secondly, it is suggested that morality is in a process of development, from its origins as 
discussed in sociobiological theory to the current widening of our circle of moral relevance 
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which, I have argued, is in general, progressing significantly in recent human history. This 
view will now be incorporated into a Christian perspective and culminate with three 
theological conclusions; firstly, from a Christian perspective this evolutionary view on 
ethics gives us a teleological axiology. Secondly, it is an axiology that places emphasis on 
our present moral obligations, and thirdly, it suggests that we are making progress towards 
the moral telos.  
 The developmental vision of ethics under discussion fits neatly with theological 
representations appreciative of the evolutionary nature of the world such as the theological 
vision espoused in Chapter Three. However, comparative resemblance will not suffice for a 
full theological reading of evolutionary ethics. To further demonstrate how Christian ethics 
could be synthesised with this evolutionary approach, it is argued that Christian ethics may 
offer a telos; an end, purpose or goal. This goal, I suggest, is the Christian notion of agape, 
which I have already signified in Chapter Two as a key feature of my understanding of 
Christian ethics. The concept of agape or indiscriminate neighbourly love may be 
considered as the ultimate expansion of our morally relevant circle (however, and only for 
the sake of focus, I will not specifically address the question of whether animals should be 
considered morally relevant – I leave this question for future ethical research).  
 An expansion of the circle of moral relevance to include even one‘s enemies is, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, a distinguishing factor of Christian ethics. The expansion of who 
we consider morally relevant can be identified as a key feature of the ethical thought of 
Jesus. As Hans Küng observes, the inclusion of enemies in our circle of moral relevance sets 
Jesus‘ ethical thinking apart from previous ethical systems, ―It is typical of Jesus not to 
recognise the ingrained frontier and estrangement between those of one‘s own group and 
those outside it.‖
692
 Among the numerous biblical instances where this theme in Christian 
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thought is conveyed, two distinct passages can be taken as examples; the Sermon on the 
Mount and the parable of the Good Samaritan – though biblical scholar John Piper in his 
study of Jesus‘ love commandment indicates several alternative pertinent texts.
693
 At the 
Sermon on the mount, Jesus explicates his vision for an indiscriminate love, and an 
inclusion of enemies into our moral conscience, ―You have heard that it was said, ‗You shall 
love your neighbour and hate your enemy.‘
 
But I say to you, Love your enemies and pray for 
those who persecute you‖ (Matt. 5:43-44).  
 Similarly, the inclusion of ‗others‘ in our moral circle who would have previously 
been excluded is evident in the act of the Samaritan; an act of kindness towards a socio-
religious ‗other‘ (Luke 10:30-37). In this parable, not only is the inclusion of others as 
morally relevant apparent, but it is the traditional enemy that provides the example to be 
followed, As Küng again explains, ―... it sets up as an example, not – as Jesus‘ hearers might 
have expected – the Jewish layman, but the hated Samaritan, the national enemy, the half-
breed and heritic. Jews and Samaritans cursed each other publically in religious services and 
would not accept assistance from one another.‖
694
 The call of agape transcends social and 
religious differences and recognises the other not only as morally relevant, but as an 
exemplar of righteousness. This is a Christian notion that, as theologian Ronald Green 
argues, envisages acts of compassion beyond the bounds of one‘s community – broadening 
the circle of moral relevance.
695
 These two passages (the Sermon on the Mount and the 
Good Samaritan) can therefore be taken as exemplars of Christian agape; an unconditional 
love of distant others, even one‘s enemies. 
 It is suggested then, that Jesus‘ attempts to widen the moral circle to be inclusive of 
enemies and more distant others could be taken as a precursor to the visions presented by 
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Lecky, Darwin and others noted in the previous section. Furthermore, on the Christian view, 
such an expansion is not merely developmental, but explicitly teleological. With respect to 
this issue, Küng makes an interesting observation about Jesus‘ motives for expanding the 
circle; his motives are a perfect imitation of God.
696
 If this theological point is 
acknowledged, and as I argued in section 3.4 that values reflect the divine/offer a glimmer of 
depth, then a decidedly theological and teleological addendum can be incorporated into the 
evolutionary view of ethics. Altruistic behaviour emerged from a non-teleological process, 
but if conscious human values are taken to carry theological connotations, i.e. reflect divine 
values, then human moral evolution can be considered teleological; it is widening to a point 
of ultimacy which seeks to, as Küng states, imitate God. Jesus‘ ethical vision of the 
inclusion of morally relevant others can be taken as an indicator of this teleology. 
 Notwithstanding this argument, I do not suggest that the now teleological 
expansion of moral relevance is exclusively Christian; other traditions may exhibit similar or 
identical goals. Here is where I depart from a number of other contemporary scholars‘ 
treatments of theological readings of evolutionary ethics such as Neil Messer and Sarah 
Coakley; I take the Christian idea of indiscriminate love of enemies as the epitome of 
expanding the circle of moral relevance, rather than the explicitly theological aspects of 
Christology such as salvation.
697
 The developmental understanding of ethics, which stems 
from an appreciation of evolutionary understandings of ethics is also reminiscent of other 
Christian ethical frameworks in important respects; the teleological widening of the circle of 
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moral relevance could be seen to echo Aquinas‘ notion of the divine law as an end.
698
 Yet 
Aquinas believed that this was an end for all things, where I argue that an ―imitation of the 
divine‖ through moral conduct can only truly be considered as an end in relation to human 
consciousness; our understanding of the evolutionary process and a naturalistic ontology 
suggests a non-teleological world. As I have stressed, it is the fact that goodness and 
teleological moral conduct emerged from the amoral, material world which gives it its due 
significance; it offers a glimmer of hope. 
 The Christian conscious expansion of the circle of moral relevance is thus 
interpreted as a further expansion of altruistic behaviour which sociobiological theory posits 
as the origin of morality. The fact that the Christian ethical programme as I understand it is 
conscious, with agape as its epitome, is a significant distinction between it and 
sociobiology. However, with the naturalistic ontology, there is no ontological difference 
between the two expansions. Thus, envisioning Christian ethics in this way is appreciative of 
evolutionary ethics, and ultimately I argue, emerges enriched; Christian ethics can envisage 
on overarching metaethic inclusive of the natural origins of morality. A full appreciation of 
evolutionary ethics and its naturalistic ontological context not only allows for a normative 
Christian ethics to be developed on the basis of neighbourly love, but actually contributes to 
it. Acknowledging the natural origins of the expanding moral circle, from genes to groups to 
individuals etc., though of course originally only by proxy of natural selection, may provide 
substantial motives to continue such an expansion consciously – again, this reiterates the 
similarities with the dialectical vision of natural law; a conscious reflection upon natural 
tendencies. We can evidence a historical, evolutionary tendency of an expanding moral 
circle, offering us a hopeful theology from a material worldview.  
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 In addition, as it was argued in section 3.6, whilst the developmental aspects of 
eschatological theologies (those of Teilhard, Haught and others) are appropriate 
interpretations in light of evolutionary theory, they may relegate our present responsibilities 
giving way to a promissory vision, which whilst hopeful, is too distant. Eschatological 
theology places the telos of God at the Omega. Yet our understandings of cosmological time 
indicate that this would seriously dilute our present responsibilities, given that the 
cosmological time-span is exponentially greater than that of our lives, or even of human 
history. However, the synthesis of Christian ethics and evolutionary ethics I have argued for 
above posits a very present telos. It is a telos that, in theory, is within the grasp of our 
lifetime – indeed, it was/is within the grasp of any human generation –  though this is not to 
suggest that it will actually be realised; time will tell. It is a telos that is a part of a 
metaphysical framework for ethics, but a metaphysical framework that is not intangible; a 
realisable telos. The fact such a telos is actually within reach gives us further reason for a 
hopeful theology, perhaps more hopeful than the theologies of eschatology and futurity 
evident in Haught, Pannenberg, Rahner and others discussed in section 3.4. 
 Having reflected upon evolutionary ethics, a theological axiology can be 
developed; one that incorporates both Christian ethics and evolutionary theory. Three 
discernable features of this axiology emerge: Firstly, it is an axiology that provides us with a 
goal. This goal, moreover, is not cosmological in time scale or metaphysically 
eschatological, but inherently temporal. It is an immanent telos, in line with a hermeneutical 
emphasis on the earthliness of the Christian prayer, ―On Earth as it is in Heaven‖ (Matt. 
6:10) – though this hermeneutical emphasis on earthliness may be selective. An emphasis on 
earthliness does not contradict the emphasis on the transcendent, atemporal God espoused in 
the previous chapter, but rather focuses on the imitation or reflection of God – which could 
be understood as the Kingdom of God. The understanding of Christian ethics with a goal of 
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promulgating the expanding moral circle is presented in one sense, as a part of a 
metaphysical naturalistic framework. However, it is also presented dialectically from a 
theological perspective as an immanent coming of the Kingdom of God. God is understood 
as ontologically transcendent though immanently reflected in human values. 
 The second feature of this axiology is that it places serious emphasis on our present 
responsibilities. It is not complacent in awaiting a metaphysical, eschatological Kingdom of 
God at the Omega, but seeks to establish a Kingdom of God in the present. It seeks to 
continue the expansion of morally relevant others that I have argued is perennially 
increasing with general consensuses being reached with regard to war and to eliminating 
discrimination based on race, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, and so on; in other 
words, encompassing more peoples as morally relevant. The pinnacle of this expansion, I 
have suggested, is the Christian understanding of agape, though the question remains over 
whether we will reach this pinnacle. Nevertheless, it is an earthly pinnacle and a pinnacle 
that we are responsible for attaining. A third feature is, as argued above, that we are 
progressing towards this telos. Although there is undoubted misery in the world and morally 
repugnant acts are prevalent, when speaking in general terms, we do seem to be making 
identifiable positive progress. We have reason to infer an optimistic reading of this axiology 
given that we are coming closer to achieving the telos of Christian agape.  
 
 5.6 Conclusion 
The scientific picture of the world, incomplete as it may be, offers then an ontological 
perspective which, I argue, can be understood to give hope. In a material and contingent 
universe, the moral evolved from the amoral; mindless matter became self-reflective, and 
the goalless process of natural selection produced altruism and eventually, the notion of 
agape. This evolution of values from the valueless offers, I argue, hope; it allows one to 
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proffer an overarching hopeful metaphysic, rather than viewing the world as nihilistic. In 
order to illustrate how it can be maintained that our actions are significantly free as to have 
moral worth, yet also that the world is purely physical, it was suggested in section 5.1 that 
freedom emerges from the complexities of the physical brain. This model of free will, it was 
argued, is sufficient for actions to have moral worth. Section 5.2 then suggested how this 
evolution of moral freedom may be understood to give hope. A theological interpretation of 
this hopeful understanding of the evolution of morality and freedom was then discussed in 
section 5.3, reiterating how values are understood in this context to be indicative of depth. 
 It was then outlined in section 5.4, how a developmental vision of morality can be 
taken from our understanding of sociobiology, which sees the further development of 
morality in humankind as a continuation of the development of altruistic behaviour in other 
forms of life. It was argued that, in general, moral progress can be evidenced among 
humankind in more recent times, from various international treaties to moral consensuses 
being reached with regard to various modes of discrimination. This moral progress can be 
used to further contribute to a hopeful worldview. This hopeful understanding of moral 
progress was then appropriated from a Christian theological perspective in section 5.5, 
arguing that the Christian concept of agape can be considered as the telos of our moral 
development. It was argued that humanity is progressing towards this moral pinnacle that is 
potentially achievable in the present. Ultimately, then, a framework for understanding ethics 
can be proffered which demonstrates how evolutionary understandings of ethics can enrich 









In this thesis, a proposal was set forth for a hopeful theological perspective on the nature of 
ethics as understood within the scheme of evolutionary theory. It was contended that 
evolutionary theory should be treated as a substantive resource concerning the nature of 
ethics. This theological framework for envisioning good and evil was presented in line with 
particular presuppositions of Christian ethics; namely, that the epitome of morality lies with 
the unqualified extension of beneficence to all others, inclusive of one‘s enemies and in 
particular the most vulnerable. Retrospectively, we can portray the evolution of morality as 
developmental, from amorality to its epitome. However, it is only since the emergence of 
human consciousness and free will that morality can truly be considered teleological and be 
meaningfully differentiated from evolutionarily functional behaviour. An overarching vision 
was put forth which views altruistic behaviour as emerging from its origins as selectively 
beneficial to the point where human consciousness eventually advocates an unqualified 
expansion of moral relevance, explicated in this context in the Christian ideal of agape and 
neighbourly love. 
 Evolutionary theory offers us the best principles available to us to understand life, 
human life being one strand amongst hundreds of millions to have ever existed. The 
significance of human life is arguable; is it a trivial detail that through human life, the 
mindless matter of the universe has become mindful, or is it truly indicative of a wider 
purpose? In either case, what is clear is that we cannot be excised from the narrative of life. 
We are an element of it. The universality of our religious and moral experience are 
important facets of human life, and whilst these require higher-level analysis, it would be 
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negligent to ignore the perspectives offered by evolutionary theory; the best framework 
available to us for understanding life.  
 The pre-scientific reflections on our moral nature which constructed the traditional 
theological narratives have great insight – for example original sin, which parallels the 
natural competitiveness which lingers as a result of our evolutionary heritage. Yet these 
reflections need to adapt and take note of new reflections, particularly those which come 
with the strength of scientific verifiability. Although moral behaviour is highly sensitive to 
psychological motives and circumstances, to undervalue the influence of our biological 
history would significantly diminish the comprehensiveness of any analysis of human 
nature, be it philosophical, sociological or indeed in this case, theological. Anselm defined 
theology as ‗faith seeking understanding‘ and it is felt that based on its predictive successes 
and experimental strength, the natural sciences offer us the clearest way to understand the 
natural world, including ourselves.   
 The scientific picture of the world presents the universe as a vast expanse of 
collocating atoms which a priori has no discernable goal or purpose in and of itself. Within 
this context too, the prevailing view of evolutionary theory can be summated in Monod‘s 
expression of ‗chance and necessity‘. Humanity has undoubtedly ascribed significant 
meaning to itself, though our place on the cosmic stage in relation to the vastness of the 
spatial and temporal scales made known through the natural sciences can seem 
disconcerting, and can lead to the interpretation of nihilism. However, the alternative may be 
even more disconcerting; a world that has a distinctive plan may lead one to believe that 
instances of evil are then the consequence and thus responsibility of a divine planner. It was 
argued against these interpretations that although the world is indeed an impenetrable causal 
web, it is not desolate or forsaken; goodness has emerged, through whatever improbability, 
and this it is argued, is indicative of depth, profundity and reflective of the divine. From the 
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material amoral universe of collocating atoms came the phenomena of the good. The 
incredibility of this facet of the universe offers us a glimmer of hope. In viewing the 
Christian vision of agape as the pinnacle of a moral development that has its origins in 
evolutionarily beneficial altruism, one can envisage a hopeful overarching view of ethics 
whilst being true to the picture of the world presented by the natural sciences. 
 Developing a theological worldview in conjunction with what we learn from 
naturalistic perspectives on ethics also provides a sense of immanence absent from the 
traditional U-profiled theological narratives of a paradisiacal past to be restored in an 
eschatological future. The viability of such narratives is deeply problematic in light of 
evolutionary theory in any case, but even still, the proposed naturalistic framework places 
emphasis on the achievability of the moral epoch in the present. It was optimistically 
inferred from an admittedly general overview of human moral history that we can be 
evidenced to be progressing morally; on the whole, equality and moral relevance is more 
prevalent now than in previous ages. Of course such a progression could not be systematic; 
indeed evolutionary theory itself differs from macro-physics in this regard – it operates 
largely through tendencies rather than inalienable laws. Notwithstanding, an expansion of 
the circle of morally relevant others, allegorically illustrated in the Christian tradition 
through the parable of the Good Samaritan, can be roughly traced. 
 In the first chapter of this work the departure point for the argument was 
explicated; the acknowledgement that theological understandings of the nature of ethics 
have been traditionally or classically framed in a certain way; namely that goodness was 
directly attributed to God and instilled in creation. The problem of the existence of evil thus 
required a theodicy. Addressing this quandary led to a framework for understanding good 
and evil depicted in the theological narrative as a paradise gone awry as a result of human 
fault, followed by a long period of suffering-as-punishment to be eventually redeemed. 
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However, the viability of such frameworks is precarious in light of the dynamic nature of 
evolution. Evolutionary theory challenges central facets of the classical vision, perhaps most 
saliently in terms of its postulation of a preordained good. Holding a vision of the nature of 
ethics that is at variance with our increasing comprehension of the natural world was argued 
to be untenable. Therefore, the need for a re-imagined metaethic was signalled in Chapter 
One.  
  Having acknowledged that evolutionary theory necessitates a reframing of 
theological metaethics, the question of the compatibility of evolutionary ethics and Christian 
ethics was considered in the second chapter. A particular understanding of what 
evolutionary ethics and Christian ethics were understood to entail was presented, followed 
by an analysis of potential conflicts between the two systems with regard to three central 
facets of Christian ethics; moral freedom, agape and neighbourly love, and natural law. It 
was argued that on my understanding of these two systems, conflict does not arise. 
Evolutionary ethics provides a scheme for understanding morality based on the principles of 
competition in natural selection which does not supersede Christian ethics but as illustrated 
later in this work, frames and enriches it. A normative Christian ethical system can coexist 
with an evolutionary understanding of the nature of ethics itself. 
 In order to provide a theological outlook that shifts from a pre-established good as 
in the traditional framework for good and evil, it was suggested in Chapter Three that 
aspects of contemporary theological approaches be reflected upon and refined. The 
developmental aspect of certain approaches to theology were incorporated given that it 
reflects the evolutionary nature of the world, however, it was argued that the explicitly 
teleological aspects of eschatological theologies are problematic in light of evolutionary 
theory. In addition, a developmental approach to theological metaethics as evident in Hick‘s 
representation of Irenaeus was noted as a partial response to the theodicy question which 
247 
 
was left unaddressed after the classical expiatory theodicy was discredited. Whilst Hick 
presented an overarching approach to theodicy, I argued that such an approach was only 
sufficient with regard to moral evil. Moreover, rather than postulating a future perfection to 
come (in an eschaton or afterlife), it was argued that evolutionary ethics provides a more 
immanent and present understanding of our moral responsibilities. 
 The need to address the problem of natural evil was the starting point for the fourth 
chapter, though it also sought to establish an ontology implied by the natural sciences and 
consider how this ontology might fit within a wider theological view. It was argued that the 
image of the world presented by the natural sciences is material and naturalistic; naturalism 
in this context was presented as an ontology that precluded any mode of divine interaction 
with the world, acknowledging that certain models of divine interaction could themselves be 
considered naturalistic. Arguments for such a view were premised on the predictive 
successes and coherence of science. Furthermore, the implications of teleological 
perspectives and divine interactions for the problem of evil were also considered and taken 
as further theological reasons to envisage an ontology preclusive of divine interaction. 
Whilst this perspective could be interpreted as inimical to religious outlooks, it was argued 
that a naturalistic ontology can be theologically appropriated apropos the themes of divine 
kenosis, autonomy and atemporality. Envisioning the world in this way, however, presents a 
distinct problem for the theological presuppositions of a God of values – namely, the 
interpretation of nihilism.  
 The culmination of this thesis was reached in Chapter Five, where it was suggested 
that a turn to a compatibilist model of free will can reconcile the materialism of a naturalistic 
ontology with the necessary prerequisite of morality; freedom. It was then argued that the 
distinctly evitable emergence of the moral from the amoral offers a glimmer of hope in a 
world that would otherwise be a valueless manifestation of interacting atoms. In addition, it 
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was argued that a vision of morality which noted the human conscious expression of 
morality as an additional development within the broader process of evolutionary ethics 
provides an overarching perspective on the nature of ethics. It is in this perspective that we 
can see hope, meaning and a reflection of the divine. It was also tentatively but evidentially 
argued that in general, there is a discernable progression within human morality; there is a 
more prevalent cohesion among humanity pertaining to moral relevance than in previous 
ages. This provides further hope from the evolutionary understanding of moral development. 
Finally, the Christian notion of indiscriminate neighbourly love was suggested as the telos 
for this moral development, providing a hopeful outlook that stresses the achievability of the 
Christian moral vision as well as our responsibilities in realising this vision.   
 Although this thesis has presented a new approach to envisioning theological 
metaethics, it is not suggested that this is the last word. I have advocated an overarching 
theological view with respect to ethics, though there is further discussion needed on the 
intricacies of this picture. I suspect that research will be needed to investigate or propose 
what actually constitutes the realisation of the Christian moral vision, given the difficulties 
societies have in establishing moral precepts amenable to all people.  Moreover, whilst I 
have argued that the Christian notion of agape is the telos of moral development, this idea is 
clearly open to hermeneutical reflection; how broad is the Christian commandment of 
neighbourly love? Are primates, or even other mammals to be included? Framing ethics as a 
development from its naturalistic context rather than within the narrative of a fall may also 
have implications for the sources of moral authority; if ethics emerges as a reasoned 
reflection upon our nature, then what conclusions can be drawn with regard to scripture, 
tradition, fact/value distinctions, and other premises. Undoubtedly too, future scientific 
advances will present unforeseen moral dilemmas; for example, by envisioning mental 
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events as material, then what ethical rights would be afforded to potential artificial 
intelligences? These are fascinating potential issues that will require further reflection.  
 The theological framework advanced in this thesis allows one to envisage Christian 
ethics in a way that maintains the centrality of Christian ethics, understood here as agape, 
yet acknowledges the conceptual setting understood through the natural sciences as 
naturalistic and material. In acknowledging the naturalistic context/nature of ethics, it forces 
us to reflect on our responsibilities towards its development; ethics were not instilled from 
on high through a divine covenant but ultimately the result of the interplay between our 
reason and nature. The view espoused does not locate the summum bonum of goodness in an 
eschatological future or lost past, but rather as something to be strived for in the present. It is 
not a view resigned to nihilism or futility but advocates the establishment of an earthly 
kingdom which reflects divine values. It allows an ultimately hopeful vision which 
recognises the theological presuppositions of a God of values whilst being dialectically 
mindful of insights of the natural sciences. In humanity, we see a transition from altruism as 
evolutionary functional behaviour to a genuine morality. Therefore, we can provide a 
hopeful and enriched envisioning of the Christian moral challenge as a conscious extension 
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Het doel van deze studie is het articuleren van een theologische meta-ethiek die de aard van 
de ethiek accepteert zoals die begrepen kan worden in het licht van de evolutietheorie. Er zal 
worden betoogd dat een dergelijke theologische meta-ethiek kan worden geïnterpreteerd als 
hoopvol en optimistisch, gezien de evolutie van moraal uit het amorele.  
 De beginselen van evolutionaire theorie kunnen worden toegepast om voorbij de 
grenzen van de biologie een Weltanschauung te ontwikkelen. Daarbij moet ook worden 
gelet op de aanzienlijke implicaties die de acceptatie van het wetenschappelijke denken 
heeft voor het denken over goed en kwaad. De auteur acht het van belang om te komen tot 
een hervorming van de theologische metaethiek op een wijze die volledige waardering toont 
voor de inzichten van de natuurwetenschappen in het algemeen, en die van de evolutionaire 
ethiek in het bijzonder. Daarom wordt in deze studie de theologische vooronderstelling van 
een op waarde gerichte God verweven met de naturalistische, materialistische 
vooronderstellingen van het moderne wetenschappelijke wereldbeeld. Het gaat de auteur 
daarbij niet om een theïstische interpretatie van evolutie of om apologetiek voor traditionele 
theologische overtuigingen, maar om het accepteren van de evolutionaire ethiek in toto en 
het integreren daarvan in een wereldbeeld waarbinnen de levensvatbaarheid van bepaalde 
theologische thema‘s opnieuw wordt geëvalueerd en een overkoepelende theologische 
metaethiek wordt gereconstrueerd. 
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 In deze studie zal worden aangevoerd dat het in het licht van kennis over de 
evolutie noodzakelijk is te komen tot een herziening van theologische benaderingen van 
goed en kwaad voor zover die verbonden zijn met de gedachte aan een ‗zondeval‘. Bij de 
beoogde herziening van de theologische metaethiek is het van belang dat de context van de 
evolutionaire theorie aandacht krijgt, ons wereldbeeld zoals dat mede bepaald wordt door de 
natuurwetenschappen. Verdedigd wordt dat zowel vanuit een wetenschappelijk perspectief 
als ook vanuit een theologisch perspectief, het meest geschikte wereldbeeld in ontologisch 
opzicht naturalistisch is. Onze natuurwetenschappelijke kennis over causale ketens in het 
universum én theologische bezinning op de problematiek van goed en kwaad passen bij een 
naturalistisch en niet-teleologisch wereldbeeld. Verhalen over een verloren gegane 
volmaaktheid in een paradijselijk verleden en verwachtingen ten aanzien van herstel in een 
eschatologische toekomst zijn niet levensvatbaar in het licht van de evolutie. Het 
voorgestelde naturalistische kader legt de nadruk op de betekenis van moraal in het heden. 
 In de menselijke morele geschiedenis, zo wordt hier verdedigd, is er op hoofdlijnen 
morele vooruitgang, bijvoorbeeld in het denken over morele gelijkwaardigheid van 
verschillende groepen mensen. Er zijn tegenslagen, maar globaal is er sprake van een 
voortdurende uitbreiding van de kring van moreel relevante anderen. Deze verbreding wordt 
in de christelijke traditie allegorisch gepresenteerd door de gelijkenis van de Barmhartige 
Samaritaan. Het theologische kader dat in deze studie naar voren wordt gebracht, maakt het 
mogelijk een christelijke ethiek te overwegen op een manier die centrale motieven van de 
christelijke ethiek zoals in het bijzonder agape, naastenliefde, behoudt, met erkenning van 
het natuurlijke, materiële karakter van het menselijk bestaan, zoals zichtbaar gemaakt door 
de natuurwetenschappen. Indien we het naturalistische kader van de ethiek erkennen, dan 
moeten wij nadenken over onze verantwoordelijkheid in het gebeuren; ethische oordelen 
zijn niet rechtstreeks door God gegeven, maar het resultaat van wisselwerking tussen sociale 
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natuur en redelijke reflectie, zoals die plaats heeft in ons en plaats had in vele voorafgaande 
generaties. In het hier gepresenteerde perspectief is het summum bonum, het hoogste goed, 
niet gelegen in een eschatologische toekomst of een verloren verleden, maar te beschouwen 
als een ideaal waar in het heden naar kan en moet worden gestreefd. Deze evolutie-
accepterende benadering impliceert géén nihilisme of zinloosheid, maar roept op tot het 
werken aan een aardse samenleving als een ‗Koninkrijk‘ dat in de ontwikkeling goddelijke 
waarden weerspiegelt. Het biedt een mogelijkheid voor een uiteindelijk hoopvolle visie die 
de theologische vooronderstellingen van een op waarde gerichte God erkent maar zich ook 
rekenschap geeft van de inzichten van de natuurwetenschappen. We zien in de mensheid een 
overgang van altruïsme als evolutionaire functioneel gedrag naar echte moraal. Daarbij 
aansluitend, zo wordt hier betoogd, kan worden gekomen tot een hoopvolle herziening van 
de christelijke morele uitdaging als een bewuste uitbreiding van de onbewuste natuurlijke 
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